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ABSTRACT
GENDER, IDENTITY AND THE PRODUCTION OF MEANING
SEPTEMBER 1989
TAMSIN E. LORRAINE, B.A., MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE
Ph
. D
. ,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Ann Ferguson
In this dissertation, I argue that writing philosophical
texts is a self-constituting activity as well as a meaning-
producing activity and that both activities are gender-
informed. To do this I develop an interpretive framework
based on some philosophical and psychoanalytic theories of
self viewed from a feminist perspective. The philosophical
theories provide the background and context for a closer
examination of a Lacanian theory of self. The latter is then
critiqued and revised in light of object relations theory and
feminist perspectives on psychoanalysis (in particular, those
of Irigaray and Chodorow) . I then apply this interpretive
framework to specific texts of three philosophers
(Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre) . I target a puzzle of
interpretation presented by each of these texts. With the
help of my interpretive framework I give each text a "gender-
sensitive" reading that resolves the puzzle in an
illuminating way.
Each text demonstrates what I term a variation in male
positioning with its own version of a gender barrier that
precludes certain solutions to problems presented by the
text . By exploring constraints presented by the need to
vi
maintain a particular version of male positioning, I provide
an internal critique of what we might call a "masculinist
"
perspective. Such a critique, by calling attention to the
inherent limitations of three examples of male positioning,
motivates an expansion of that perspective to incorporate
other points of view. I thus hope to demonstrate some ways
in which gender categories inform philosophical "truths" and
to motivate further work on the effects of gender in
philosophical texts. Such work could clarify problems in
self-constituting activity presented by the need to maintain
a partiuclar gender identity, and possibly suggest avenues
for solutions to philosophical problems that would involve
deconstructing gender categories entirely.
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CHAPTER 1
SETTING THE CONTEXT
1 . 1 Introduction
The question of who we are—what kind of creature is a
human being—has been with us for a long time. Philosophers
have made many attempts over the centuries to give the
definitive answer, but the more we probe the question the
more complicated it seems to get. Evolving scientific
procedures to study objects "out there" is difficult enough,
but when the object of study is ourselves, we seem to run
into the paradoxical problem of trying to split ourselves in
two in order to become our own objects of study.
Nowhere is this paradox more apparent than in the
attempts that philosophers have made to theorize about the
self. We feel ourselves to be the subjects of our own
thoughts and actions. My thought is not your thought; you
are not responsible for my actions. Not only am I the
subject of my experiences as I have them, but I can remember
my past experiences as mine, and respond to current
situations as "me". This "me" somehow represents the sum
total of who I am and who I've been--the self to which I
refer all my experiences over the greater part of my life-
span. We all feel we have one, and we suspect that it is a
crucial aspect of being human, and yet when we try to say
just what it is, it slips away from us. We either close our
eyes and stop our ears in the attempt to find it
(Descartes) [ 1 ] , decide it simply doesn't exist (Hume) [2], or
2turn to discussions of personal identity instead
(contemporary analytic philosophers) [3] . And yet a theory of
self a theory about the subjective experience we all have
that my experiences are mine is crucial to our understanding
of human beings as subjects of knowledge, as agents of
action, thought or desire, and as participants in social and
political systems. Human beings are not simply objects whose
behavior can be tabulated and analyzed; they are intentional
agents whose consciousness of themselves and the world they
live in form an inextricable feature of everything they say,
think or do.
The traditional, humanist view of human beings as
unified, rational, self-interested agents, has become
increasingly suspect. In this dissertation I develop an
open-ended theory of self that can meet some of the
challenges of post-modernist attacks on traditional notions
of the self and human subjectivity as well as fulfill some of
the requirements of a feminist concern for social change. In
the attempt to formulate a new approach to self-understanding
that doesn't sacrifice the notions of human agency and
responsibility, I propose the following:
1) that the Hegelian tradition of theorizing self/other
relations is more helpful for developing a theory of self
than the Cartesian tradition.
2) that post-structuralists (in particular, for the purposes
of my project, the French psychoanalyst, Lacan) extend the
Hegelian tradition in a useful way.
3
3)
that feminist literature (in particular, feminist
epistemological standpoint literature and feminist critiques
of psychoanalysis) gives us a basis for including gender in a
theory of self, as well as providing suggestions for
solutions to certain problems of post-structuralist thought.
I am thus proposing an approach to theorizing about the
self rooted in the Hegelian tradition as it extends through
post-structuralist thought, and informed by psychoanalysis
and feminist theory. The theory of self I arrive at will
posit the following:
1) that a theory of self should be a theory about self-
constituting activity rather than about a fixed entity.
2) that this self-constituting activity is informed by
gender
.
3) that self-constituting activity is inextricably linked
with meaning-producing activity.
4) that meaning-producing activity is also gender-informed.
5) that we can trace the process of self-constituting,
meaning-producing activity in the examination of
philosophical texts.
6) that such an examination can yield further insights into
how gender informs self-constituting and meaning-producing
activity
.
7) that this new understanding of the self can give us
insights into how particular perspectives inform and shape
social reality and how we can move toward social change.
4In section 1.2 I will give an overview of this approach
to a theory of self. In section 1.3 I will contrast the
Cartesian and Hegelian approaches in theorizing the self,
arguing for the latter. In section 1.4, I will further
develop the Hegelian approach toward the self by discussing
views on the self held by Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger.
And in section 1.5 I will set the feminist context for a
gender-sensitive approach to the self.
This chapter will prepare the way for the psychoanalytic
discussion of the self presented in chapter 2 which draws
heavily on the French post-structuralist, Lacan, and the
feminist critiques of psychoanalytic discussions of the self
presented in chapter 3. Chapter 4 will give some examples of
how the theory of self developed in chapters 1, 2, and 3 can
yield further insights by being brought to bear on the
reading of philosophical texts. In chapter 5 I present some
tentative conclusions for a gender-sensitive theory of self
and give some suggestions for future work.
1 . 2 Overview of Mv Approach to a Theory of Self
It was Hegel who, in The Phenomenology of Spirit , first
approached a theory of self through a description of the
changing forms of consciousness . Rather than assuming
consciousness always had one role appropriate to it, he
stressed the importance of studying consciousness in relation
to its object and traced the changing nature of this
relationship. In addition to introducing the dialectical
5role of the social context into the question of
consciousness, he also introduced the quest for self-
certainty as a problem that consciousness needed to solve in
each turn of its transformation. [4]
Marx picked up Hegel's theory, stressing the dialectical
1 st ion s h ip of human nature with its social context
. For
him, this meant that differing class consciousnesses were
formed on the basis of one's relationship to the mode of
production. Human capacities, needs and interests change
over time in response to changes in the mode of production,
and this change in human nature, in turn, makes for further
changes in the mode of production. In class societies, the
ruling class ultimately dominates prevailing ideologies. The
latter generates forms of "false consciousness"--ways of
understanding human nature and society that distort "reality"
in the interests of the ruling class. [5]
Recent trends in post-structuralist thought (for
example, the work of Lacan, Derrida and Foucault in France)
have further extended this tradition to give us the
"decentered self", a self that is radically contingent in
nature. These trends have progressively "deconstructed"
human nature, leaving an ever smaller core of essential human
attributes. In taking the Hegelian-Marxist view of human
nature to its logical extreme, the humanist version of the
self unravels completely: less and less is counted as
"natural" until the self is entirely dispersed into the
social structures within which it is formed. In contrast to
6the Marxist problem of demystifying "false consciousness,"
this aspect of post— structuralist thought presents new
problems for human agency, freedom and social critique.
If what we call "selves" are the product of language and
social forces beyond our control, if there is no way to
distinguish an "authentic" self from one distorted by the
dominant ideology, then what basis do we have for taking
responsibility for our actions or for demanding social
change? I believe that feminist theory can suggest some
answers to this question. We are more than arbitrary
products of linguistic and social forces entirely beyond our
control. Despite the insights offered by post-structuralists
such as Lacan, Derrida, and Foucault [6], this "post-
modernist" literature misses a crucial point. We cannot
create meaning in a vacuum. Any meaning I create must be
created in the context of self /other relations. It is thus
dependent on contact with embodied others . This contact has
significance that always exceeds the linguistic and social
structures that inform us as subjects. It is to this
"intuitive" realm beyond language which the attempts to
capture what is distinctive to "feminine" experience can lead
us. In this realm words may be inadequate for the "truth" of
a moment of connectedness shared with another. Yet out of
that moment will come new attempts to communicate what was
shared in that experience.
Feminists have always been concerned with providing
women with the self-understanding necessary to understanding
7their experiences as being the experiences of women. That
is, they have searched, for ways to give voice to precisely
those aspects of women's experience they have felt to be
ignored, devalued or distorted by dominant modes of
expression. A contemporary strand of feminism is currently
investigating the possibility of developing a feminist
epistemological standpoint grounded in aspects of experience
felt to be distinctive to women. [7] Feminists disagree on
the feasibility as well as the desirability of such a
project. Some feel that it is detrimental to the feminist
cause because it presupposes precisely those’ essentialist
arguments about differences between the nature of men and the
nature of women that we want to discard. Others feel,
however, that if we grant a systematic difference between the
experience of men and the experience of women due to social
structures that affect men and women differently (rather than
due to biological differences)
,
and if we take seriously the
Hegelian claim that one's "truth" is informed by one's
experience, than a feminist "deconst ructive project" would be
to
identify how distinctively masculine perspectives
on masculine experience have shaped the most
fundamental and most formal aspects of systematic
thought in philosophy and in the social and natural
sciences--the aspects of thought supposedly most
gender-neutral (Harding and Hintikka 1983, x)
Feminists concerned with articulating a perspective
rooted in what they consider to be women's distinctive
experience have taken various tacks. Some have argued, on
8the basis of psychoanalysis and object relations theory, that
f ®nee
s
between male and female children in the early
experiences of the process of separation and individuation
from the primary caretaker, have lasting repercussions for
^ f6rsnces between the two genders
. [8] Other feminists
have built directly on this work, while others have
emphasized other differences in the experiences of men and
women. The latter literature argues that the sexual division
of labor, due to the predominance of women in the role of
"sex/affective production” [9] (i.e., childbearing,
childrearing, and emotional servicing) and/or the more
"mundane" tasks of day to day life (i.e., cooking, housework,
etc.) creates the material conditions for distinctively
gendered perspectives.
Feminist discussions of different perspectives bring us
to a deeper understanding of how perspectives shape and form
one another, as well as of how any perspective at all comes
into being. With the Hegelian tradition that stresses the
dialectical interaction between self and world, and the
psychoanalytic tradition that stresses the development of a
self, this literature can help us address the question of how
social identity and social reality comes to be.
Simone de Beauvoir introduced the notion of woman as
'other' into the Hegelian tradition of theorizing self/other
relations. [10] Current feminist epistemological standpoint
literature builds on this literature. In this dissertation I
want to investigate self/other relations more fully by
9bringing psychoanalysis and philosophy together with the help
of Lacan and feminist critiques of psychoanalysis. This
project is both deconst ruct ive and reconstructive. On the
basis of the feminist literature I've mentioned, I assume
that a difference in perspectives exist. On the one hand I
want to develop a masculinist perspective on identity and
self /other relations. On the other I want to articulate more
fully what the feminine perspective on identity and
self/other relations might be. [11] Thus, my project is to
construct a theory of self that is informed by debates
sensitive to gender-difference in perspectives on self/other
relations, in light of the current, post-structuralist
literature (in particular, Lacanian psychoanalysis) that has
cast our traditional notions of human subjectivity into
doubt
.
I believe that we can characterize the foundation for a
masculinist epistemological standpoint versus a feminist
epistemological standpoint in two kinds of self-strategies.
These self-strategies are formed in early childhood and are
continually reaffirmed in the context of the two realms of
experience depicted by current feminist literature. I call
these two self-strategies "masculine" and "feminine" with the
understanding that there is a continuum between the two
extreme forms of these self—strategies that are manifested by
concrete individuals. Thus, characterizing them in their
extreme forms is a tool in coming to understand how gender
affects our perspective and reality in ways more complicated
10
than such a schema may allow. Just as there are many
different versions of "true" masculinity or femininity, there
are many different versions of these two self-strategies. In
trying to characterize two self
—strategies I am speaking to
the truth that I think lies behind the feminist attempt to
characterize an alternative epistemological perspective—
a
perspective that is distinct from the masculine one. Just as
the current hegemony of the current dominant discourses
cannot be said to represent the perspective of all men in
this society, there is no feminist theory that can be said to
represent the perspective of all women in this society. I
don't believe that we can, or should, reduce the number of
epistemological standpoints we construct to that of one
masculinist standpoint or one feminist one.
What I want to do here speaks to the truth I feel
emanates from post-structuralist thought: there is no one
perspective, and, in fact, no one perspective can be
validated as the correct one. The post-structuralist claim
that there is no "rational" basis for valorizing any
perspective over any other, no matter how "marginal, " fosters
a distrust of adopting any perspective at all. I feel there
is a way out of the impasse of the distrust of theory and of
any thrust toward social hegemony that this viewpoint
entails. That is, there is a way out of the relativist
dilemma of both taking a critical stance with respect to
society and having an agenda that one wants society to
emulate. By working together to achieve a collective
11
perspective, a new hegemony, that incorporates into its
symbolic structures the lived experience of all the
individuals that fill its positions, we could build a social
self-understanding acceptable to all. [12]
In the chapters to come I will argue that such a social
self-understanding must build on the "authentic" experiences
of us all. These "authentic" experiences include those often
inarticulate experiences in which our bodies as sensitive
instruments register sensations in a world that provoke a
complete reaction from us. We can create new categories that
signify these bodily sensations in a socially acceptable form
in relations with human others that mirror back to us our
sensations, demonstrating their acknowledgement of an aspect
of our experience that up to then we had thought was ours
alone. In the reflecting mirrors of self/other relatedness
we communicate bodily sensations to human others, thus giving
a generalized meaning to those bodily sensations that exceed
the particularity of a particular experience by putting it in
context with human others. Thus, new categories of meaning
are born. rather than simply building on the meaning
categories already laid out in language, this kind of
communication attempts to symbolize bodily sensation in such
a way that other human beings can recognize similar
sensations of their own.
On this view, human individuals are always embodied,
always rooted in the bodily sensations that they feel due to
the five senses of their own embodied selves . Language is
not solely self-referent ial unless it leaves behind its
referential roots—the roots of feeling and sensation that
lie in our embodied selves . A gender-sensitive investigation
of perspectives on self/other relations will reveal different
perspectives on the production of meaning. This in turn will
provide some hints and suggestions for how meaning, generated
in the felt sensation of bodies in self/other relations, is
generated and translated into the symbolic categories that
attempt to generalize human experience so that we can share
our experiences and be known to one another.
In keeping with my project I want to propose a new
problematic for constructing a theory of self. The new
problematic I propose adopts the Hegelian notion of self-
certainty. Not only are there various forms of selfhood, but
each form is a response to the problem of establishing self-
certainty. That human beings are subjects of experiences
with selves that constitute the locus of those experiences
(at least on an experiential level) is not simply a reality:
it is the human response to the problem of intentional
agency. To be an intentional agent requires more than a
conscious subject of experience. It requires a subject that
perceives itself as having some degree of autonomy and
efficacy in the world— in short, a self. On this view, the
'self' could be understood in two senses—the construct
ordering the range of experiences that one identifies as
one's own, as well as the activity that allows for a
meaningful processing of one's experiences as one lives them.
13
This latter notion of self would then posit selfhood (or
subjectivity) as mental activity that operates according to
some principle that orders one's experiences into some sort
of coherence. The base of this activity would be the
illusory and provisional construct of self created from one's
experiences in relation to which mental activity could carry
out its function. The subject of consciousness, the, would
be a construct created out of consciousness--with
consciousness being an amorphous, easily dispersed activity.
Subjectivity would be a centering of that activity around
certain experiences held within a framework of significance.
It is this framework that would stabilize those experiences
with respect to other experiences.
Selfhood is the human solution to the problem of
effective agency. Our actions have meaning because we are
responsible agents who carry them out with a purpose in mind.
What we do, think and say has significance within the broader
framework of social significance of which we form a part. An
important feature of the ability to be an effective agent is
self-awareness—-a sense of one's place in the broader social
framework and of how one's words and actions will impact from
that place.
The body is the organic base of a huge mass of
information. For agency to be possible, this information has
to be ordered in some way. Consciousness processes this
information. In the process it creates a self that acts as
the locus of significance, the principle around which
14
experience is ordered. The problem of selfhood is the
problem of how to create subjectivity out of the confusing
mass of experience and bodily sensation generated by the
human body. A theory of self that posits selfhood as the
solution to the problem of human agency moves us away from a
theory of self to a theory of self-construction. Not only
are we interested in the various forms that selfhood has
taken, we are also interested in how each of these forms
solved the problem in particular circumstances. That is, how
was the self established with respect to its objects at a
given time?
On the view that human beings engage in purposive human
activity in order to maintain themselves as intentional
agents as well as to carry out their intentions, the writing
of philosophical texts can be seen as a form of self-
construction. A philosophical text would then be the
representation of the construction of a particular form of
self. Deconstruction, a by-product of post-structuralist
thought [13], is a theory of interpretation that can help us
read out texts as representations of self-constituting
activity. The technique of deconstruction is influenced by
psychoanalysis and a new way of conceptualizing the self. It
is when the traditional notion of a coherent, unified self is
brought into question that deconst ruct ive readings become a
legitimate way of entering a text. Once it is no longer
taken for granted that the author's meaning forms a complete
and consistent picture that is self-transparent, the ruptures
15
in the text become entryways into meaning that may subvert
any given line of interpretation. A self that is divided and
in contradiction with itself will produce texts with divided
and contradictory meaning. Exploring the gaps and
contradictions of a text will thus illuminate the
contradictions in the self produced by the text, and a theory
of self that addresses such contradictions will give us more
insight into the gaps and contradictions of texts.
The kind of deconstruct ive reading I advocate is one
that would bring the question of woman to the fore. One
advantage of psychoanalysis over philosophical accounts of
the self, is that the former brings sexuality into the
limelight . This focus necessitates addressing the questions
of gender and sexual difference. The self becomes a gendered
self and questions about that engenderment enter into the
whole problematic of a self that is inherently divided and
decentered. If how we conceptualize the self affects how we
philosophize, it also affects the kind of questions we will
bring to a philosophical text. Once the question of woman
becomes crucial to a theory of self, it also becomes crucial
to the readings of texts that are based on that theory.
Assuming a traditional notion of self, we will construct
coherent and consistent interpretations of texts with a
certain amount of closure. Assuming a divided, decentered
self, a reading that traces contradictions and breaks in the
text will be more in keeping than a reading that attempts to
impose an order that isn't there. The problematic of gender
16
in psychoanalysis leads us to the question of woman as one of
the entryways into subversion of meaning in a text.
Psychoanalysis posits gender identity as a problem rather
than a given. Resolving this problem is one of the tasks
crucial to the development of an autonomous self. A divided,
decentered self must not only continually reconstruct itself
to maintain some sort of coherency, it must also re-engender
itself . How this is done and the tensions this causes can be
revealed in a deconst ructive reading that takes the question
of woman as an entryway into the text.
Psychoanalysis originated in the interest of bringing
people to psychic health. A coherent sense of self seems to
be one of the requirements of psychic health. In the search
for a norm for health, this discipline theorized not only
about what the self should be, but the possible break-down
points to developing a satisfactory sense of self.
Investigation of failures in attaining the full selfhood we
associate with a socially functioning human being revealed
the tentative nature of selfhood itself.
Psychoanalysis, in its various forms, has spawned a
multitude of theories about the self, each related to a
preferred method of therapy. To give a complete survey of
them all, or to try and offer a distillation of all they have
to offer, is far beyond the scope of this dissertation. What
I would like to do is pick my way through some of what
psychoanalysis has to offer in order to offer my own theory
of self. My hope is to lay the ground for further work on
17
such a theory by pulling together some strands of
psychoanalysis in a philosophical context.
Since I am not a psychoanalyst, my evidence and
confirmation for a theory of self will not lie in my work
with analysands
. Rather, as a philosopher I will pursue the
question of how a theory of self plays into one's conception
of knowledge and social reality. If I can develop a theory
of self that can explain gaps and contradictions in a
philosophical text that are otherwise inexplicable, then I
will have some confirmation of my theory. If a theory of
self can provide an explanation of some of the contradictions
in a philosophical text, then the connection between the self
of the text and the interpretation of reality it attempts to
articulate will become clearer.
What I am suggesting is that in any articulation we are
not only proffering a response to the world, we are also
proffering a response to ourselves. Any interpretation of
the world is inextricable from an attempt to interpret
ourselves and our place in the world. The creation of a
particular philosophical outlook, then, is coextensive with
the creation of a particular type of self. Investigating the
views presented on, for example, knowing and social reality
is one means to a deeper understanding of a philosophical
text while investigating the conception of self that
explicitly and implicitly created in the text is another. A
better understanding of how the two affect one another in a
particular text can lead to a better understanding of how the
18
two moments of subject and object interact and transform one
another
.
Of course the same interaction will take place between
me and the texts I peruse. The theory of self I take to the
text as an interpretive tool would be no more than a device
for reductive analysis if I did not allow the texts to
interact with and transform my theory. A psychoanalyst would
not be doing justice to her analysands if she closed herself
to perceiving words or behavior simply because they didn't
fit her theory. As a practicing psychoanalyst she would
expect her theory to change over time. Thus, in developing a
theory of self that picks and chooses some elements from a
vast and divergent literature, I am not trying to give a
definitive theory. What I'm trying to do is develop a theory
that is workable, and that could be further developed through
use .
My interest in the relationship of subject and object,
self and world, is based on two more specific interests that
I see as interconnected: the problem of knowledge and the
problem of social identity. It is my contention that it is
with respect to the self that these two problems
interconnect. Interpreting who we are through interpreting a
reality not merely places us in a particular social order but
creates our place in it. By defining the social position of
the people around us we define our own social position. the
latter is a more specific instance of the former—and not in
an entirely different realm. In both activities we are
19
placing ourselves as selves in a world. And if the self is
"dropped out" as it seems to be, for example, in scientific
discourse, this is only because that discourse has chosen to
maintain the perspective involved as an implicit given.
This dissertation attempts to provide a grounding for a
more complete theory of the relation between gender and self-
construction. More readings of the type sketched here would
have to be done to fill out the theory with respect to
philosophical texts. Philosophers who speculate about the
self in the Hegelian tradition have already taken significant
steps towards breaking down traditional notions of the self
as a discrete, unified entity that can be understood in
isolation from its world. What I have done here with the
help of feminist theory and psychoanalysis is to develop a
way of reading texts that would add to this tradition.
Such a theory is crucial to a feminist project. One
major obstacle in the way of any program for radical social
change is that the problem of maintaining a sense of self for
human agency is a problem of terrifying proportions. Men
obviously have a stake in maintaining a patriarchal social
structure. But I don't believe that it necessarily follows
that men perpetuate patriarchy out of a "natural" desire to
dominate. If a typical pattern of problem-solving in our era
has been to overpower the "opposition" into submission, be it
with words or physical force, perhaps it is to the current
strategies in self-construction that we can look for an
explanation. The more aware we become of how our selves are
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determined by social reality and the contradictions involved,
the more control over self-definition we can take.
In the following section I will distinguish what I call
a Cartesian from a Hegelian approach to the self. This will
set the context for a review of some approaches to the self
that have influenced post-structuralist thought. The latter
will frame the view of the self, chiefly derived from
Lacanian psychoanalysis, that I will develop in chapter 2.
In the final section of this chapter I will review some
feminist arguments about what might constitute a feminist
perspective distinct from the masculine perspective that
informs dominant forms of discourse. This will frame the
view of the self derived from feminist critiques of
psychoanalysis developed in chapter 3.
1 . 3 Descartes and Hegel; Two Approaches to the Self
In the philosophical tradition there have been two
tendencies with respect to epistemological concerns and
concerns about the social order . One tendency has been to
separate the two sets of concerns, saying that questions
about truth and falsity and when and whether we attain true
knowledge are completely separate from questions about how
the social order is constituted and how it should be
constituted. This tendency takes epistemology as the study
of an individual subject in contemplative seclusion from the
world who pursues objective knowledge of the object at hand.
Another tendency takes epistemological questions and
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questions about the social order as inextricably linked:
there is no such thing as a knowing subject unaffected by his
or her position in a particular social order. Thus, any
question about how we come to know must also account for the
subject's position in society and what interests motivate
that subject's knowing. With the latter view, "objectivity"
in the sense of the disinterested knowledge of value-free
facts is rendered problematic, if not completely undermined.
One way of labelling these two tendencies would be to
call the first tendency in the Cartesian tradition and the
second tendency in the Hegelian tradition.
On the Cartesian epistemological model, the more we can
detach the object of study from its surroundings and
determine the properties essential to it, the better we will
know it. The more we can remove the object of study from its
concrete context the more "objective" our study will be.
Objectivity here refers to the universal validity of our
findings—no matter where or when or by whom the same study
was carried out, the findings would be the same.
There is a current trend, particularly in continental
philosophy, to question the sub ject/ob ject split. [14] On
this view, there is no such thing as a perspective from which
we can gain disinterested, "objective" knowledge of objects
that are "out there." Any viewpoint we take is taken with an
end in view. To assume that there is such a thing as the
disinterested stance that can avoid subjective colorings in
order to lay bare reality "as it is, only conceals one's
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perspective. Thus, taking the subject and object in a fully
contextualized setting could be more revealing than taking
the object in isolation. It is only within the context of
investigation that we can know the objectives that are
coloring a given interpretation.
On the assumption that we have direct access to reality,
questions about our limitations in gaining knowledge of it
and the degree to which that "knowledge" is a distortion
don't arise. Once we start questioning how comprehensive and
accurate our knowledge is of the world we live in, the
question of just how we come by that knowledge becomes
important . It is then that the question of who and what we
are becomes inextricably linked with questions about the
nature of reality. Self-understanding then becomes a crucial
aspect in our broader understanding of the world and
prescriptions for the "correct" way to approach questions
about reality may be given. Where metaphysical
investigations don't directly address the question of how the
questioning subject affects the investigation, they hold
implicit assumptions about what the nature of that subject is
or should be. Current analytic philosophy tends to assume
that the ideal questioning subject is the contemplative,
unextended thinking substance of Cartesian philosophy. [15]
Such an assumption about the nature of the questioning
subject has repercussions for what is taken to be relevant to
metaphysical discussions. On this view the rational endeavor
that will lead to true knowledge is seen as the product of a
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disembodied self in contemplative seclusion from the world of
everyday affairs. In order to arrive at the most
comprehensive and accurate account possible of reality as it
"really" is, one must detach oneself from one's mundane
concerns and take an appropriately "objective" attitude
toward the topic at hand. This Cartesian approach to
metaphysical questions with its assumption of a distinct
sub ject /ob ject dichotomy has far-reaching consequences for
both our understanding of ourselves and our world.
Hegel exemplifies another tradition in self-
understanding as it relates to metaphysical questions in
which the questioning subject is seen as a moment in a
broader whole.' In this tradition the questioning subject
cannot be understood out of the particular context in which
it is found and any questions about how that subject affects
metaphysical investigations are an on-going and pressing
i
concern. This view insists that the questioning subject
cannot be dropped out of consideration once, say, we reach an
appropriately disembodied stance towards the topic at hand.
Since any knowledge of reality is obtained in a particular
context by a particular subject, the particular nature of
that subject and how it affects the knowledge obtained must
always be taken into account. Thus, instead of a distinct
split between questioning subject and the world "out there"
under question, we have a subject that is unable to take an
external perspective on the world she would question since
she is a part of that world.
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On the Cartesian view, questions about the nature of the
self have little bearing on metaphysical questions since it
is already assumed that there is an ideal stance from which
metaphysical investigations should be conducted. On the
Hegelian view such an ideal stance is precluded. this
problemat izes the relationship between subject and object and
renders knowledge of the subject in all its changing forms
crucial to our knowledge of the world. Thus, self-
understanding comes to have an on-going and transformative
effect on our understanding of the nature of reality.
Instead of assuming that there is a particular stance from
which we can finally grasp the truth about the world, it is
assumed that as we change, the "truths" we grasp will change
and that an understanding of our changing selves will give us
insight into the reality we come to know.
Questions about the nature of the self have taken
different tacks depending on which tradition the questions
come out of. On the Cartesian view, an investigation of the
self takes the self as an object like any other that one must
examine from an appropriately disinterested perspective if
one is to truly understand just what it is. The self-
understanding that comes from this investigation is not
expected to have any repercussions for either how one
understands other aspects of reality or how one goes about
investigating the nature of reality. On the Hegelian view,
there is no disinterested perspective from which one can
examine the self as an object in isolation from other
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objects. Self-understanding must come through an examination
of the process of interaction between self and world.
The dialectical tradition of philosophy has focused on
the subject and object of knowledge and desire as two moments
of a whole that interact. In this dialectical interaction
the object is not merely known or desired, but enters into a
relationship with the subject in which both subject and
object are transformed. such a view of the subject of
knowledge and desire posits the self as a material
construction with a historicity that precludes easy
definition, rather than a transcendental entity.
On a dialectical reading, the self cannot be left out of
any account of the world since the two are moments in a whole
of interpretation. If the self has a transformative effect,
that is, if the self creates reality as much as being created
by it, then an understanding of the self's motivations and
interests will help us understand the constraints on our
claims to knowledge as well as our desires. Given that
subject and object are moments of a whole rather than
isolated from one another, the subject's self-understanding
is going to affect its understanding of what's true and
what's desirable. How one sees one's self and one's stake in
that self as the foundation of one's subjectivity is going to
play an important constraining role in how one understands
one's world. Thus, the relationship between self and world
becomes problemat ized . One's personal identity plays a
crucial role in determining one's interpretation of reality.
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In the next section I will take a closer look at
approaches to the self derived from Hegel, Nietzsche and
Heidegger. The approaches discussed here have been taken up
into pos
t
— s t ructu ra
1
1 s t thought and will set the context for
the Lacanian approach to the self taken up in the next
chapter
.
I- 4 Approaches to the Self in the Hegelian Tradition: Heael
.
Nietzsche, and Heidegger
Hegel
In the Phenomenology of Spirit . Hegel proposes to
"undertake the exposition of knowledge as a phenomenon." In
this work, he refocuses metaphysical discussions about
timeless "truth" to a discussion of the changing relationship
of knowing subject to the "truth" that is known. In keeping
with a phenomenological approach, he allows the truth to
determine itself completely within consciousness rather than
positing it as a standard existing somewhere outside of
consciousness. Hegel takes the philosophical stance of the
"we" who are investigating knowledge to examine the actual
experience of the consciousness who knows. he then shows how
in the actual process of knowing, consciousness is forced to
revise its concept of truth if it is to know at all. By
tracing the phenomenology of spirit, Hegel hopes to lay the
groundwork for his theory of truth in the actual experience
of consciousness itself. In the first two chapters of the
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Phenomenology we can see the grounds for a dialectical theory
of truth that emphasizes the relational nature of the self.
At each level of consciousness a dialectic is seen to
emerge where knowledge of an object is referred to the object
known for verification, only to discover that the object
itself must be revised. In the experience of consciousness
this dialectic does not explicitly emerge— it is the
philosophical perusal of what occurs in experience that
renders the pattern of in-itself, for-itself and in-and-for-
it self explicit by noting the necessity of the movement from
one object constituting truth to the next
. In the actual
experience of this movement the original object is supplanted
and lost as if it had never been.
In investigating sense-certainty—the first level of
consciousness— as it is experienced, Hegel delineates the I,
the object, and the certainty that it is the object that is
the essential reality as features of this level of
consciousness. At this level, the object apprehended i_s.
truth. But when I point out an object "meaning" to point it
out in all its particularity, I discover that rather than
pointing out a concrete particular I have pointed out a
universal (the "This" I point to)
.
Once sense-certainty has
discovered that the This taken in-itself to be essential
reality turned out to be for consciousness an empty
abstraction, it is forced to alter its criterion for truth.
By examining the actual experience of sense-certainty
Hegel has shown its own conception of knowledge to be
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inadequate to itself. Because of the original inadequacy of
its conception, consciousness is forced past sense-certainty
to the level of perception in the attempt to find a
conception of knowledge that will be borne out by its
experience
.
At this stage sense-certainty takes it for granted that
it has direct access to truth; once the object is apprehended
it is known as it is. When pushed to grasp the object
pointed out in tis entirety, sense-certainty’s truth turns
out to be out of reach. The sub ject /object distinction that
was no problem for knowledge as long as the object
constituted truth turns out to be problematic. But rather
than assume the object to be truth intact, and the problem to
lie in gaining access to that object, consciousness shifts
its perception of the sub ject /object relation itself.
In perception the I, in order to relate a plurality of
universals in the "one" that makes that plurality this
particular object, takes the object as self-same and relates
the diverse moments of her apprehension accordingly. For
perception the criterion of truth is the self-same that
which remains the same from perception to perception. Now
that the principle of knowledge is the universal,
consciousness is freed from the self—identical relation of
sense-certainty whose truth is the bare act of intuiting, and
can ferret out the truth of multiple acts of perception. At
this point in perception, truth is the object.
Consciousness, in taking the object as the essential element,
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refers untruth to its perception and takes the object as the
true universal--the self-same.
In the case of perception, consciousness is forced back
upon itself in that it takes the diversity of properties to
be due to the perceiving I, and any untruth of its perception
as being within consciousness rather than the object. Again
truth is seen to lie in the entire process of I and object
rather than in either the one or the other.
Rather than a direct access to truth from subject to
object, we have a more complicated criterion for truth
emerging. A criterion that requires ever more participation
on the part of the subject in order to provide any sort of
verification for knowledge at all. At the end of
consciousness's experience of perception the object is no
longer a tenable criterion for truth-— it has broken up into
two opposing elements that can only be brought together
through the perceiving subject.
Perception maintains the object as truth by shifting
back and forth from the object as the "also" to the object as
the "one", the object for another and the object for itself,
it is only from our philosophical perspective that we can see
the contradiction involved in thus putting forth first one,
then the other, aspect as the truth. The shifting of
perception from the one aspect of the object to the other is
only enabled through the reflection of consciousness back
into itself. Although at this stage this return of the
subject from the object back into itself is not effected with
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a genuine awareness of consciousness as an object for
knowledge and as constituting its own truth, its growing
capacity for such a role is here made apparent.
By tracing the shifting sub ject /object relation that
emerges in the search for an adequate criterion of truth in
the first two chapters of the Phenomenology
. we see an ever
more complicated theory of truth emerging within the system
of Hegel's thought. From direct apprehension of truth as
object we have gone to a criterion of truth that oscillates
between subject and object. While the oscillation between
the two has not yet become apparent to the experiencing
consciousness, "we" can see that the "truth" at stake here is
a truth that emerges from a complex relationship between
subject and object. And that the truth that emerges is
affected by the self-understanding of the knowing subject
that comes to know it
.
While Nietzsche strongly objects to the kind of system-
building endemic in Hegel's philosophy, he too will
problemat ize the status of "truth" by challenging traditional
notions about its relationship to the knowing subject.
Nietzsche
There has been an upsurge of contemporary interest in
N 1
0
-£ z s che . [16] One of the reasons for this interest has
been due to the decentering of self that Nietzsche
deliberately provokes in his texts. Refusing to build a
system, or to allow his philosophy to be systematized, he
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writes in aphorisms. Rather than presenting extended
philosophical arguments to support his views, he gives us
discontinuous passages, each one of which demands
interpretation in order to be comprehensible. He
deliberately discourages "closure" in the interpretation of
his texts. Closure would imply the definitive reading of a
text, the reading that finally unravelled all the
significance the text had to offer. If one could get such
closure, one could also get to the "real" self that spoke the
text, implying that there was such a self who intended to
impart to the reader the significance that the reader's
definitive reading finally revealed.
The work of people like Gadamer in hermeneutical
philosophy and Derrida in deconstruction [17] has shattered
the notion that a text is the product of a unified self with
a definitively "correct" interpretat ion--the significance
intended by the author. Nietzsche's philosophical style
encourages the kind of deconstructive reading of conventional
concepts and his own text that deconstruction has made vogue.
Many contemporary figures have recently focused on
Nietzsche's radical use of language and the repercussions
this has for our conventional concepts.
In proclaiming such concepts as substance and the self
as fictions [18], Nietzsche helped lay the ground for the
decentered self that is currently getting increasing
attention. We think we are people with a personal identity
that extends over time to which we refer our experiences. We
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think we have selves a sense of who we are, a personality
with a history, a unified self that provides the basis for
our knowledge and our actions. To give increasing attention
to a decentered notion of self is to increasingly undermine
the notion that a person has a unified self that provides a
central perspective for knowledge and agency.
The self is a fiction, something that we impose on a
wide and conflicting range of forces that make up who we are.
Nietzsche's point in calling such a self a fiction was to
underline the fiction that we are unified and coherent
agents. If we have a unified sense of self, it is only
because we have succeeded in subordinating our instincts in
such a way that consistency and coherence appear to reign.
It is through mastering a conflicting torrent of impulses
and, by setting up ruling instincts, bringing the rest into a
hierarchy obedient to the ruling instincts that we are able
to preserve the illusion of a unified self. [19]
The self, then, is not a thing, not a substance that we
carry around with us. There is nothing stable about us. We
are an intersection of forces that are forever in the process
of becoming. [20] If there is anything stable about us, it
is the fictional self in accordance with which we constrain
those forces to act. But this self is a dream, an illusion
by which we attempt to veil the reality of our constant
change and becoming—the chaos that we really are. Just as
we need illusions to mask Dionysian flux when it comes to
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external reality, so we need the illusion of the self to mask
the terror of a complete loss identity.
If, as Nietzsche says, self and substance are but
fictions that we impose upon Dionysian process, and if, as
Hegel suggests, the act of experiencing is a double act in
which we constitute both self and object, then how we see
ourselves will be inextricably linked with how we see the
world. Both our view of ourselves and of the world will be
no more than interpretations rather than essential truths,
and these interpretations will be seen as the creations of an
activity that constitutes both self and world at once. To
investigate the how of self-constitution and the conditions
under which it si possible, would also illuminate the how of
object-constitution and the constraints under which our
conception of reality is put if we are to have selves at all.
Nietzsche introduced anti-systemic strands into Hegelian
thought that post-structuralists later picked up. It is
Heidegger, however, who emphasized the social web of forces
that converge to form a self.
Heidegger
Heidegger felt that the problem of skepticism arises
from the presupposition of a distinction between inner
experiences and objects in the external world. he believes
that the Cartesian model presents a false view of ourselves.
The self as a res cooitans is an objectified description of
the self obtained by focusing on ourselves as passive
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spectators. But our fundamental mode of being is one of
being actively engaged in the world. On this view being
human is treated as a relation where a stand is taken on
one's Being in one's everyday activities. Furthermore, to be
human is to be a place-holder in a network of internal
relations, constituted by a public language, of the communal
world into which Dasein (human existence, or the human self
as a relation— see Guignon 1983, 86) is thrown. It is the
cultural context that provides Dasein with meaningful
possibilities for its concrete ways of being engaged in the
world. Since language is the medium in which both self and
world can first be discovered, there is no distinction to be
drawn between a private bundle of internal impressions and
the public ways that Dasein manifests itself in the world.
(See Guignon 1983, ch . III.)
Thus, Heidegger, like Hegel, refuses to isolate the self
from its relation to the world. In fact, the self is
considered to be a relation—the active process of taking a
particular stance vis a vis one's own Being. Human beings
are the kind of entities that care about what it is to be
human. In living out their lives they are "Being-toward-
death"—that is, living with an eye to the significance that
their lives as a whole will have when it is complete
(Heidegger, 1962, #51-52) . Because language is the medium by
which we create significance, it will be crucial to both our
self-interpretations as well as interpretations of the world.
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In B.ging and Time, Heidegger taKes Being-in-the-world as
his starting point for investigating Dasein' s Being. Thus,
his analytic of Dasein emphasizes the unitary wholeness of
Dasein and its environment. This in turn shifts attention
from a world of entities in isolation from the Being which
questions their ontology, to entities whose meaning arises in
the particular context of Dasein’s concern. We find
ourselves thrown into a world in which we are already
involved. But we are free to make something of our lives as
a whole within the confines of the factical situation into
which we are thrown. To take a stand with respect to my life
requires a certain competence in getting along within the
interrelated system of my culture. I do not have a "true"
self private to me in the sense that the way I act and the
roles I take on are the acts and roles of the "they"
(Heidegger 1962, #27) . Insofar as my acts have meaning it is
a public meaning made available by the meaningful
possibilities for action with which my culture presents me.
That my life is mine means that I choose the possibilities
available to me in a particular way, but those meaningful
possibilities would also be available to anyone else.
In approaching the question of human existence (as a
preliminary to the question of being in general) without
preconceptions of what constitutes a human being, Heidegger
develops a vocabulary of his own that indicates processes
rather than occurrences that have already taken place and are
now being examined after the fact. Such an approach focuses
36
attention on the dynamic nature of meanings and the shifting
frame of reference from which each one of us makes sense of
the world as our concerns change. By bringing back into the
picture the questioning entity that traditional ontology
overlooks, Heidegger prepares the way for a conception of
knowledge that focuses on the totality of the questioning
subject and the object questioned rather than trying to
explicate knowledge in terms of an object in isolation from
the knowing subject.
Anything that I attend to is brought to my attention
within the context of my immediate interests which are in
turn meaningful to me within the context of who I understand
myself to be. Thus, how the world presents itself tome and
how I understand myself are inextricably linked.
Furthermore, the range of possibilities for self-
understanding is made available to me by my culture. My self
is therefore not a private entity, but an intersection of
interrelating cultural systems.
For Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger the pure ’I' of
Cartesian philosophy is at best a static abstraction of our
experience of being selves. The latter cannot be described
in terms of an object. Instead it is a process, a relating
of subject to object, an interpreting activity that
constitutes both self and world at once. Hegel and Heidegger
stress the connection between the interpretation of self and
the interpretation of world. Nietzsche does not stress the
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link between self- and world-constitution. Both are a
product of the same activity, but it is not clear that in
producing the one, one is also producing the other. In
undermining the notion of essential truth, however, he also
undermines the notion of an essential self. Nietzsche
deliberately works against falling into ready-made patterns
of significance by insisting on playing with many masks—many
selves from which he can proclaim conflicting truths. From
each self comes a different perspective. A decentered self
entails a perspective that no longer privileges its viewpoint
as the "correct" one. Thus, Nietzsche underlines our
creative power in playing with masks, in taking up selves
only to put them down again. If the self is a fiction, it is
also not the constraint we once thought—we are not bound to
our selves as if they were givens from which we can't escape.
The self as a relating process is an activity that may choose
to change its orientation, with profound results for both
self and world. Thus, a self could be seen as an orienting
activity, a stance vis-a-vis the world, a perspective that
interprets. In urging us to play, to make our words dance
[21], Nietzsche is urging us to take risks in our
interpretations—to risk the loss of self that a breakdown in
significance entails in order to create significance anew.
Heidegger introduces a note of caution into the
Nietzschean dance with his notion of the self, in the form of
the They, as a "crossing point" of cultural systems. Not
only is the self I am not an object, but is not even "my"
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self in the sense that the interpretations that make up my
consciousness are drawn from a public realm of the
interpretive possibilities made available by my culture.
Although my interpretations may be my own, they are
constrained by the possibilities my culture makes available
to me .
Due to the grammar of our language it is hard to talk
about the self I'm referring to here in terms that aren't
misleading. The 'self' implies a substance, not a process or
relation. When I describe myself I tend to list attributes
about someone that I hope has some coherence and consistency-
-something that remains the same over time. Subjectivity
might be a better term for the self as process or activity,
but it is often awkward grammatically. Also, there is a
difference between talking about the activity or experience
of being selves versus the selves that we consider ourselves
to be. In the latter case I would probably be referring to
what in psychoanalytic terms might be called a 'self-
representation. ' Self-representations are ideas we have
about who we are that guide our thinking and behavior. They
change over time as our goals change, but they are static in
the sense that they are images we refer to rather than active
processes .
If we take the Heideggerian notion that there is no
distinction between inner and outer, that our selves are the
words we speak, the thoughts we think and the action we take,
then these words, thoughts and actions are testimony to the
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self as a relation or process. They are self-representations
we present to the world that tend to guide further processing
activity as we attempt to make sense of our life as a whole.
Although Nietzsche emphasizes the creative possibilities in
self- and world-constitution [22], we would be hard put to
create interpretations in a vacuum. No matter how much we
may push at the bounds of the language and social structures
at our disposal, we are constrained by the limits of what
they can express.
Feminists have attempted to theorize the relationship of
a specifically female self to the world. In doing so, some
have attempted to characterize what might distinguish
distinctively feminist self- and world-constituting activity
from "masculinist " self- and world-constituting activity. In
the next section I will review some of these attempts as well
as some of the problems with such a project.
1 . 5 The Feminist Context for a Gender-sensitive Approach to
the Self
Gender identity is one way that we have for representing
ourselves. By labelling myself a 'man' or a 'woman' I am
also conjuring up a whole range of possibilities presented to
me in my culture and language. If I stay within conventional
bounds I will create a self on the basis of what s offered
me. If I am more adventurous, I will push beyond
conventional bounds, thus adding to my culture or language
new possibilities of what a man or woman could be. Caring
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about the significance of my life as a whole means creating
self- and world- interpretations that work for me.
In our society gender identity is a key element in our
self-representations. that is, it tends to be a stable and
important feature by which we orient our actions. In the
process of being selves we tend to orient ourselves
differently according to our gender. Gender would thus be an
interesting feature to look at when it comes to the question
of how we orient ourselves. Differences in orientation due
to sexual difference may give us further clues as to how
subjectivity is possible. If selves are fictions and every
perspective is no more than that-—a perspective—then what
clues can sexual difference give us to how a perspective is
created?
In "Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions of Rationality"
(Harding 1983)
,
Sandra Harding discusses the implications of
feminist gender theory for gender identity and perspectives
informed by that identity. Gender theory developed by
Dorothy Dinnerstein (1977), Jane Flax (1978, 1983), Nancy
Chodorow (1978), "and others" draws on post-Freudian
psychoanalytic "object-relations" theory (e.g., Mahler,
Guntrip and Winnicott) . Traditional psychological theories
attributed the formation of gendered personalities to nature,
sex, or "social learning" after the age of three. In
contrast, gender theory attributes such formation
to the very same social/physical processes within
which initially androgynous newborns are
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transformed, and transform themselves, into
distinctive human persons (Harding 1983, 50) .
Harding argues that gender theory is important due to
the centrality of gender identity to personality formation
[23] and due to its ability to provide a causal account of
gender which is both "materialist" and nondeterminist ic
:
The account is materialist because the form of the
actual psychosocial-physical environment with which
the infant interacts is the variable determining
whether or not gender will be produced. The
account suggests that if, societywide, men shared
equally in infant caretaking and the day-today
maintenance of self and others, and if women shared
equally in the labor of ruling, gender would not be
produced at all (Harding 1983, 53)
.
On this view, we can trace variations in gender formation to
historically specific psychosocial conditions, and we can
entertain the possibility that gender could be "eliminated
through political processes" (p. 54)
.
On the basis of gender theory and additional feminist
literature that examines gendered perspectives arising from
the divisions of labor by sex/gender, Harding offers two
gendered perspectives on rationality:
A rational person, for women, values highly her
abilities to empathize and "connect" with
particular others and wants to learn more complex
and satisfying ways to take the role of the
particular other in relat ionships . . . . For men, in
contrast, a rational person values highly his
ability to separate himself from others and to make
decisions independent of what others think—to
develop "autonomy." And he wants to learn more
complex and satisfying ways to take the role of the
generalized other" (Harding 1983, 53-54)
.
The contrast of a feminine, relational point of view that
emphasizes empathy and connectedness to a masculine,
oppositional point of view that emphasizes autonomy and
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separation, is a recurrent theme of this literature. [24]
Emerging from this literature is the possibility of what some
feminists have called a "feminist standpoint"—that is, a
distinctively feminist perspective based in distinctively
feminine experience that posits an alternative theory of
knowledge to go with it. Nancy Hirschmann (Hirschmann 1987)
expresses this relationship of epistemology to a feminist
standpoint this way:
Feminist standpoint epistemology rejects the idea
that epistemology is "objective" or "universal;" it
holds that epistemology is itself a product of
particular social relations. Not just knowledge,
or what we know, is shaped by particular experience
and the relations we have to others, but how we
know and how we conceive of knowledge are also
similarly shaped (p. 251).
On this view, a feminist perspective would involve not only
experiencing aspects of life a masculinist perspective
wouldn't (knowing different things), it would also involve
experiencing aspects of life differently (knowing in a
different way)
.
To give this difference in perspective
justice, we would have to give a thorough-going critique of
the conceptual frameworks of dominant (masculinist)
discourse .
In The Science Question in Feminism (Harding 1986)
,
Harding describes feminists such as Jane Flax, Hilary Rose,
Nancy Hartsock and Dorothy Smith as being engaged in the work
of developing a feminist standpoint approach. She
characterizes this approach as follows:
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Briefly, this proposal argues that men's dominating
position in social life results in partial and
perverse understandings, whereas women's subjugated
position provides the possibility of more complete
and less perverse understandings. Feminism and the
women's movement provide the theory and motivation
for inquiry and political struggle that can
transform the perspective of women into a
"standpoint"—a morally and scientifically
preferable grounding for our interpretations and
explanations of nature and social life. The
feminist critiques of social and natural science,
whether expressed by women or by men, are grounded
in the universal features pf women's experience as
understood from the perspective of feminism" (p.
26) .
In chapter 6 of this book she reviews some of the specifics
of the work of Flax, Rose, Hartsock and Smith. All are
concerned with locating a gendered difference in perspective
based in gender theory and/or in divisions of labor by
sex/gender. Hilary Rose (1983) focuses on the unification of
the manual, the mental, and the emotional ("hand, brain, and
heart") that she claims is typical of women's work (and
atypical of men's work) . Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1984), in
addition to drawing on gender theory, discusses the
implications of engaging in "subsistence" work (cooking,
cleaning, clothing maintenance, etc.) and childrearing for a
feminist perspective. Jane Flax (1983) emphasizes the
repercussions of a "defensive," masculine self versus a less-
defensive, feminine self, first formed in early childhood and
then reaffirmed by patriarchal culture. [25] Dorothy Smith
(1974, 1979) examines how women's work:
relieves men of the need to take care of their
bodies or of the local places where they exist,
freeing them to immerse themselves in the world of
abstract concepts (Harding 1986, 156) .
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In addition to arguing that women's labor shapes male
concepts in specific ways, she claims that women's experience
of their own labor is "incomprehensible and inexpressible
within the distorted abstractions of men's conceptual
schemes" (Harding 1986, 156)
.
All four attempt to make generalizations on the basis of
gender theory and/or relatively rigid divisions of labor by
sex/gender in our society, that could ground a unified
feminist perspective. As any feminist knows, there are
problems with this approach. Despite the obvious advantages
of a unified perspective for collective political action, the
differences among women disallow such a perspective. As
Harding, after characterizing the feminist standpoint
approach, goes on to ask: "Can there be a feminist standpoint
if women ' s ... social experience is divided by class, race, and
culture?" (Harding 1986, 26)
.
She goes on to argue for
"feminist postmodernism, " an approach that would be
profoundly skeptical toward any universal or universalizing
claims about "the existence, nature and powers of reason,
progress, science, language and the ' sub ject /self ' " (quoted
by Harding from Flax 1986, 3) .
Terry Winant deals with this problem by introducing a
distinction between a feminist philosophical stance and a
feminist standpoint, arguing that there is one of the former
and many of the latter. She defines standpoints as locations
in the political and cultural world that carry with them
specific commitments to projects for political and cultural
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transformation. Obviously, these will vary from feminist to
feminist according to her specific location. The adoption of
the feminist philosophical stance, however, entails the
following
:
...a commitment to bear full responsibility for a
variety of philosophical positions according to
which each individual epistemic subject can
establish his or her epistemic authority (i.e.
reliability as a knower) only as a function of his
or her place in the whole net of human
interdependency (Winant 1987, 143) .
In addition to being competent in the dominant discourse,
women are competent in the marginal discourses of their
marginal identities as women, blacks, Jews, etc. This gives
them epistemic competence in multiple forms of life depending
on the specific marginal discourses at their disposal due to
their specific background. Thus:
The feminist standpoint is to be considered not as
a finished, fully elaborated standpoint, but as a
flexibly developing standpoint that can handle
whatever emerges in the process of eliminating
sexism. . . .Our feminism is a stance from which to
articulate our concerns in the idiom we deem
appropriate, drawing on the full resources of all
the languages we know--including a multiplicity of
"mother tongues "--or
,
as I shall dub such
resources, "cultural and discursive birthplaces"
(Winant 1987, 127) .
Ann Ferguson has expressed a similar point in her
article "A Feminist Aspect Theory of the Self" (Ferguson
1987)
.
To counter the essentializing tendencies of a
feminist theory that makes universal claims about the
experience of being women, she proposes an "Aspect theory of
self." This theory rejects the idea that the self is an
unchanging, unified consciousness:
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Rather, conscious selfhood is an ongoing process in
which both unique individual priorities and social
constraints vie in limiting and defining one's
self-identity (p. 350).
Gender is only one aspect of a self that has many aspects,
none of which can be determined to be prior, more fundamental
or more or less authentic than other aspects of the self.
Instead aspects of our selves are developed by participating
in social practices which insist on certain skills and
values" (p. 351)
.
If the skills and values developed by
engaging in different social practices conflict, those
participating in these practices "will develop conflicting
aspects of self" (p. 351).
Just as Winant points to competence in marginal
discourses as a resource for women, Ferguson points to
competence in what we could call "marginal" social practices.
Competence in both dominant and marginal discourses and
social practices can push women to a feminist viewpoint that
attempts to resolve the conflicts in self-identity such
competence entails. While Winant doesn't discuss the content
of categories like "masculine" or "feminine," Ferguson's
article implies that we can make some general, historically
specific claims about these categories. Thus, due to a
"developing conflict in gender roles" (p. 353) men and women
"will have both so-called masculine and feminine aspects of
self as developed by their ongoing social practices" (p
.
351)
.
Although we cannot look at men to determine what so-
called masculine aspects of self are, or at women to
determine the so-called feminine aspects of self, we can
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attempt to fill out the content of these gender categories by
investigating how they operate in our discourses and social
practices
.
In the chapters to come I will develop a theory of self
that views the self as a process engaged in an ongoing
struggle to maintain itself within and through the discourses
and social practices at its disposal. As a feminist, I am
interested in the role gender categories have to play in any
process of self-const itut ion . I attempt to articulate the
content of these categories in light of that interest. In
keeping with the views presented here by Harding, Winant and
Ferguson, however, I am trying to move beyond any
essentialist notions about gender by moving beyond
essentialist notions about the self. My investigation of
gender categories in the pages to come must thus be taken as
an investigation of socially constructed categories that
currently play a key role int he construction of selves and
identities. I believe that some generalizations about these
categories can be made along the lines of feminist standpoint
literature on the basis of an examination of gendered social
structures. But my purpose in building on this literature is
not to make the line between genders any clearer. Rather, I
would like to articulate gender categories as still useful
categories for expressing different aspects of human
experience and modes of experiencing in the hopes of moving
beyond those categories and making a richer range of
experience available to us all.
NOTES
[1] "I shall now close my eyes, I shall stop my ears, I
shall call away all my senses... and thus
. . . I shall try little
by little to reach a better knowledge of .. .myself . " From
Meditation III of the Meditations (Descartes 1977, 157)
[2] "I never can catch myself at any time without a
perception, and never can observe anything but the
perception .... I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind
that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different
perceptions.” From section VI, part IV, book I of A Treat
i
sp
of Human Nature (Hume 1978, 252)
.
[3] For an interesting discussion of how philosophical
debate turned from a "self -approach" that took the experience
of being a self into account (represented by philosophers
like Descartes and Hume) to questions about personal identity
that no longer considered the subjective experience of being
a self, see C.O. Evans (1970)
.
[4] For a discussion of the French reception of Hegel
and its influence on French post-structuralist thought, see
Descombes (1982) .
[5] This is, of course, a very abbreviated discussion of
Marx's contribution to theories of the self. Marx, along
with Hegel, has had a decisive influence on both post-
structuralist and feminist thought. For discussions of some
aspects of this influence, see Descombes (1982) and Jaggar
(1983) .
[6] For the purposes of this dissertation I am
restricting myself to exploring and developing Lacanian
insights into the self; I will not here defend what I believe
to be the positive contributions of other post-structuralists
such as Derrida and Foucault to the discussion. Although I
am not at this point arguing for the importance of Lacan's
contribution, I hope this will become clearer in the next
chapter
.
[7] I will give a more detailed discussion of this
strand of feminism in section 1.4. My remarks here are meant
to situate the importance of this literature to my current
project of developing a theory of self.
[8] The classic sources on this are Dinnerstein (1977)
and Chodorow (1978) . I will discuss Chodorow in more detail
in chapter 3, section 4.
[9] Ann Ferguson develops this concept in Ferguson
(1983) : "The conceptual category sex/affective product ion is
a way of understanding the social organization of labor and
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the exchange of services that occur between men and women in
the production of children, affection, and sexuality" (p
156) .
[10] The cornerstone of theory on woman as other is
Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex (de Beauvoir 1961)
.
[11] I oppose a "masculinist" to a "feminist"
perspective here because the kind of perspective I'm talking
about involves the self-understanding to go along with it
required for seeing one's perspective as a perspective rooted
in particular kinds of experience. See the passage I quote
from Harding 1986, 26, on page of this chapter.
[12] I realize this claim has a utopian ring, but it
speaks to current feminist debates about forming feminist
collectives despite the differences among women. I will
follow up on this point in section 1.5.
[13] For some useful discussions of how post-
structuralist thought affects the interpretation of texts,
see Harari (1979), Silverman and Inde (1985), and Felman
(1982) .
[14] See, for example, Habermas (1971)
.
[15] For an interesting review of different responses to
a breakdown in this way of thinking rooted in various
philosophical traditions, see Baynes, Bohman and McCarthy
(1987) .
[16] See, for example, Allison (1977), O'Hara (1985) and
Lorraine (1987) . Also, for the French reception of Nietzsche
and its influence on post-structuralist thought, see
Descombes (1983), Deleuze (1983) and Kofman (1972).
[17] See, for example, Gadamer (1982) and Derrida
(1978) .
[18] "...the basic presuppositions of the metaphysics of
language, in plain talk, the presuppositions of reason.
Everywhere it sees a doer and doing; it believes in will as
the cause; it believes in the ego, in the ego as being, in
the ego as substance, and it projects this faith in the ego-
substance upon all things—only thereby does it first crecLt£
the concept of "thing."" From Twilight of the Idols
(Nietzsche 1968a, 483)
.
[19] "I taught them all my creating and striving, to
cind carry into One what in man is fragment and riddle
and dreadful accident..." From Thus Spoke Zqrftthu5tE£
(Nietzsche 1966, 198) . Also, see my discussion of Nietzsche
in chapter 4 .
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[20]
See Deleuze (1983) for an interesting discussion in
the post-structuralist tradition of Nietzsche's concept of
force
.
[21] "...thinking wants to be learned like dancing, ^S. a
kind of dancing." From Twilight of the Trinl
s
(Nietzsche
1968, 512) .
[22] For an interpretation that emphasizes this aspect
of Nietzsche's thought, see Nehemas (1985).
[23] "...of all social characteristics, gender is the
earliest to be solidified in the individual, the hardest to
change, and the most inextricably connected with how we
conceptualize and relate to ourselves, to others, and to
nature" (Harding 1983, 49).
[24] See, for example, Bordo (1985), DiStefano (1983),
Gilligan (1982), Harding and Hintikka (1983), Lloyd (1984),
O'Brien (1981), Trebilcot (1983), and Wawrytko (1981).
[25] "...Flax is arguing that infantile dilemmas are
more appropriately resolved, less problematic, for women than
for men. This small gap between the genders prefigures a
larger gap between the defensive gendered selves produced in
patriarchal modes of child rearing and the reciprocal,
degendered selves that could exist were men as well as women
primary caretakers of infants, and women as well as men
responsible for public life" (Harding 1986, 153)
.
CHAPTER 2
LACAN AND OBJECT RELATIONS
2 . 1 Introduction
In this chapter I will delve into the riches of
psychoanalytic theory guided by the requirements for a theory
of self argued for in chapter one, that is, a theory of self
that is
:
(1) a relational theory of self that looks at the self in a
broader social context that forms and is formed by that
context (as opposed to a scientific model of investigation
that would attempt to isolate the self as an object of
study)
;
(2) a processional theory of self that looks at the self as a
process in time (as opposed to a static object with essential
properties)
;
(3) a theory of self that takes the self as a solution to the
problem of effective human agency, i.e., that relates the
significance of an individual's "sense of self" to that
individual's thoughts and actions and the motivations that
give them significance;
(4) a theory of self that can explain thoughts and actions,
such as the writing of philosophical texts, as a self-
constituting activity of a particular type that can be linked
to the perspective it manifests.
In chapter three I will address the further requirement
that the theory of self I evolve be one that can account for
the role of gender in self-construction.
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Psychoanalysis is useful to the approach to a theory of
self I propose here because it explores the development of a
self and the problems that can arise in such development.
Because it was created to "cure" people whose functioning as
socially acceptable persons was impaired, it explores
possible breakdowns in the various attempts made by
individuals to find a solution to the problem of effective
human agency. Thus, rather than take the self for granted,
it has problematized the development of a self and theorized
about the conditions that make selfhood possible. This has
encouraged both a relational and a processional theory of
self: according to psychoanalytic theory the self is first
formed in the relational context of the family, and a self
formed in that context is an on-going process that can
disintegrate (e.g., into psychosis or schizophrenia) at a
later time. In addition, psychoanalysis is particularly
useful for a feminist theory of self due to its emphasis on
sexuality and the sensitivity to gender this emphasis
entails .
Lacanian psychoanalysis is particularly useful to my
project because Lacan chooses to emphasize the
linguistic/symbolic aspects of Freud's thought rather than
the aspects that stress biological drive that were taken up
by classical Freudian theory. In chapter one I argued that
the Hegelian tradition was more congenial to an approach to
the self that accounts for the dialectical interaction of
self and world. Philosophers like Nietzsche and Heidegger
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have extended this tradition by further exploring the
relationship of human consciousness to the world it "knows"
and desires. Lacan draws on this tradition [1] and extends
it into the terrain opened up by Freud with the help of
Saussurian linguistics (see below)
. The Hegelian tradition
emphasizes the effects of concepts and symbols on human
consciousness and human reality. In keeping with this
emphasis, Lacan deemphasizes the biological determinism of
classical Freudian theory and instead posits human behavior
as the effect of a broader context of social significance.
Thus, we can explain an individual's behavior as the effect
of both personal and social networks of meaning which relate
and interact in complicated ways.
Feminist work has substantiated the important role the
cultural coding of 'woman' and "women's experience" has
played in women's self-understanding. [2] The project of
emancipating women has thus included "consciousness-raising"
to help women see how their experiences have been coded by
images and concepts not necessarily their own, and the
creation of new, "liberating," images and concepts.
Feminists advocate this approach because they have found it
personally empowering— i.e., it works. Post-structuralist
work such as Lacan's can give us additional theoretical
impetus for explaining why the images and concepts with which
we code ourselves and our world are so important. In
addition, it can provide us with further insight into how
social networks of meaning impact on individuals and vice
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versa. This in turn can inform our social theory with new
possibilities for promoting social change.
Before expositing Lacan's views in more detail in
section I, I will now set the context for the peculiar flavor
of Lacanian psychoanalysis by clarifying the linguistic
emphasis of Lacan's rereading of Freud. Lacan's relationship
to more orthodox branches of psychoanalysis has not been
unproblematic. The Societe frangaise de psychanalyse formed
upon a succession led by Lacan and Daniel Lagache of a number
of analysts and students from the Societe psychoanalytique de
Paris. Although Lacan himself was never reconciled with the
International Association, the other members of the Societe
frangaise de psychanalyse have since rejoined it under a new
affiliation
.
One of the important points of contention that led to
the succession involved Lacan's emphasis on the question of
the status of human discourse in analysis. Lacan was opposed
to the tendency to reduce analysis to a study of behavior, a
quasi-biological theory of insnincts, or a "medical therapy
inclined to reduce the subject's psychical life to a series
of symptoms to be interpreted by the (all-knowing) analyst in
the way that a doctor interprets the symptoms of
physiological disease" (Wilden 1968, xxv)
.
Lacan felt that these tendencies failed to be true to
Freud's spirit. If one was to use psychoanalytic technique,
one had to have a correct understanding of the underlying
concepts. And a proper understanding of Freudian concepts
55
could be obtained only by orienting them in the domain of
language
.
Lacan felt that people had turned away from Freud's more
radical insights and that these insights could be put into
more modern terms with the help of structural linguistics.
Saussure, a key figure in this discipline, provided the
foundation for Lacan's theory of the signifier, although
Lacan chose to radicalize Saussure ' s views in his rereading
of Freud. According to Saussure, there is no one-to-one
correlation between words and things, between signifiers and
signified. Therefore any relationship between the two is an
arbitrary one. The meaning of each signifier is determined
by a signifying chain of signifiers. At each articulation it
has a new meaning that is determined by its relation to the
context of signifiers. Saussure represented the relationship
of a signifier (psychic imprint of an acoustic image) to the
signified (concept) thus: S/s with an ellipse around it to
emphasize the relationship of a particular signifier to its
signified (Lemaire 1977, ch . one). Lacan removed the ellipse
to emphasize the bar between the two. On his view, a
signifier signifies only by virtue of its relationship to the
whole chain (system) of signifiers. This produces the
constant sliding of the signified under the signifier
—
signifieds rather than staying put vis a vis any particular
signifier tend to slip under the bar. For the production of
meaning to take place, for signifiers to generate the
signified—meaning--there must be a third term to witness the
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meaning produced. This third term is the subject. The
subject who intends meaning constructs itself in relation to
meaning and thus completes the signifying chain by finding a
place for itself in that chain (Lemaire 1977, ch. three, and
Coward and Ellis 1977, ch. six)
.
Lacan thus calls attention to the notion of a subject in
process. Individuals of a society are not discrete entities
that provide the supports of a social structure. We are not
unified, consistent selves that adapt to the society we find
ourselves in. Instead, we constitute ourselves as subjects
by taking up a particular position with respect to the
network of social relations that constitute society. This
process can be traced, according to Lacan, in our use of
language. It is with our entry into language that we first
take up the position of subject. In order to utter
meaningful sentences I must come to grasp my position as a
speaker. If I say 'snow is white.' I must have some notion
of the snow as the subject of the ascription of a property,
and I must have some notion that the snow I am describing is
not me. In other words, a meaningful utterance locates the
speaker as well as what is spoken about. "Lacan calls the
domain of the signifier, in which this perpetual
restructuring of the subject takes place, the Symbolic order
(Bowie 1979, 132) . The "domain of the signifier" in its
broadest form includes all the symbolic orders by which we
represent reality in meaning structures that operate via
opposition, i.e., logico-mathemat ical symbolism, language,
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and social and cultural symbolism (Lemaire 1977, 55) . The
more sophisticated one's descriptions of the world become,
the more clearly one articulates one's position with respect
to the world.
To use language at all, then, there must be a subject
who can distinguish herself from the world, and make further
distinctions about what lies outside of her, as well as about
what she is. The Symbolic constitutes the possibilities for
being able to take up any position in language at all. The
particular relations an individual takes up with respect to
the particular set of social relations she finds herself in
are fixed in the same process by which she produces herself
as a subject. The prevalent ideologies of the culture will
determine the particular manifestations of positioning
oneself in one's culture. An awareness of the unconscious—
that is the "gap" between the coherent subject that is
perfectly suited to a position in society, and the
contradictions within the subject that work against that
position--reveal the price one must pay to perpetuate the
illusion of a unified self (Coward and Ellis 1977, 93-94).
In "The function and field of speech and language in
psychoanalysis" Lacan says that the unconscious is:
that part of the concrete discourse, insofar as it
is transindividual, that is not at the disposal of
the subject in re-establishing the continuity of
his conscious discourse (Lacan 1977, 49)
.
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The conscious understanding we have of ourselves and the
words we utter doesn't give a full account of the meaning of
our words. According to Anika Lemaire
:
Lacan's originality is to have wished to furnish
the proof that the signifier acts separately from
its signification and without the subject being
aware of it. As a constituent element of the
unconscious, the figure, the literal character of
the signifier, makes its effects felt in
consciousness without the mind having anything at
all to do with it (Lemaire 1977, 38)
.
Lacan makes use of the discoveries of the linguist, Jakobson,
in delineating some laws of language. On this view,
signifiers may be related by a principle of
combination/contiguity (e.g., cause/effect, part/whole,
sign/thing signified) or a principle of
selection/substitution (e.e.g, similarity/dissimilarity).
Lacan has assimilated these two principles or axes of
language to metonymy and metaphor respectively. he argues
that the processes of the unconscious are structured like a
language, and so also follow the axes of combination and
selection. Here he links the functions of metonymy and
metaphor to Freud's primary processes of condensation and
displacement respectively (Muller and Richardson 1979, 339-
344; Lemaire 1977, ch . two). The signifier that is actually
enunciated by a subject of speech has significance only in
the context of a whole "battery" of signifiers, unconscious
as well as conscious, of those who hear it--including the
speaker. Psychoanalysis is interested in investigating the
subject of speech—the effects of signifiers at"unconscious
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play in meaning making that are not readily accessible to the
conscious subject of speech.
Lacanian theory thus explores the various meaning
structures within which and by which human subjects come to
position themselves with respect to the world and one
another. Like Hegel, Lacan posits human consciousness as
always searching for self-certainty and transforming itself
snd its world in its attempts to achieve such certainty.
Like Nietzsche, Lacan posits a fictional self always on the
verge of disintegration, a self that speaks to the desire of
the subject for the illusion of wholeness. Like Heidegger,
Lacan posits a self formed in and from a social matrix of
meaning. What Lacan adds to this tradition is a linguistic
rereading of Freud that situates the origins of individual
selves within the social matrix of meaning and further
explores the strategies by which selves are created and
maintained. Because the strategies he explores are
linguistic and representational strategies humans use in
order to be persons that can function in a social whole, he
refocuses psychoanalytic explanations of human behavior.
Whereas before such explanations tended to restrict
themselves to the individual, his or her biological drives
and their interaction with the environment within the limited
context of the family and important others, Lacanian theory
extends that context to society as a whole. This impetus, in
turn, gives social theory new insights into how individual
selves negotiate larger social structures.
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Although I am not in complete agreement with all of
Lacanian theory, I think it deserves serious attention. As
we take our identities and our world less and less for
granted, we are more and more confronted with the complicated
ways in which the two interact. Lacanian theory addresses
the question of how our social meaning structures inform our
identities and how those identities in turn, navigate those
meaning structures. Lacan's linguistic turn brings the
question of the relationship of self and other, self and
world, into arenas already staked out by the contemporary
philosophical interest in language. With the help of
Lacanian theory we can read individual philosophical texts as
meaning structures that make sense only within a broader
context of social significance. We can also unravel those
texts as answers to the problem of effective human agency.
This kind of reading of philosophical texts can give us new
insight into how concerns about human identity within social
networks of significance inform and shape the content of
those texts.
On the Lacanian view I am espousing here that the
meaning produced by a subject of speech is the effect not
only of that subject's conscious discourse, but a whole range
of signifying chains that operate beyond the subject's
awareness, the traditional approach to philosophical texts
(interpretations constrained by some notion of the author's
conscious intentions) reveals only a small part of the
signifying activity actually at work. Furthermore, any
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production of meaning is also an act of self
—constitution
.
For example, a philosophical text, in addition to having a
meaningful "content "--the thoughts it communicates (or
miscommunicates ) --will also represent a self in process--the
evolving relationship of the authorial voice to the meaning
structures evoked in and by the text. An examination of
Lacanian psychoanalysis will hence be an aid to developing my
thesis that philosophical texts represent a from of self-
construction. In addition, Lacan feels that taking up a
position with respect to meaning structures is inextricably
gender-linked. Thus, his views on sexual difference will
help establish the role gender plays in that process of self-
construction .
In section 2.2. I will give an exposition of Lacan
supporting such a view. In section 2.3 I will develop the
implications of Lacanian theory for the reading of
philosophical texts as an activity of self-construction. In
section 2.4 I will appeal to object relations theory to
critique Lacan's notion of a "fictional" self, and in section
2.5 I will develop the implications of this critique for our
interpretive framework.
2 . 2 Lacan and the Fictional Self
To understand the Lacanian view of a "split" subject
unaware of much of the signifying activity motivating her
words, we must try and pin down some of Lacan's terminology.
In what follows I will characterize the pre-mirror, mirror,
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and post mirror stages of early childhood development
. This
characterization will help us to understand Lacan's notions
about the dialectical aspect of subjectivity as well as the
distinction he makes between the Imaginary and the Symbolic
realms. I will then characterize the adult human subject via
Lacan's "schema L" and summarize the interrelationships of a
split subject—the "effect" of signifying chains that operate
in various realms (the unconscious and consciousness)
,
and
self /other dialectics (me/other, I/Other (Other/me)) —that
make any production of meaning an overdetermined and
inherently conflictual process.
Lacan's linguistic rereading of Freud presents the
unconscious as primarily symbolic and relational. To
understand this conception of the unconscious we must be
aware of the careful distinction Lacan maintains between
Freud's notions of "instinct" (Instinkt) and "drive" (Trieb)
.
The former is a biological term used to describe animal
behavior that is fixed by heredity. The latter refers to the
energy which motivates human beings (Ragland-Sullivan 1986,
70) . We will see that on Lacan's reading this energy (in
French
—
pulsion) takes a representational form with the goal
of maintaining self-constancy and has very little connection
with innate instincts. Tracing out Lacan's views on the
initial formation of identity as it unfolds in early
childhood will give us a better sense of Lacan's rereading of
Freud as a structural theory about human motivation rather
than a biological theory about innate instincts. The stages
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I am going to describe are not developmental stages in the
sense of Piaget—they are not genetically encoded in the
biological organism. Instead, they are culturally encoded.
Becoming a subject within the cultural context of the meaning
structures of language and symbolic codes as we know them
requires a developmental process wherein the subject takes
her place in those codes
. How Lacan describes this process
is what I now want to address
.
The "Pre-mirror" or "Prespecular " Stage
The infant is born without sub ject ivity--no unconscious,
no identity, no sense of "self". He [3] has a highly
developed perceptual system, but very little muscular
coordination due to his prematuration at birth. Lacan
describes this organic insufficiency as a "lack of
coordination of his own mot ility
. . .
int ra-organic and
relational discordance during the first six months" (Lacan
1977, 18-19). Although the infant has neither individuality
or subjectivity and although he cannot walk, talk or obtain
food on his own, he watches and listens to the world around
him. Lacan calls this stage the "pre-mirror" stage. It
lasts from roughly 0-6 months and it is marked with the
experience of fragmentation. At this point drive takes its
primary form and is synonymous with "need." Need aims at the
suppression of all tension in order to keep the organism
constant through the satisfaction of physical needs (Ragland-
Sullivan 1986, 70)
.
The infant, being unable to actively
take charge of satisfying his needs, strives to maintain
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constancy through the introjection of part-objects. That is,
drive as a primary representational energy, mentally
represents part-objects that satisfy. There are four
prespecular drives whose images make up perceptual matrices
to which other images attach (Ragland-Sullivan 1986, 73-74)
.
The voice and gaze of the primordial Other—the Other that
satisfies his needs—are introjected as part-objects to paper
over his inability due to prematuration to maintain the
organism in a tensionless state of constancy.
These elemental signif iers--the voice, the gaze, part-
objects, etc. --are recorded by the infant in his link with
the Other that maintains the organism's constancy. Because
the infant can't place himself in the array of
representations of lived experience that he records, he
merges with them, becoming, for example, the part-object of
breast, the gaze of his mother, or his own gaze. Phonemes,
bits and pieces of the language spoken to and around him are
taken in along with other images. At this stage these images
are fragmentary and fleeting; there is no underlying
continuity to perception.
Freud describes this early stage of human existence in
"Instincts and their Vicissitudes" (Freud 1957) . The
infant's "pleasure-ego" absorbs objects that are sources of
pleasure and "thrusts forth upon the external world whatever
within itself gives rise to pain" (p. 82). The pleasure ego
is so named because the criterion for distinguishing the ego
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from the external world is a subjective one based on what
gives the infant pleasure.
This stage, along with the next, are both narcissistic
stages where the infant has as yet made no distinction
between himself and the pleasurable objects that are (in
actuality) distinct from him. He is self-sufficient; he is
his world insofar as he makes no distinction between himself
and the objects that give him pleasure. It is not until the
object stage (Lacan's post-mirror stage) that the infant
begins to realize himself as subject and pleasure and pain
denote relations of the ego to objects rather than the status
of those objects in terms of inner and outer.
The Mirror Stage
The "mirror stage," Lacan's term for the final phase of
narcissism that precedes the object stage, is crucial for the
development of subjectivity. It occurs at roughly 6-18
months and is marked by the "jouissance" (joy) of fusion with
a whole Gestalt of the human form. Freud discusses the
interplay of the actual ego and the ego-ideals by which an
adult measures herself in "On Narcissism" (Freud 1957)
.
In
the primary narcissism of the mirror stage the infant feels
himself to be ideal--his jubilation at the sight of his
reflection is not yet marred by any suspicion of lack. In
the transition from primary narcissism to the object stage a
sort of dialectic between the actual ego and the ego-ideal
comes into play:
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To this ideal ego is now directed the self love
which the real ego enjoyed in childhood. the
narcissism seems to be now displaced on to this new
ideal ego, which, like the infantile ego, deems
itself the possessor of all perfections
. . . . That
which he projects ahead of him as his ideal is
merely his substitute for the lost narcissism of
his childhood, the time when he was his own ideal
(p. 116)
.
Lacan's description of the origin of this dialectic given in
"The mirror stage" (Lacan 1977, 1), characterizes the
illusory identifications of the Imaginary realm. It is the
nature of this dialectic that will lead Lacan to posit the
fictional nature of the self.
In the mirror-stage the infant is still narcissistic; he
has not yet experienced the rupture of the tie between him
and his mother that will confront him with wanting what is
absent. Hence, the ego as subject has not yet emerged. yet
the glimmerings are there. The infant takes pleasure in his
reflection because it presents him with "the total form of
the body by which the subject anticipate in a mirage the
maturation of his power" (p. 2) . The Gestalt reflected in
the mirror is a pregnant one which will give birth to the
self to come. It "symbolizes the mental permanence of the I,
at the same time as it prefigures its alienating destination"
(p. 2) . The dialectic between actual ego and ego-ideal is
prefigured here in primordial form as the infant assumes the
image of the total body (representing the mental permanence
of the I) in contrast to "the turbulent movements that the
subject feels are animating him" (p. 2) (which contrast
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prefigures the gap between actual ego and ego-ideal)
. The
assumption of the image
would seem to exhibit in an exemplary situation the
symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a
primordial form, before it is objectified in the
dialectic of identification with the other, and
before language restores to it, in the universal,
its function as subject, (p. 2)
This first encounter with one's reflection sets a dialectic
in motion that prefigures the dialectic between self and
Other to come.
The primordial I precipitated from this original
dialectic "situates the agency of the ego, before its social
determination, in a fictional direction which will always
remain irreducible for the individual alone" (p. 2) . That
is, the very origin of the dialectic between self and Other
is founded on the assumption of an image in the form of a
totality that belies the fragmented movements and responses
the infant actually feels himself to be. The image of the
total form of the body is an anticipation of the mastery over
motor locomotion that at this stage of dependency is yet to
come. Hence, even the primordial I, the prefiguration of the
ego to come, is a fiction, based on a projection of what has
not yet occurred. The infant assumes the image because it is
more pleasurable to feel one's self to be a functioning whole
rather than a random array of discrete movements and
sensations. But to assume this image from the outside is to
internalize something that comes from the external world. At
the pleasure-ego phase this is natural--but the primordial I
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will emerge in the object-stage as the ego, still carrying
with it the fiction of an object (the image) absorbed into
itself on the basis of the subjective criterion of pleasure.
Thus, at the very irreducible core of the self (if one could
call it a core) lies a fiction of totality assumed from the
outside that is later elaborated layer by layer in the
dialectic of identification with the other.
The gap in the primordial me initiates the rivalry
between these two "selves" (the inner sense of fragmentation
vs. the whole image of the human form) and the aggressivity
of the me who defends against the feeling of disintegration
by identifying with an alien object. Whereas primary energy
in the prespecular stage aimed at satisfaction of physical
need, drive at the mirror stage becomes secondary energy or
primary libido that takes the form of Desire. There is a
growing awareness of differentiation and otherness along with
psychic awareness, although the "pleasure-ego" still reigns.
The infant still feels himself to be what gives him pleasure,
but rather than merging with the part-objects of the
prespecular stage he wants to merge with the mother as a
whole object. To feel that he and his mother are one, the
infant must gain the mother's recognition. Pleasure becomes
linked with responses from the mother that demonstrate his
effect on the mother as a whole. Desire in its primary form
is the Desire to be desired by the (m) Other in order to fuse
with her; it is this recognition of the (m) Other that desires
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him that allows ident ificatory merging to occur (Ragland-
Sullivan 1986, 72-73) .
Thus Need matures into Desire via the recognition of the
(m) Other. To be desired the infant must forfeit certain
pleasures in order to conform to the desire of the (m) Other.
Need in its original undifferentiated form is repressed as
the infant becomes increasingly aware of him-"self" as an
object of the voice and gaze of the other. It is recorded as
primal repression—the fixing of a primary, signifying chain-
-the earliest representations of Desire in their link to the
(m) Other. The infant identifies with the mother, fusing with
her so as to retain the sense of stability and continuity he
wouldn't otherwise feel. At some point (given all the
frustrations his mother causes him) he comes to realize that
he not only isn't omnipotent (that is, he isn't the whole
world that matters to him--the mother that supplies his
needs) but his mother is also imperfect. She wants more than
to cater to his needs, she has desires of her own. Not only
does the infant still want to fuse with the mother (as in the
mirror stage proper) but he becomes increasingly aware of his
separateness. The realization that the mother lacks (i.e.,
has desires of her own) brings on the castration complex
which marks the end of the mirror stage. With the advent of
the castration complex the primordial ego formed through
ident if icatory merging with the (m) Other will succumb to
secondary repression. The child will displace his desire for
(m) Other-fusion onto cultural substitutions that disallow
70
such fusion, and the ego will be built up by layers of
identifications. But representations of ident if icatory
mergings with the (m) Other who originally desired one in very
specific ways, although repressed, will continue to exert an
effect
.
The Post-Mirror Stage
For Lacan, the transition from narcissism to the object
stage is marked by loss; the tie between mother and child is
lost and the child is confronted with his existential
negativity. That is, the child realizes that he is not self-
sufficient, and that objects important to him (such as the
mother) can absent themselves and so are separate from him.
But what of love? In "Instincts and their Vicissitudes"
Freud says that love "originates in the capacity of the ego
to satisfy some of its instincts auto-erotically through the
obtaining of 'organ-pleasure'" (Freud 1957, 85)
.
It is
originally narcissistic in nature, and is then transferred to
objects absorbed into the ego and "expresses the motor
striving of the ego after these objects as sources of
pleasure" (p. 85). Thus, the infant discovers that some of
those stimuli it can't avoid, i.e., certain instincts, it can
satisfy itself. This auto-eroticism is then transferred to
objects the pleasure-ego has absorbed, and is finally
expressed as love in the motor-striving of the ego after the
objects that give it pleasure. In "On Narcissism" Freud says
that the departure of the developing ego from primary
narcissism results in a vigorous attempt to recover the
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primary state (where the infant was self-sufficient)
. The
departure is due to the displacement of libido to an external
ego-ideal. Thus, object-libido and ego-libido become
distinguished, the latter being the narcissistic return to
the self, while the former is based on the displacement of
libido to an external ideal. here we find the basis of the
desire and desire to be desired that Lacan will develop: "He
who loves has, so to speak, forfeited a part of his
narcissism, which can only be replaced by his being loved"
(Freud 1957, 120); "an actual happy love corresponds to the
primal condition in which object-libido and ego-libido cannot
be distinguished" (p. 121) . that is, it is not enough to
strive after the objects that give it pleasure; the ego, in
its attempt to return to the narcissistic state where it felt
no lack, needs also to be loved, to have turned upon it the
libido of the Other.
For Lacan, the end of the mirror-stage inaugurates "the
dialectic that will henceforth link the I. to socially
elaborated situations" (Lacan 1977, 5) . The I is then turned
into an apparatus "for which every instinctual
thrust ... should correspond to a natural
maturation ... dependent , in man, on a cultural mediation as
exemplified, in the case of the sexual object, by the Oedipus
complex." (p. 5-6). That is, at the object-stage the ego
strives after the objects it desires through the cultural
mediation of the Oedipus complex. This means that a third
party is introduced into what was a dyadic relationship
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between the mother and infant, i.e., the father taken as a
paternal metaphor": "The father is a function and refers to
a law, the place outside the imaginary dyad against which it
k r®9-ks (Rose 1985, 39) . Desire in its secondary form
emerges as the child confronts its existential negativity and
yearns for the happily self-sufficient state of narcissism
when he constituted his whole world. In desiring the mother—
-the lost object--the child wants also to be desired; it is
in this reflection of libido from the Other that the self
attempts to restore the lost self-sufficiency of primary
narcissism
.
At this point the father and language step in with the
Law-of-the-Father that forbids incest (fusion with the
mother) and gives the child something to compensate him for
his terrible loss—the symbolizing power of language. Words,
due to their power to represent what's absent, help the child
to compensate himself for the pain of separation from his
mother. In the famous fort/da game of the baby observed by
Freud (in Beyond the Pleasure Principle ) , the baby throws a
cotton reel out of his crib saying ooo (fort--gone) and
reeling it back saying da — thus mastering (according to
Freud) the comings and goings of his mother by representing
them with the help of the spool, and words that will
eventually come to represent in and of themselves. By
soothing the pain of absence, words allow the child to defer
his desires, to articulate them as representations that he
can keep until such time as satisfaction is possible.
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In the desire to be desired the child identifies with
the object the mother seems to desire, i.e., the father.
Thus,, the child assumes an image that anticipates the power
that is not yet his in much the same way as the infant
assumes the mirror-image. This identification, however, is
modified by the restrictions placed upon the child in the
symbolic matrix which encodes kinship relations (and
prohibits incest)
. Hence, a dialectic between the actual ego
with all its inadequacies in getting its desires satisfied
and the ego-ideal the ego compares itself to (the ego-ideal
incorporating ever more of the restrictions the actual ego is
confronted with)
,
is mediated through successive
identifications with the Other within the Symbolic matrix.
The castration complex is the moment in which the
subject finds his signifying place and completes the
detachment from the dependency on the mother as source of
satisfaction of needs. In the post-mirror stage the Desire
to be desired so that ident if icatory fusion can occur is
displaced from the mother who becomes identified with the
mysterious force of repression. The child attempts to fill
in his libidinal lack through fusions with cultural
substitutions, rather than the spontaneous fusions of the
narcissistic pre-mirror and mirror stages (Ragland-Sullivan
1986, 79)
.
Thus, secondary libido, while still linked to the
Imaginary, manifests itself in the Symbolic. The transition
from the Imaginary to the Symbolic is forced by the
assumption of castration which creates the lack "through
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which desire is produced in a way organized to cultural ends"
(Coward and Ellis 1977, 120)
.
In the primary processes of the unconscious system,
psychical energy flows freely by means of displacement and
condensation. These processes are at work in the fleeting
and fragmentary mergings of the infant in the prespecular
stage as well as the narcissistic identifications of the
mirror stage. In the secondary processes, "satisfaction is
delayed while the mind tries different ways to satisfaction"
(Coward and Ellis 1977, 100) . In the post-mirror stage the
subject acquires the ability to exercise the secondary
processes of conscious thought . The processes of ego-
construction through the layering of self/other
identifications in accordance with paternal law are the same
processes as that by which the subject is constructed in
language. The subject first splits itself off from "its
sense of continuum with the mother's body, then it splits
itself off from the ideal ego of the mirror stage, and
finally it separates itself in order to find itself a place
in symbol isat ion " (Coward and Ellis 1977, 100) . Thus, the
process which constitutes a subject of speech who can place
itself with respect to its world constitutes the unconscious
in the same movement (Coward and Ellis 1977, 115)
.
The Schema L
For Lacan, a theory of "self" is a misnomer if what we
mean by a self is a unified subject of experience. Lacan's
theory of self is better termed a theory of the human
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subject. And rather than a theory about how an ego develops
and maintains itself, it is a theory about a structure of
signification which can only maintain itself by repeatedly
reconstituting these significations in the present.
With the help of Lacan's famous schema L [4] we can
summarize our characterization of the pre—mirror, mirror, and
post-mirror stages:
In this schema Lacan characterizes the human subject as a
quadrature of dialectical structures that oscillate between
four poles. The signifying chains that are activated in
these structures operate in the two realms of the Imaginary
and the Symbolic, as well as at the unconscious and conscious
levels. It is not always clear just how to distinguish the
various features of this quadrature. The following rendition
of their interconnections is bound to reduce some of the
complexity of Lacan's thought, but in doing so I hope to make
clear how Lacanian theory can support the view that
philosophical texts can be read as representative of a self-
constituting activity.
The diagram represents four poles of subjectivity
through which an individual's signification oscillates. S
represents the speaking subject—the 'I' of speech. The 'me'
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is the subject of identifications and narcissism that informs
the 'I' with libidinal energy. The 'other' (with a small o)
is the other that one addresses in the Imaginary realm— it
functions as a screen onto which the identity drama is
projected. The 'Other' (with a capital 0) is the source of
unconscious truth—the Other to which an individual's "full
speech" is addressed. With any production of meaning the
subject is also questioning itself about its identity.
The Other is formed, in part, by the primordial
representations (the voice, gaze, part-objects, etc.,
discussed on page of this chapter) of the prespecular
stage. In the precipitation of the me that desires fusion
with the (m) Other, representations of lived experience
dropped out, thus forming the primordial unconscious, as
irrelevant to the primary libido. This forms the first split
in the subject. The second split occurs when the (m) Other of
Imaginary merging in the mirror stage is repressed due to the
castration complex and the acquisition of subjectivity in the
Symbolic. With secondary repression Desire for fusion is
deferred via symbolic representations and representations of
lived experiences of the (m) Other's Desire is relegated to
the place of the Other as well.
The split subject of the me of narcissistic
identifications and the I of speech make the project of self-
identity and self-constitution an on-going project of trying
to find some equilibrium between conflicting aspects of the
subject in order to maintain the illusion that the subject is
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a unified self. The place of the Other is the place of both
lived representations not incorporated into the me/other
dialectic and the place of meaning structures of the Symbolic
(i.e., language) not incorporated by the I into the conscious
signifying chains of the subject. The I is the locus of
significance as determined by the rules of language. The me
is the ideal ego first formed through identification with the
mother (or primary caretaker) and then diverted into a series
of identifications with ego ideals. Although the me/other
dialectic of narcissistic identifications originates in the
mirror stage, its origins have been relegated to the place of
the Other. This dialectic operates in the realm of the
Imaginary where the me seeks to maintain the illusion that it
is without lack by repeating self/other identifications
reminiscent of mother-fusion.
The I/Other dialectic originates in the post-mirror
stage where the subject is introduced into the realm of
language and the Symbolic order. In the taking on of sexual
identity and the subjectivity of a language speaker, a split
is created in the subject between the me of narcissistic
identifications and the I that submits Desire to the paternal
law. In the Symbolic realm the I positions itself with
respect to the social categories of the Symbolic order,
activating signifying chains by placing itself as a signifier
with respect to those chains. It is continually deflected
from a dialectical relationship with the Other, by the me
which wants to dictate the position the I takes with respect
78
to an other. In the on going search of the me for a sense of
cohesiveness, a stable, continuous identity, it enlists the
aid of the I to "translate” its ident if icatory needs by
adding the additional, intentional aim to the speaking
subject of tracing out the desire of the me.
The dialectic of the I with the Other can take two
forms. The I can be the subject of "empty" speech, forever
deferring Desire by representing objects of Desire in the
Symbolic that are further and further removed from the
unconscious representations of lived experience. That is,
layers of identification motored by the me are mechanically
played out in keeping with Symbolic meaning structures rather
than the representations of lived experience of mother-
fusion. Or, the I can be the subject of "full" speech that
addresses the Other of real Desire--thus activating
representations of lived experiences of satisfied Desire that
have thus far eluded the me/other dialectic. [5]
The unconscious is the discourse of the Other. It
speaks in the individual's dreams, slips of the tongue and so
forth. This speech will have an ostensible listener, the
other, to whom one is speaking, but will actually be
addressed to one's own Other, the source of unconscious
truth. The truth sought by what Lacan calls the "true"
subject is the truth that the me evades with every
narcissistic trick of identification that it has at its
disposal. It is the truth of the subject's radical lack of
being, the primordial gap that marks it. While the me
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continually searches to overcome this gap by papering it over
with identifications that give it the illusion of being
whole, full speech confronts this gap by articulating one's
real Desire—Desire that has been repressed by the me in its
ruses to maintain illusions about its wholeness
.
The me is a function of the Imaginary while the I
operates in the Symbolic. The identifications of the me are
crucial to subjectivity, but they also lead to the alienation
of one's truth in illusion. The Lacanian "ideal norm" of
selfhood (if we can call it that) is to objectify the
specular lures of the Imaginary other in language (thus
rendering Imaginary significance Symbolic) . The strategies
of the me were put into place in the preoedipal stage and
lost to consciousness with the resolution of the Oedipus
complex. Others are searched for that will mirror back the
wholeness the me can identify with--that is, one seeks the
illusion of being a particular ideal ego with a fairly
predictable set of ego ideals to go with it. These Imaginary
"lures" that "capture" the me can restrict the range of an
individual's conscious acts and thoughts. The imagos of the
Imaginary act as lures that motivate a person's view of
reality, putting that person's range of available signifying
possibilities into the service of a limited repertoire of
narcissistic identifications. Since the self (the me) isn't
a thing, but a dialectical structure dependent on the other
to maintain the fiction that it exists, libidinal energy is
unceasingly motivating the I, another dialectical structure,
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to find and recreate the ident if icatory relationships it
needs for its survival.
At the same time, signifiers repressed first due to the
"no" of the father and one's insertion into the Symbolic, and
then repressed due to one's subjugation to that Symbolic
order, still exert pressure. The illusions of the me are
belied by the signifiers that represent aspects of lived
experience the me has had to deny. The "truths" of the
Symbolic order, reality as it is officially sanctioned by
socially imposed meaning structures, are also belied by
aspects of one's lived experience repressed in deference to
those structures.
The truth of the unconscious points to what Lacan calls
the Real—the realm beyond language, the ineffable, that
which slips away when we try to speak it. [6] The signifiers
of the unconscious use a different logic than that of the
conscious system. But it is still composed of
representations of lived experience that form networks of
meaning. When Lacan says that the unconscious is structured
like a language, he means that the signifiers that make it up
(representations of lived experience) are significant in
relationship to one another, just as the signifiers of
language are. They form signifying chains that operate on
the principle of condensation and displacement--which Lacan
assimilates to the linguistic principles of metaphor and
metonymy (Wilden 1968, 238-249) . The Real of the subject's
lived present activate the signifiers that operate in the
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Imaginary and Symbolic realms, on conscious and unconscious
levels, but finally eludes all attempts at definitive
signification
.
In listening to the discourse of the Other, the Other
who responds to the full speech of the I, one is freed from
the lures of the Imaginary, and open to the possibility of
new meaning. Shattering specular identifications shakes the
person's stability by threatening her "sense of self", but it
also allows the possibility for coming closer to articulating
the true Desire blocked out (repressed) in the need to
maintain an illusory wholeness. Releasing significance
hitherto relegated to the unconscious releases truths of the
individual's lived experience not yet accounted for by the
range of conventional significance offered her given her
Desire as mapped out by the me. While the Symbolic order of
language can lead one to further and further alienation by
deferring one's desire further and further through Symbolic
signifying chains in the service of the me, it can also lead
one closer to unconscious truth by representing one's Desire
more accurately—the Desire articulated in the discourse of
the Other.
Lacan went a step further than Saussure when he claimed
that not only isn't there a determined link between signifier
and signified, but that the signified is produced by the
signifier. And that all signifiers have the same signified
that is, desire and castration (Juranville 1984, ch . III).
This common signified presents itself according to the
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primordial distinction between man and woman—the signifying
difference par excellence. The signifiers are equivalent in
the sense that it is true for all of them that they only
exist due to their difference from the others. For a
signifier to signify it cannot be taken in isolation, but
must be taken in tis difference from the whole battery of
signifiers. No one signifier or signifying chain can render
either a timeless truth or a whole subject. Meaning will
continually shift with the shifting of signifiers in
signifying chains. The subject will never know a definitive
truth about either itself or the world because the signifieds
of meaning production can never be fixed. The Desire to take
one's place in the Symbolic as the person one "really" is is
forever thwarted by the inadequacy of the signifier by which
one must represent oneself. Thus, the subject is doomed to
"castration." Since there is nothing that can fill in the
subject's lack so it can finally be whole, the object of
desire as such is impossible. The subject will never attain
the wholeness it seeks by deferring its Desire through
Symbolic signifying chains. Without such an object one might
expect desire as well to be impossible. But oedipal rivalry
dissimulates the impossibility of mother-fusion, leaving one
with the illusion that one can find the absolute object that
will replace the lost (m) Other and fill in one's gap. The
absolute object or "objet a" (the desired object) is the
"lure" that makes Desire possible despite its futility.
Thus, the signifier and speech creates both the law of
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castration imposed on the one who speaks as well as the
subject that desires.
The subject as a signifier, and the self as the effect
(that is, the signified) are linked through the discourse of
the Other, i.e., the unconscious. A changing array of
signifiers at both the conscious and unconscious level will
effect changes in the signified. Thus, my identity is the
outcome of a signifying network at various levels (conscious-
preconscious and unconscious) and in three realms (the
Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real) that play themselves
out in a zigzag between the four poles of the Schema L.
2 . 3 Self-Construction and the Production of Meaning: Take T
In section 2.2 we saw that in the act of speaking or
writing, the Lacanian subject is not merely attempting to
communicate information to his audience. Instead, there is
an oscillation of meaning between the four poles that make up
the Lacanian quadrature. That is, not only is the human
subject not a unified entity transmitting information to
another unified entity, but it is a quadrature in complicated
communication with itself who only incidentally transmits
information to another.
Such a view of the human subject requires us to change
the form of our interpretations of philosophical texts. The
assumption that there is a unified self behind the text with
a unified set of intentions leads the interpreter to cancel
out contradictions and discrepancies in the text to conjure
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up a picture of what the author "really" meant. The
assumption that the author is a split subject, a decentered
self of signifying chains that oscillate between four poles,
renders interpretations that assume such a unified
subjectivity reduct ionistic
. A reading that cancels out the
contradictory, and equally valid, meanings the text yields
doesn't do justice to the complexity of the text.
Desire—the desire to fill in the primordial gap in-
being— is the motivating force of enunciation. The speaking
'I' strings together signifying chains according to socially
acceptable codes of meaning. The 'me' directs these chains
in keeping with its desire to maintain the illusion of
wholeness and continuity. The 'I' in enunciating a
signifying chain signifies the self by taking up a position
in the signifying chains enunciated. This position is
motivated by the 'me' which ceaselessly reconstitutes its
position with respect to the other according to old patterns.
If the subject cannot reconstitute itself with respect to the
other—that is, put into play the signifying chains that have
represented it in the past—the subject will be threatened
with disintegration— loss of continuity, loss of meaning,
loss of self.
Although the 'me' attempts to direct the speaking 'I' in
its interest, the subject's "truth" which has its location in
the place of the Other will subvert those attempts. We thus
have the picture of a subject at odds with herself. A
subject with two sources of "truth"—the "truth" of the ego
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that would paper over its lack with illusion, and the "truth"
of the unconscious subject who would subvert that truth by
bringing into play the unanticipated meaning of signifiers
not yet incorporated into the me/other dialectic. The gaps
and contradictions of a text can be seen as the collision of
these two orders of "truth"—the self-certainty of the me
(based on illusion) and the unanticipated meaning of the
unconscious forever trying to subvert that truth and confront
the individual with its irreducible lack.
So, the very act of writing theory is simultaneously an
act of self-construction in which the subject constructs
signifying chains that position it as a signifier. In the
act of writing theory, the writer is attempting to assimilate
experience in accordance with rules of conventional language
as well as in accordance with the identity themes that give
coherence to that writer's experience. To do only the first
would result in arbitrary strings of words that would have
meaning, but no impetus. Without a speaking "self" that
informs the words with intent ionality, significance beyond
the conventional meaning of the words would be missing,
leaving us with the feeling that we were just reading
arbitrary strings of words. What gives language impact is
the drive of a 'me' that through its drive to reconstitute a
relation to an other in continuity with an endless series of
such relations that extend back to earliest infancy, attempts
to communicate something beyond the conventional meaning of
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the words—the message of who the speaker is, what he is
about, what his relationship to the words spoken is.
Thus theory is simultaneously about the subject who is
writing it as well as about the object under examination. We
can thus read it for the story it conveys about the positions
a subject took in constructing self-identity as well as for
the meaning it -conveys in terms of a social pool of meaning.
What I would like to examine in philosophical texts is
the play of the me and the unconscious subject of truth as
two levels of meaning in a text--the identifications
translated by the 'I' as well as the "symptoms" of the text
that subvert those identifications.
On a Lacanian view, a theorist wants to find the lost
object, that which will fill his lack and make him whole.
That object has been truth. There are times when theory
pushes at the boundaries of meaning in order to incorporate
more of the lived experience that evades current (Symbolic)
meaning structures, and there are times when language is put
into the service of maintaining old, if comforting,
illusions. Lacan gives us a way of reading out both. As
Lacan says, although ideally we want to do away with the me
entirely, that is not possible. Without the me we would have
no subjectivity whatsoever. But what theory should be able
to do is to push at the outer limits of that subjectivity.
Any "self "-concept ion is going to be inadequate since it is
based on a fiction. Analogously no theory is ever going to
be whole. The illusion of the theorist is that she's finally
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found closure, finally gotten the "whole" theory, the "whole"
truth. She wants to maintain the illusion of that wholeness,
just as she wants to maintain the illusion of her own
wholeness, by evading the truth that would subvert that
illusion--the meaning that eludes her theory. The desire of
the theorist is finally to take on the image of the whole
theorist --the theorist who's whole, who knows all, who has
filled in the gap in self, the gap in knowledge. Lacan
suggests not only that that's impossible, but that the desire
motivating such a quest is inextricably bound with the quest
for wholeness of self, for self-identity. We will never find
the lost 'objet a' because we never had it to begin with.
And yet we will be forever searching for that object. And,
in fact, Lacan does not advocate giving up the quest for
wholeness--in fact, the "cure" consists not in giving up the
quest, but in adhering to it more rigorously, in a less
alienated way, by escaping the lures of the me that would
delude us into thinking that we've already achieved what we
were looking for. [7]
But while Lacan emphasizes the illusory nature of the
me '
s
quest for wholeness, I will now turn to object relations
theory for a different reading of the me '
s
activity. A look
at the work of Winnicott and Mahler, presented in the next
section, will allow us to critique Lacan's conceptions of the
mirror stage and of the radically fictional nature of the me.
This critique will allow us, in section 2.5, to conceptualize
alternative to the strategy for self-constitution
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characterized by Lacan's schema L which, in turn, will allow
us to conceptualize an alternative strategy in the production
of meaning.
2 • 4 Object Relation s and a Critique of the Fictional Self
Although Lacanian psychoanalysis is attractive in light
of my project, I believe that it can be enriched with
insights taken from object relations theory. Lacan makes
room for the pre-oedipal experiences of the mother/child dyad
that object relations theory tends to emphasize with his
notion of the Imaginary. But on his view, one takes up one's
Symbolic position in language by accepting the paternal law
(forbidding sexual access to the mother) and the father as
legislator of that law. Although positionality in the
Symbolic order is influenced by effects of the Imaginary, it
has more to do with the father (or the paternal law) than the
mother. I think that Lacan's emphasis on the Symbolic leads
him to overlook intricacies of relationships in the Imaginary
that could further illuminate how positioning in the Symbolic
is affected. When we come to the question of sexual
difference and the role of gender in self-construction in
chapter three the emphasis of object relations theory on such
relationships will open the door to possibilities overlooked
by Lacan
.
Lacan's quadrature provides an illuminating conceptual
framework for understanding how the kinds of pre-verbal
identifications made in early childhood can interact with
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identifications rooted in the Symbolic, e.g., the taking on
of a particular role in life (doctor, lawyer or Indian
chief)
. The latter involves inserting oneself into the
symbolic code, taking one's place in a network of kinship
relationships within the family (daughter/sister or
son/brother etc.) and in the broader network of social
relationships (black and rich or white and middle-class for
example)
. These positions are encoded in language—marked
out by the signifying chains connected with each position
(for example, it sounds "funny" for me to say "I'm a menace
to society if "I" refers to an upper-middle-class doctor and
perfectly natural if "I" refers to a poor car-thief) . The
pre-verbal identifications of the Imaginary involve
identifications based on symbiotic fusion with the primary
caretaker. Since such fusion involves a more "direct" form
of identification than an identification mediated by symbolic
representation, it is less accessible to symbolic
understanding. That is, analyzing what my uncle represents
to me as a role-model that I patterned myself after is more
straight-forward than analyzing the wordless fusion
experiences I had with my primary caretaker as an infant
.
Lacan's interrelating of the Imaginary and Symbolic realms
underlines the unconscious effects my original fusion had in
any later identifications that take place on a more
"conscious" level. On his account, Imaginary effects are
playing into the Symbolic identifications I later make. And
these Imaginary effects remain unconscious for the most part.
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The 'me' enlists the 'I' in the attempts to repeat its
original identifications and so maintain "self "-continuity
.
Thus the preoedipal experiences that constitute the Imaginary
have a lasting effect throughout one's life, no matter how
much they are modified and diverted by the Oedipal complex
and the diversion of desire through the symbolic chain.
It is to Lacan's credit that he underlines the interplay
of the Imaginary and Symbolic realms throughout life—the
preoedipal realm where the mother predominates and the
Symbolic realm of the father introduced by the Oedipus
complex. In this way we can see how both the mother and the
father (taken in the traditional sense) can exert an on-going
influence on one's self-identity, and we can untangle some of
the mechanisms involved in such an identity. Lacan
emphasizes the "lures" of the Imaginary and the "illusion" of
wholeness that fusion gives one—an illusion that we must
shatter if we are to uncover "truth". His technique of
analysis and the "short session" emphasizes the father role
of rupture—breaking off the analysand's session at arbitrary
moments in order to reveal the illusory nature of any
Imaginary identifications the analysand may be in the course
of carrying out. [8] We could contrast this kind of
technique to that of the object relations theorist,
Winnicott, who prefers sessions longer than the traditional
50 minutes, sessions which foster trust and the creation of a
"holding environment" for the analysand. This technique
would seem to be more in keeping with the analyst as mother.
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I agree with Lacan that Imaginary fixations that lead
one to ignore or deny aspects of one's experience that don't
allow for the maintainence of illusory wholeness can
unnecessarily restrict one, leading to a life ever more
alienated from the "Real" that eludes one's rigidified
structures of meaning. Lacan's technique, by involving the
analysand in the "death work" necessary to break one out of
restricted meaning structures, certainly has a place in
liberating one from such fixations. His own "flight from
mother engulfment," however, has led him to underemphasize
the more positive aspects of the Imaginary—aspects that can
be revealed with the help of object relations theory.
While Lacan emphasizes the primordial gap in one's
"self "--the gap between one's own inner sense of
fragmentation versus the alien mirror image one identifies
with in order to feel whole--ob ject relations theory attempts
a more complete account of the origins of self. An important
feature of identification in the Imaginary for an object
relations theorist is the "match" between infant and primary
caretaker that make it possible. Of course, Lacan recognizes
the necessity of adequate mothering for the origins of self,
but object relations theorists trace out more completely just
what "adequate" might mean. In doing so, they bring
attention to a feature of primary identification that Lacan
overlooks—that is, the necessity for an adaptation on the
part of both infant and primary caretaker in order to achieve
the particular kind of connectedness that allow
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identification to occur. This leads me to question the
completely illusory quality of such identifications. True,
the infant's belief that caretaker and infant are one is an
illusion that will be destroyed, compensated for and
protected aqainst in various ways by the infant throughout
his life. But contrary to Lacan's claim that most
communication is "mis "-communication, it seems crucial to me
that the feeling of identification (that for the infant
amounts to an experience of fusion) is based on a very real
adaptation of two entities, one to another. In Lacan's
terms, one might say that identification involves actual
experiences of a match between two human beings with respect
to their desire to be desires. That is, for periods of time
at least, the infant IS what the caretaker wants and the
caretaker IS what the infant wants. Thus, identification
involves the felt experience, for a period of time, of
actually being all to one another, with no need to defer
one's desire through the symbolic chain. The infant can feel
at one with its caretaker because the caretaker identifies
with the needs of the infant.
It can be argued that men have a more difficult time re-
experiencing this kind of fusion in their lives—those
moments when two people can actually be what the other
desires at the same moment —because of their masculine need
to dis-identify with the mother (cf. Chodorow 1978,
Dinnerstein 1977) . Reading Winnicott and Mahler, we can get
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some sense of what a fusion experience involves, of what a
"match" between two human beings might mean.
Winnicott felt that Freud presupposed the "separateness
of the self and a structuring of the ego" (Winnicott 1965,
41) . Because Freud assumed that the patient was a person, he
overlooked factors involving the emergence of personhood.
Winnicott, in his work with psychotics, became interested in
the early developmental processes that facilitate the
emergence of personhood. Psychotics are not "persons" in our
usual meaning of the term. Why not? What is the process of
becoming a person? Where did it break down in the case of
his patients who never fully emerged as persons?
According to Winnicott, it is the mother who provides
the infant with the experiences necessary for the emergence
of a self. [9] At birth the infant is in a state of
"unintegration." The infant has no self to act as the
subject of his experiences. Instead there are only
fragmented experiences. These fragmented experiences
correspond to the experiences of Lacan's pre-mirror stage.
The organization of the infant's experience is preceded by
and draws upon the mother's organized perceptions of him.
Due to "primary maternal preoccupation:" the mother offers
herself as an attentive medium for the infant's growth. She
both provides a holding environment for the infant in his
quiescent states, and "brings the world to the child" in
response to his needs. The mother, in the case of "good-
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enough mothering," is attentive enough to her baby that she
anticipates his needs, presenting him with the object (e.g.,
the breast) that will satisfy him just as the infant craves
that object. This creates a situation of infantile
omnipotence in which the infant experiences himself as the
source of all creation—the objects that the infant
hallucinate appear, leading him to believe that it was he who
created them. This infantile omnipotence is the basis for
the healthy development and solidity of the self:
The simultaneity of infantile hallucination and
maternal presentation provide the repetitive
experiential basis for the child's sense of contact
with and power over external reality (Greenberg and
Mitchell 1983, 192)
.
The mother's responsiveness to her baby's needs provides
a mirroring effect that allows the baby to become attuned to
his own bodily functions and impulses which become the basis
for his slowly evolving sense of self. One of the needs the
mother must be responsive to for "good-enough-mothering" is
the need for a nondemanding presence so that the infant can
experience a state of "going-on-being" of needlessness and
complete unintegration out of which needs and spontaneous
gestures can emerge.
Just as Lacan stresses the necessity on the part of the
infant for turning to an external object for the feeling of
wholeness that constitutes the primordial self, so Winnicott
stresses the importance of a whole external object to which
the infant can turn. [10] Winnicott, however, gives a more
detailed account of what this mirroring effect involves. The
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infant's identifications with its mother, the fusion
experience of feeling at one with its mother (and therefore
omn lpotent or in Lacan's te rms
,
free of lack)
,
re gu ires
certain conditions. That is, for fusion to occur, as the
infant feels a need and hallucinates the object that will
fulfill that need (e.g., the need of hunger and the breast
that will satisfy it), the actual object must appear.
Without this "good-enough-mothering" the infant will not be
able to make the identifications of the mirror-stage. He
will have no sense of creative mastery, no sense that what he
hallucinates is real--and therefore no confidence that the
mirror image of himself that he takes on as his own to
maintain constancy in the face of felt fragmentation, is
actually his. Thus, the mirror-image traced in his memory as
a primordial self-representation--the first in a complicated
series of signifying representations that will make up his
self-identity, what it means to him to be him--occurs due to
a nurturing context where his needs were attended to by the
other "good-enough" to tune in to and anticipate those needs.
This primordial self-representation allows the ordering of a
whole series of representations that hitherto were the
fragmented experiences of a being with no self. It gave
those fragmented images order by grouping them (e.g., my hand
waving, my foot kicking, etc.) into the gestalt of a whole
human form.
Once hallucinatory omnipotence is established, the child
needs to learn the limits of his power. "Good-enough-
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mothering would not involve a shift from the all-consuming
attentiveness of the new mother to a mother who no longer
anticipates her infant's every need. Thus, maternal
responsiveness decreases in synchrony with the infant's
increasing ability to communicate his needs. Now, rather
than having his every wish anticipated, the infant expresses
his needs through gestures and signals that the mother
responds to. The mother's "graduated failure of adaptation"
(Winnicott 158, 246) is essential to the development of
separation, differentiation, and realization (Greenberg and
Mitchell 1983, 194)
.
Just as Winnicott stresses the role of frustration in
confronting one with the need for symbolic representation
(gestures and signals to an outside world rather than
hallucinations), Lacan stresses the role of the infant's felt
lack that leads it to the desire to be desired (being what
will draw the mother into fusion with one) and symbolization
that will master lack by making the absent present. Again,
however, note the attention Winnicott gives to a decrease in
maternal responsiveness that is in "synchrony" with the
infant's needs. In other words, an on-going and real
synchronization of infant and caretaker is needed if the
illusory identifications the infant makes are to continue.
Two kinds of maternal deficiencies are "experienced by
the child as a terrifying interference with the continuity of
his own personal existence" (Greenberg and Mitchell 1983,
194) and result in the experience of the "annihilation of the
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s self
'
(Winnicott 1958, 304)
. One is the failure to
actualize the infant’s hallucinations; the other is
interference with the infant's quiescent states of
formlessness. In "good-enough-mothering," the mother acts as
both the medium for formlessness and the instrument of
omnipotence. Failure to provide such a medium results in the
fragmentation of the infant's experience into a "true self"
and a "false self." The former is the source of spontaneous
needs, images and gestures. it goes into hiding to avoid the
psychic annihilation caused by expressing itself without
being able to get a response. The latter's content rises out
of maternal expectations and claims. The child thus becomes
the mother's image of him:
The false self draws on cognitive functions in its
anticipations of and reactions to environmental
impingements, resulting in an overactivity of mind
and a separation of cognitive processes from any
affective or somatic grounding. [11]
Winnicott here makes a distinction between two kinds of
possible identifications—both of which go into the layering
of identifications that make up the self. In Lacan's terms,
the "true self" refers to those identifications made with a
caretaker whose desires are in synch with the child's felt
needs. That is, in the desire to be desired by the
caretaker, the child meshes with the desire on the part of
the caretaker to be desired by the child. There is a meeting
ground where the desires of both fuse. The "false self"
refers to those identifications made when no such mutuality
of desire occurs. The child tunes in to the caretaker's
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desire, but the caretaker doesn't tune in to the child's
desire. This distinction can help us better understand when
Imaginary identifications may release significance (by
allowing new gestalts of representations of lived experience)
that may be more than a replay of an Imaginary fixation that
alienates us ever further from ourselves.
The interesting feature about Winnicott's account that
Lacan glosses over is the particular context required for the
emerging significance of the self. While Lacan emphasizes
the fictional character of the self, Winnicott emphasizes the
space created between infant and caretaker that allowed new
significance for the infant to emerge. In Playing and
Reality he introduces the notions of the transitional object
and playing and discusses this space further. The emergence
of the person involves the movement from a state of illusory
omnipotence to a state of objective perception; of
solipsistic subjectivity to objective perception; of the
inner world to the world of outer reality. "Relations with
transitional objects constitute a third, intermediary, and
transitional realm between these two worlds." (Greenberg and
Mitchell 1983, 195) Such transitional objects are allocated
to neither of the two realms, thus allowing the baby to
gradually negotiate shifting from the experience of himself
as the center of a subjective world to the experience of
himself as a person among other persons:
In transitional experience, we maintain access to
the most private wellspring of our thoughts and
imagery, without being held accountable for them in
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the clear and harsh light of objective reality
(Greenberg and Mitchell 1983, 196) .
The transitional object of a young child can be many
things, for example a soft rag or blanket the child clings
to. Winnicott believes that such objects relate to the
process a child (as well as the rest of us throughout life)
undergoes in relating inner to outer reality. The parent who
doesn't challenge the importance of the object to the child
is agreeing to a neutral area of experience, an area where
the question of whether the child conceived of the object or
whether the object was presented to the child from the
outside, will not be asked (Winnicott 1971, 12) . That is, an
area of experience where one does not have to make a final
decision on whether an object is my own creation or part of
an external reality. According to Winnicott, this
intermediate area between inner and outer reality of
transitional phenomena continues to play a role throughout
our lives
.
There is a direct development from transitional
phenomena to playing, and from playing to shared
playing, and from this to cultural experiences
(Winnicott 1971, 51).
It is this feature of existence that for Winnicott allows us
the capacity for creative living that makes life worthwhile,
and it is in the overlap of the playing together of two
people that real communication occurs.
The "playful" space in which the infant first originates
a self is crucial for the layering of identifications
necessary to taking one's place in the Symbolic order. Lacan
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would, of course, agree. However, Winnicott chooses to
underline the creative aspects of a holding environment based
on trust and the reliability of the caretaker in which new
gestalts can spontaneously emerge, while Lacan emphasizes the
dangers of Imaginary "lures". Winnicott underlines the need
for mutual attunement in an overlap of two play areas in
which neither makes the final decision on what is and what
isn't, as the appropriate environment for the emergence of
new significance. Such "play" can lead to fusion-like
experiences. In creative play (for example two children
fantasizing together to two jazz musicians improvising
together)
,
two people play off of one another by anticipating
where the other is headed (in Lacan's terms, anticipating the
desire of the other and attempting to satisfy it in advance-
even if the other player could not have predicted in advance
what the next move desired was)
.
The "fun" comes in the
attunements of one to another that leads to a final confusion
in the end about who contributed what to the playing. In
contrast, Lacan emphasizes the "no" of the father that would
have us forever defer fusion through the Symbolic chain.
Mahler's work corroborates and complements Winnicott '
s
work by giving us specifics about the attunement of the
mother-child dyad. For Mahler, the child must struggle to
reconcile his longing for autonomy with the equally intense
longing to "surrender and reimmerse himself in the enveloping
fusion from which he has come." (Greenberg and Mitchell
1983, 273) She distinguishes three phases of development in
101
the child s preoedipal development, the second of which is
further divided into three subphases. The first phase is the
normal autistic phase." In this phase the infant is
concerned only with the satisfaction of his needs and doesn't
associate that satisfaction with its source in the external
world. The second phase is the "normal symbiotic phase." At
3-4 weeks of age enhanced responsiveness on the infant's part
results in a dim awareness of the mother as an external
object. The infant continues to behave, however, as if he
and the mother form a symbiotic, omnipotent unit. "Islands
of "good" and "bad" memory traces form within the
undifferentiated matrix of ego and id." (Greenberg and
Mitchell 1983, 275) From 4-10 months there is a
differentiation subphase in which the infant becomes
increasingly aware of his mother as an external object. In
the "practicing subphase" the infant begins to express an
increasing interest in exploring his world, but an interest
in mother still takes precedence over interest in the world
of things . It is in this subphase that Mahler locates the
occurrence of "psychological birth." With the achievement of
upright locomotion, the child's horizons widen, and he
concentrates on his expanding abilities which are perceived
by him as omnipotence. In the rapprochement subphase, which
usually occurs between fifteen to eighteen months of age, the
child experiences a kind of separation anxiety due to the
deflation of his illusion of omnipotence. From approximately
eighteen to twenty or twenty-four months of age, the child,
102
to consolidate his separation from the mother, denies that he
needs help from another person, at the same time that he
experiences the need for such help. "This leads to a
behavioral picture in which intense neediness and clinging to
the mother alternates with egually intense negativity and
battling with her." (Greenberg and Mitchell 1983, 278)
Mahler sees the successful resolution of this stage as
crucial for the avoidance of the more severe
psychopathologies, just as Freud felt that the successful
resolution of the Oedipus complex was crucial for avoiding
neurosis
.
The next phase is the phase of libidinal object
constancy. It normally takes place during the third year of
life and its major task is to form stable concepts of the
self and of the other. In this phase, the child establishes
emotional object constancy by consolidating the
internalization of a constant, inner image of the mother that
was gradually developed in the previous phases. Mahler
stresses that the achievement of establishing a reliable,
internal image necessary for a stable sense of self is not
possible without the trust and confidence developed in the
child's relationship with the primary caretaker. Trust and
confidence is developed through the "regularly occurring
relief of need tension provided by the need-satisfying
agency" which over the course of the sub-phases of phase two
described above "is gradually attributed to the need-
satisfying whole object (the mother) and is then transferred
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by means of internalization to the intrapsychic
representation of the mother" (Mahler et al. 1975, 101) . In
other words, for the child to internalize a "good"
representation of the mother, a representation that will
sooth the emotional distress caused by the inability to
maintain an omnipotent duality of mother and child, something
must occur in the real interactions of the caretaker/child's
relationship. This something involves "need-satisfying". In
delineating the various phases and subphases Mahler studied
in her observations of mother/child interactions, she
stresses that this "need-satisfying" cannot occur without
what she calls "mutual cuing". That is, as is obvious from
the description of the phases given above, the child has
different needs at different times. In the autistic phase
the infant needs to sleep. In the symbiotic subphase of
differentiation he needs to be cuddled and engaged by eye-
contact. In the practicing subphase, increased motor
coordination (i.e., the ability to crawl) allows him more
opportunity for leaving the mother behind. At this point the
kind of maternal behavior appropriate in the previous
subphase becomes a liability for the infant's need to
separate from the mother. In the rapprochement subphase, the
now-walking toddler needs emotional support from his mother
to calm his fears about separation and loss of omnipotence,
and yet encourage further separation.
The mothers Mahler observed also had needs. Some
mothers were much more comfortable with a nursing baby and
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resented their growing child's increased independence. These
mothers found it harder to give their child the freedom to
crawl at will, or the emotional support he needed as a
toddler to explore. Other mothers felt overwhelmed at an
infant's dependency needs and disrupted early symbiosis by
encouraging their child to be independent before he was
ready. All these infants did become healthy children with
intact self-identity. Mahler stresses the "mutual cuing" of
each mother/child pair that allowed this to come about. A
child whose mother preferred a dependent infant tended to
remain a "lap-baby" longer, or reacted by refusing to meld
his body into the mother's. A child who didn't get the
reassurance he needed at the rapprochement subphase tended to
become clingy, reverting to an earlier phase where he got
what he needed, or found tactics that would get his mother's
attention .
Thus, we can fill out Winnicott ' s picture of the mother
who adapts herself to the child's needs, with the mutual
adaptation of mother and child that Mahler observed.
Winnicott talks about "good-enough-mothering", Mahler of
"mutual cuing" . For both, the infant forms and stabilizes an
identity in the context of a loving other attentive to their
bodily cues whose bodily cues they also attend to in order to
get their need met.
Through attentive tuning in to the gestalt of the cues
given by the other (as opposed, for example, to the meaning
content of speech, say) and the anticipation of the desires
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of the other, a bond of communication is formed where who
wants what becomes blurred--where the self/other distinction
breaks down in a mutual recognition of desire. This forms a
moment of contact between two people, a moment when one's own
desire is in synch with the desire of the other in such a way
that the two become mutually satisfying and fuse into a place
of no lack. For this to happen, both must be prepared to
anticipate the other’s desire, willing to desire that the
other's desire be satisfied rather than insisting that the
other satisfy one's own (fixated) desire. It is through this
mutual adaptation of desire that fusion is born. As a self
becomes more fixed such moments become extremely rare due to
the need to repeat past ident ificatory patterns for self-
continuity. The trick becomes to find a meeting ground for
fusion between two people--a place where, for moments of
time, they "connect" through the fusion of mutually
satisfying desire at the same time that each maintains self-
integrity—that is, continuity with the layers of
signification that they feel themselves to be. Of course, an
infant— starting out fresh so to speak— is much less
restricted by that need than an adult, making fusion that
much easier. For them, physical need will provide the
departure point for "authentic" contact. This point of
contact, then, would be the meeting ground in an area in
which the appearance of an object would be a satisfying one.
Through mutual cuing and adaptation to the other of one's own
desire within the range of what would satisfy that desire
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one s physical needs (the infant) or the network of
signifiers that make up one's conscious and unconscious
systems (the mother)
,
one can find those points where meaning
connects—where both find in the unanticipated Real that
eludes current meaning structures, something that satisfies.
In light of Winnicott and Mahler's rendering of the
origins of the me, we can critique Lacan's characterization
of the mirror-stage. According to Lacan, the self
precipitated in symbiotic fusion is a "fiction." The image
with which the infant identified was outside of him. It was
an illegitimate, if necessary, move to take on this image of
wholeness as his own when he actually felt fragmented and out
of control—and not whole at all. To maintain this
identification he was forced into the dialectic of desire
that leads him to identify with his father and the position
of phallic power and deny the loss of the mother by upholding
the paternal law that will provide him with substitutes for
that loss.
We can explain this misreading of the mirror stage with
Lacan's own views on the me ' s denial of its lack to
perpetuate the illusion that it is self-sufficient. From the
start the mother is no more than a vehicle for the infant's
self-constituting activity. What occurs in fusion is a
fiction. The infant is actually self-sufficient, using his
mother to reflect himself back to himself. The feeling of
wholeness is an illusion—a necessary illusion, but an
illusion nevertheless . The loss of the mother is thus not
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really a loss, because the infant never had the mother to
begin with—he just used his mother as the first image he
identified with. this image, due to the nature of early
child care, carried with it many intensely felt
representations of the sensations of bodily contact with the
mother, but the feeling of fusion with the mother was still
illusory
.
The Lacanian theorist looking back on such early
experiences sees the infant and mother as two distinct
entities with clear-cut boundaries. The self the me
maintains must be one, whole, and phallic—-the self of the me
without lack. In reading the phallic self back into this
early childhood experience, the sense of connectedness, of
feeling one with another—the two as one of fusion--is
discounted as an illusion. The self that is maintained is
reconstituted in experiences that repeat this conception of
the mirror stage— a me that projects what I need onto an
other in order to repeat an identification with something
outside of myself. these identifications are always
illusions, always to be looked upon with suspicion as "lures"
we project upon the world to evade our primordial lack of
being. Thus, on a Lacanian view, self-insuf f iciency becomes
synonymous with the illusory nature of connectedness with
others
.
Lacan breaks down the illusion of a unified self in
favor of a split subject that is continually reconstituting
itself in a dialectic of self and other. But he assumes that
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if subjectivity is to occur, this dialectic must be purely
specular in nature that is, no real connection between me
and an other ever occurs. Thus, he assumes that the self is
entirely fictional when in fact the concrete connections in
which it is based are real
. The mirror image is not merely
identified with, an image taken on from the outside; it is
created in connectedness with another in a space where two
are one, a place where desire is satiated and becomes
pleasure. Fusion with another is truly experienced--as truly
experienced as the experiences of fragmentation. It is
within fusion that one experiences oneself in responsiveness
to another who also responds . These experiences are recorded
in representations that may never reach consciousness or play
into the repetition of narcissistic identifications. To feel
that responsiveness one needs connection, one needs more than
an image projected by the me to identify with. For meaning
to be created, for the original images to be formed, the
subject must be in a state of responsiveness to a world which
responds to it. Thus the illusion of the mirror stage is not
that one was whole in connectedness with an other, but that
one does not need an other for such connectedness.
2 . 5 Self-Construction and the Production of Meaning ; Take II
Lacan's "cure" consists in freeing the subject from the
me's lures so that the 'I' can address the Other of
unconscious truth. Lacan seems to think that this truth will
always be that the subject is primordially lacking and so is
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doomed to a futile search for the lost 'objet a' that would
complete it. The truth the unconscious lets slip as the me
attempts to maintain the illusion of a whole self is that
there is no object that will satisfy Desire.
The me Lacan characterizes in the schema L is the me of
the post-mirror stage who has repressed mother-fusion,
modifying its self/other identifications in accordance with
paternal law. This me represents the objects of its Desire
via Symbolic categories. Satisfaction is continually
deferred since Symbolic representations can never fill in the
subject's gap. On Lacan's reading of the mirror-stage there
is no alternative to a self-constituting activity that
subjects itself to the Symbolic order since mother-fusion was
an illusion. This means that the Lacanian subject is the
effect of the battery of signifiers in which and by which it
places itself. The subject is subjected to and constructed
by language. The me, being inherently fictional in nature,
provides only arbitrary guidance to the speaking subject. It
is necessary for the continuance of subjectivity, but the
"truth" of the subject is that it is an arbitrary effect of
the linguistic signifiers at play through the four poles of
the schema L. Lacan's "cure" therefore emphasizes the
negative moment of undermining the subject at any point it
may find peace or repose in a sense of wholeness.
Taking what we have learned from Winnicott and Mahler to
Lacan's schema L we might posit another me with an
alternative self-constituting activity. Assuming that it was
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the kinfl of contact (m) Other-fusion provided, rather than an
identity that could take a fixed position within the
Symbolic, that the subject Desired, the subject could choose
to re-experience that contact. That is, rather than defer
Desire by representing objects of Desire via Symbolic
categories, the me could seek fusion with another in its
lived present. The "truth" of a subject with such a me would
not be that its primordial gap dooms it to a futile search
for satisfaction, but rather that it is forever "doomed" to
seek its satisfaction in connectedness with others. Such a
subject would accept that it could never be whole in and of
itself and would continually reconstitute itself through
contact with others
.
A theorist who engaged in such self-constituting
activity would have a different attitude toward the concepts
at her disposal than the theorist I described in section 2.3
in light of Lacan's schema L. The theorist depicted by
Lacan's schema would evade the "truth" that no matter how
masterful his theory, no matter how well he wields words in
keeping with paternal law, he will never find the lost 'objet
a' that would complete him. Instead he will be captured by
the lures of a me that structures reality via fixed imagos it
projects upon the Real of lived experience. Such theory will
say more about the particular theorist's identity fixations
than the Real which continually eludes our attempts to
symbolize it . The theorist who has taken Lacanian analysis
to heart will refuse to become captured by the identity
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fixations of his me. Instead, he will pay attention to the
Other that his I attempts to address. The Unconscious—the
discourse of the Other--will subvert the subject's every
attempt to pronounce a truth, be it about himself or the
world, that can stand for all time in an enduring edifice of
Truth. The Lacanian theorist will thus deliberately tease
his reader by refusing to make any final pronouncements
. He
will attempt to follow the twists and turns of the discourse
of the Other—thus demonstrating his prowess in evading
capture by his me. [12]
The theorist who engages in the self-constituting
activity that seeks fusion will neither evade the "truth" of
her inability to find the lost objet a, nor demonstrate her
prowess by forever evading the lures of her me. Instead, she
will engage in the playful open-endedness we saw in our
discussion of Winnicott's transitional object. This kind of
theorist will hold in suspension any final decision on the
existential status (real or imagined) of the objects her
words represent. her desire is not for the object (e.g., a
truth about herself) that will complete her, but for a
particular kind of contact with the other (the reader) as
well as her own Other (that speaks from the unconscious)
.
She is not looking for an object that will fill in her gap
and allow her to take up a final position in a timeless
Symbolic order of fixed positions, but for the word that will
enable contact with another.
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It is not what the word refers to that matters, so much
as the feeling it evokes in the Other. Contact is made when
the word (or words) sets off a chain of associations that
reverberate in the unconscious, activating representations of
experiences not yet integrated into the me ' s structure.
Through receptive attentiveness this theorist tries first one
word and then another, listening for the Other's response,
until the right word is found—the word that "fits." This
theorist's desire for psychic wholeness manifests itself both
in the desire to maintain the me ' s structural coherence and
in the desire for contact with an other that will allow new
meaning to emerge. She creates a playspace in which the
question of the word's viability as a substitute for Desire
(i.e., as a stand-in for the objet a that is in accordance
with paternal law) is left open. In her willingness to
respond to the desire of the Other she holds her narcissistic
identifications in suspension, looking for the word that will
stimulate a yes from the Other. In these moments of contact,
resolution and integration can occur. The me, rather than
seeking to obscure the subject's lack, seeks to compensate
for lack by incorporating new meaning into its dialectical
structure. This, in turn, will allow the subject to make
sense of a broader range of sensations. Receptivity to the
other's (the reader's) Desire and to one's own Other's Desire
(what the Other wants the me to be) allows the theorist to
play with words in order to generate new meaning. This
theorist will not merely tease her reader, but will allow
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moments of fullness—moments of integration when both she and
(hopefully) her reader discover a word or category that
characterizes hitherto inarticulate sensations in a
satisfying way. Just as the infant's sensations were
originally given meaning in contact with the caretaker who
articulated his desire for him by supplying him with objects
that satisfied him, this theorist finds a "fit" between
inart iculated experience and the word that could symbolize
it
.
For example, I could be developing a theory about
childhood development. As I contemplate the process of
separation/individuation I may have feelings and sensations
that I can't articulate. I could choose to ignore them,
cranking out my theory according to familiar views I've long
held about children. Or I could attend to those feelings
until I found words that made sense of them. If, say, I felt
queasy every time I thought of the child's first step away
from mother, I may finally connect that queasiness to anxiety
about separation I had myself experienced. This could affect
not only my theory, but my view of myself as someone who
could easily leave people behind. thus, to incorporate this
insight into my theory would require incorporating a new
aspect of my experience into my self-system. [13] If I chose
not to change my self-other pattern I could, for example,
continue to hold the view that the process of
separation/individuation is an automatic, relatively painless
experience
.
For the theorist to allow insights such vague
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feelings and "intuitions" can give, she must be willing to
cnate a space in which she holds both her conceptions of
herself and her "reality" in suspension.
By emphasizing the negative aspects of a me that evades
confrontation of loss with identifications based in the
"Imaginary," Lacan underestimates the positive moment of a me
who seeks integrative contact based in lived experience. To
counter the danger of the former, Lacan would have us unravel
the me entirely. Although I agree that the danger of the me
who alienates the subject ever further from the "truth" of
unconscious Desire is a real one, I don't agree that human
subjectivity entails the continual deferment of satisfaction.
Lacan describes one approach to subjectivity, but there is an
alternative approach. We could characterize this alternative
approach as an alternative self-strategy that the me might
choose. We would then have two self-strategies that could
enable human sub jectivity--one that forever deferred Desire
through Symbolic signifying chains (Lacan's version) and one
that sought to re-experience "Imaginary" fusion (the
alternative derived from our look at object relations
theory) . In the next chapter I will link the two self-
strategies delineated above to gender categories and develop
them further through a critique of Lacan from a feminist
perspective. I will then discuss the role of gender in the
self-constituting activity of writing philosophical texts.
NOTES
[1] For discussions of Lacan's relationship to this
tradition, see Dews (1982, chapter 2); Juranville (1984);
Ragland-Sullivan (1986); and Edward S. Casey and J. Melvin
Woody's "Hegel, Heidegger, Lacan: The Dialectic of Desire"
and Wilfried Ver Eecke ' s "Hegel as Lacan's Source for
Necessity in Psychoanalytic Theory," both in Smith and
Kerrigan (1983) .
[2] See, for example, Bartky (1979), Frye (1983),
Millett (1971), Smith (1974, 1979) and Weedon (1987).
[3] After trying out just about every conceivable
combination of pronouns for referring to the infant I have
decided to refer to the infant/child as 'he' for the
following reasons: 1) although at this point in the infant's
development he has no gender identity (on a Lacanian
reading)
,
this makes no difference to the people who care for
him (whether he knows it or not, he is gender-labelled from
birth, and even before), 2) despite my preference for the
generic 'she,' using 'he' for the generic is less confusing
since 'she' can then refer to the mother without ambiguity,
and 3) Lacanian theory, like Freudian theory, tends to take
masculine development as the paradigm for human development
.
[4] Lacan discusses his schema L in "Le Seminaire sur La
Lett re Vo lee " (Lacan 1966, 53) and in "On a question
preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis" (Lacan
1977, 193-194) . The following discussion is informed by
these essays, the exposition of Lacan thus far given in this
section, and discussions of the schema L in Benvenuto and
Kennedy (1986, 100-1, 130, 146), Andre Green (1966), Ragland-
Sullivan (1986, 2-3, 46-47, 196-197) and Wilden (1968, 106-
108) .
[5] For discussions of "empty" versus "full" speech see
"The function and field of speech and language in
psychoanalysis" (Lacan 1977, 30-113), Ragland-Sullivan (1986,
160-162) and Wilden (1968)
.
[6] I do not have space here to do Lacan's realm of the
'Real' full justice. For discussions of this important
concept see, Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986), Juranville (1984,
84-86), Lemaire (1977), Ragland-Sullivan (1986, 183-195) and
Wilden (1968, 197-200) .
[7] See Ragland-Sullivan ' s discussion of transference
and resistance (1986, 119-129) and Juranville's remarks on
the analytic cure (1984, 95-96)
.
[8] Schneiderman discusses both the controversy Lacan's
short session caused in the psychoanalytic community and its
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effects from the personal perspective of the analysand in
Schneiderman (1983)
.
[9] I am indebted in the discussion of Winnicott and
Mahler that follows to Greenberg and Mitchell's clear account
of Winnicott' s views on the emergence of the self (1983, 190-
210 ) .
[10] For some discussion of the relationship of object
relations theory to Lacanian theory see Ragland-Sullivan
(1986) .
[11] Greenberg and Mitchell (1983, 194-195). They cite
Winnicott 1953, 191-192 as the source for this information.
[12] Gallop gives a playful account of Lacan's stylistic
prowess in The Daughter's Seduction (Gallop 1982)
.
[13]
The concept 'self-system' as developed in Epstein
(1973) is similar in many respects to the version of the self
as a process that I am developing in this dissertation. I
have generally chosen to use the term ' self-strategy ' since
it speaks to the problematic I have set for selfhood as the
solution to human agency.
CHAPTER 3
LACAN AND THE FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
3 . 1 Introduction
In this chapter I want to explore the question of how
gender affects self-constituting activity. We will find that
the two self-strategies laid out at the end of chapter 2—one
seeking fusion and the other deferring Desire through the
signifying chains of the symbolic—can be characterized as
what I will call "female" and "male" self-strategies. It
will turn out that women tend to make use of the former
strategy and men tend to make use of the latter strategy due
to their different resolutions of the Oedipus complex. I am
not presuming that this characterization of self-strategies
is either universal or necessary. But it is a telling one
for those times and places where the Freudian and Lacanian
conceptions of the Oedipus complex can be said to illuminate
the socialization process of human beings. [1]
Thus far I have developed a theory of self that pays as
little attention as possible to gender. Of course, the
Oedipus and castration complexes can't be the same for girls
as they are for boys, but this has been accounted for by
painting a somewhat deviant picture for the female path to
selfhood. The full-blown self is that of the male adult— if
the path to that self is different, even more difficult, for
women, masculine identity is still the norm to which both the
sexes are compared. [2]
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Much psychoanalytic theory today still minimizes the
problem of gender there may be certain differences at key
points along the way, but otherwise the process is the same.
Thus, there is often no systematic effort to account for
gender differences. The tendency since Freud has been to
posit woman as a sort of negative reflection or complement to
man. Rather than provide a positive account of the category
'woman' that category became the repository of everything
that isn't 'man'. Irigaray, a French psychoanalyst in the
Lacanian tradition, and Chodorow, an American sociologist
interested in object relations theory, have both taken steps
to rectify this situation. [3] Both attempt--in very
different ways--to give a positive rendering of the feminine
that goes beyond relegating woman to the inverse image of
man. That is, they go beyond doctoring Freudian theory here
and there to fit in women in order to present a systematic
account of just where Freudian theory fails. Irigaray does
this with a radical critique of Freud's approach to
femininity that reduces woman into the polar opposite, the
specular image, of man. [4] Chodorow does this by addressing
the question of gender in the preoedipal stage. Both use
psychoanalysis to help account for the inferior status of
women—as the sex that is man's specular image (Irigaray) and
as the sex that does the nurturing (Chodorow)
.
The question of woman in psychoanalysis, then, entails
not only the question of accounting for the path of female
development, but also the question of sexual difference and
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the validity of the male model of selfhood as the model
.
Taking gender into account in a systematic way in the course
of developing a theory of self reveals two different
strategies for constructing and maintaining a self. All
psychoanalysts agree that certain key turning points for the
developing child--the discovery of anatomical difference,
resolution of the Oedipus complex
—
present different problems
for the different sexes. What hasn't been addressed as fully
is just how the solutions to these different problems
represent different strategies for evolving a self that have
lasting ramifications throughout the individual's life.
Freudian theory has tended to presume that the paradigm for
normal adulthood must be the same for both sexes--if women
are not as "mature" or "adult" it is because certain
obstacles, not faced by males, have blocked their
development. [5] The possibility that a woman may have faced
the problems presented her and overcome them, achieving
maturity in her own right, has been underplayed.
A theory of self that takes gender seriously
problemat izes the norm for "mature" selfhood. If both sexes
equally successfully navigate the problems set for them and
yet one sex somehow achieves a "maturity" that the other sex
doesn't, then is it "lack" on women's part (perhaps
biologically based) or a misconstrual of the ideal paradigm
of selfhood that's at fault?
In this chapter I will, with the help of Lacanian theory
and feminist critiques of Lacan, delineate two positions,
120
male and female, correlated with two strategies for self-
constitution. In section 3.2 I will address the question of
gender with respect to Lacanian theory. In section 3.3 I
will critique Lacan on the basis of Irigaray's work. In
section 3.4, I will balance that critique with Chodorow's
feminist perspective on object relations theory. Taking the
male and female positions as positions that apply in one's
relationship to language and the self-constituting strategies
one uses in writing theory, I will argue in section 3.5 that
1) the positions revealed in a text are not biologically
determined by the author's anatomy, 2) the male position of a
text can be subverted by aspects of that text, 3) these
subversive aspects can be read as symptoms of a conflict in
self-strategies by a post-Lacanian reading that focuses on
the category 'woman', and 4) this conflict could be resolved
with a deeper understanding of the female position.
3 . 2 Lacan and the Gendered Self
As we saw in chapter two, the castration complex
introduces the child to sexual difference and the Symbolic
realm. The mother/infant dyad is, in a certain sense,
static. In the world of symbiosis where nothing lacks, no
positioning with respect to difference need take place. The
phallic signifier represents sexual different. [6] The
mother is not complete unto herself, but desires the phallus.
Thus the phallus is the signifier of lack that establishes
substitutive Desire. Rather than desiring the mother, the
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child first identifies with what the mother wants—the
phallus—and then relinquishes desire for fusion in order to
take up a position with respect to the phallus. The power of
the phallic signifier comes from representing difference and
lack which introduces the child into the public realm of
individuation and language where exchange and communication
occur throughout a complex network of social relations.
While identification with the mother provided the infant with
a victory over fragmentation, identification with the father
reaffirms the split in the human subject. Ident if icatory
fusion with the mother in the Imaginary papered over the
primordial gap between the fragmentary experience of
prematuration and the gaze of the mother that reflected one
back as whole. Identification with the father reaffirms that
gap by disallowing fusion, and stipulating the search for the
object that will fill in one's gap in accordance with rules
laid out by the Symbolic order. Henceforth the child cannot
settle for Imaginary "illusion", but must continually defer
Desire for fusion by accepting Symbolic substitutions for the
objects of Desire.
Thus, in "normal" development, the child will ultimately
identify with the phallic signifier—the male embodying it,
and the female by associating with it (Ragland-Sullivan 1986,
293)
.
That is, both sexes will accept castration. They will
accept that they cannot remain in the world of symbiotic
fusion with the mother, that they will instead have to take
up a position in a network of social positions that are
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different from one another. The boy accepts castration with
the understanding that he is heir to the paternal law--while
now he is subject to it, he will one day embody the phallus
himself and have a mother-substitute for his own. The girl
accepts castration by turning to the father. Her loss of the
mother as a love-object is complete— she will never have the
phallus, never have her mother back. Her compensation is to
turn to her father who does have the phallus. By association
with mean she will vicariously experience some of the power
they possess, and may also receive from a man one day the
child that can be her phallus.
Feminists interested in developing Lacan's work have
emphasized that according to Lacan both men and women are
castrated. That is, we are all split subjects with a
primordial gap in our being—we all "lack," we are all
motivated by the Desire to compensate for our lack. [7]
Ragland-Sullivan has argued that the inferior position of
women stems from a "secondary castration" (Ragland-Sullivan
1986, 298)
.
In addition to acceding to the castration
complex, women have been subjected to the myths perpetrated
by the Symbol. in order that veil man's lack by symbolizing
him as the "tout," the whole that can fill in the hole, and
symbolizes woman as lack. [8] Thus, the mother symbolizes
loss that is relegated to the unconscious— lack, the nether
side of conscious existence--while the father is privileged
because he symbolizes the opposite of need or loss. But this
symbolization of man and the father is based on an illusion
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that would veil the primordial gap in our being that we all
share as human subjects.
Thus, the truth is that we are all castrated. How we
with that truth has taken the form of two different
strategies that take two different positions with respect to
the phallus the signifier of sexual difference and lack.
The "haves" (men) flee that truth in the Symbolic. The
"have-nots" (women" deal with that truth in the Imaginary.
By further delineating these two strategies we may find some
means to transcending the impasse of sex polarization.
We can characterize the male and female positions of
Lacanian theory as follows [9]
:
Male position : The boy learns that although the
paternal law forbids him to fuse with mother, he will one day
have a woman of his own if he identifies with his father and
upholds the paternal law. That is, he "has" th phallus, he
isn't castrated after all, he has what his mother desires.
The Symbolic order represents paternal law. It lays out the
social hierarchy determined by the Name-of-the-Father . It
decides what the relationship of all the beings of the
society is according to socially sanctioned codes. As heir
to the paternal law he will wield its phallic power—making
judgments about the form relationships should take according
to his desire. To identify with the father he will deny the
loss of his mother— i.e., deny castration—and displace his
desire for his mother onto words that represent the objects
of desire. he will continually defer the fusion sought by
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displacing his desire along the signifying chain in keeping
with narcissistic identifications. Through repetition he
will maintain the self first precipitated in fusion with his
mother. This will compensate him for the loss of that
fusion. What was gained in fusion was a sense of wholeness
more pleasurable than the feelings of fragmentation that
preceded it. It is this feeling of wholeness, of mastery,
that he strives to maintain with the repetition of
c i s s i s t ic identifications. The Symbolic order assures him
he can maintain his self through the repetition of positions
first established in the Oedipus complex.
The male position thus involves the repetition of a self
through the Symbolic that translates and transposes the same
self precipitated in early childhood throughout life
according to the rules of the Symbolic. In doing so he will
deny the (m) Other within in order to find the substitutes for
his primordial Desire (the mother of fusion) that are in
keeping with the Symbolic order and paternal law.
The female position : The girl learns that not only is
she not allowed fusion with the mother, but she will never
regain a woman-substitute for the mother. That is, she
doesn't "have" the phallus. She is castrated, she lacks, the
loss she is currently experiencing is final, her
compensations inferior to that of the boy. Instead of
identifying with the father, with phallic power, with the
wielder of the paternal law, she can only passively enjoy
phallic power through association with a man. The paternal
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law doesn't interest her the same way it interests a man
because it guarantees her nothing. She will never be what is
desired by the other and thereby regain the fusion she lost.
She can only be the other for some man, can only vicariously
enjoy his phallic pleasure at being the whole. Being
passive, she can never create the paternal law that orders
social relationships. she is an object of exchange, waiting
to be exchanged by those who wield phallic power, those who
have the right to say where and when fusion can occur. thus,
she cannot speak with the same authority as a man. She can
only parody a power that is really not hers to wield. The
self that she lost with the loss of fusion can only be
maintained passively by finding subjects to whom she can be
an other. Instead of actively repeating the self she formed
in fusion in a layering of identifications according to the
rules of the Symbolic order, she will take on the position of
the sex that lacks. Instead of maintaining the experience of
wholeness she experienced in the mirror stage in a layering
of repetitions where she repeatedly plays the phallic whole
that is mirrored in others' responses to her, she will find
her identity by mirroring others' wholeness back to them,
letting them define her by being the lack, the hole, that
their "wholeness" fills.
Despite the drawbacks with respect to social power such
a position entails, woman does have a certain compensation.
There is woman only as excluded by the nature of
things which is the nature of words .... It none the
less remains that if she is excluded by the nature
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of things, it is precisely that in being not all(pas toute)
,
she has, in relation to what the
phallic function designates of i ou i ssanrp
f a
supplementary iouissance (Mitchell and rose 1985
144)
.
[10]
On a Lacanian reading, it is not clear whether or not
woman as woman can be a subject, playing out her own desire
in the same way a man does
. Given that she is of the sex
that doesn't have the phallus, she can't want in the way a
man does. A man desires objects that are substitutes for the
mother. he desires to reconstitute himself by replaying the
dialectic of being desired by the other (originally his
mother) according to the rules of the Symbolic order. A
woman can't, properly speaking, desire at all. Since she is
of the sex that lacks, she can’t hope to find substitutes for
the mother. She will never be able to regain the desire of'
an other, a substitute for the mother, in some dialectic of
identifications that through the transformation rules of the
Symbolic represents the other as the other that can reflect
her back to herself as a whole. What then, as a woman, can
she do?
Ragland-Sullivan says that she is closer to the personal
and the narcissistic (1986, 296-297). That is, because she
is not allowed to find substitutes for the mother in the same
way as a man, she is closer to the primordial Desire of the
mother whose messages she received into the unconscious in
symbiotic fusion. Lacking the same phallic power the man has
to find substitutes for the Desire to satisfy this primordial
Desire, she is closer to the loss of the mother, the loss of
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the feeling of fusion when mother was satisfied by the
infsnt r and mother and infant were one
. Because she is
confronted with this loss in a way that someone who "has" the
phallus isn't, she doesn't have the male option of
reconstituting the situation of fusion in identifications
with images that replace objects associated with the mother,
that is, she can't maintain the self of fusion by finding
others to mirror back to her that she is desired in a way
that is analogous to the way she was as an an infant
.
On the Lacanian view, this means that she has no
possibility of subjectivity at all. Unable to find the
reflection in an other that will repeat ans so confirm her
primordial self in a layering of identifications, she is
reduced to being the other, the mirror, for the self-
representations of men. Unable to wield the phallus herself,
she can maintain what little identity he has only by being a
screen for the imagoes that men project upon her. By
conforming to their desire, responding to their need to see
themselves as forever the same, always the same self, she can
gain vicarious pleasure in phallic power through association.
While one can assume that Lacan intends the schema L we
discussed in chapter two, section 2.3, to represent the self-
constituting process of both the men and women that go to him
for analysis, it is clear that his notion of pure femininity
excludes woman from this process. Rather than projecting her
imagoes onto others and thus reaffirming herself through
narcissistic identifications, she is man's other. It is thus
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that Lacan comes to say that as a category woman doesn't
exist [11], that in fact if she were actually to exist there
would be no man. For man to maintain himself he must be able
to find others that will support the repetitions of self and
other needed to provide him with continuity. For this to
occur, an other that will conform to his imago is needed.
Woman, having no identity as woman of her own, being defined
as lack, is eminently suited for this purpose. To ask what
woman wants, then, and be prepared to hear her speak, would
actually threaten this whole project of self-constitution.
[12] Because Lacan himself is writing from the male
position, using the male strategy of self-constitution, he
cannot really ask the question of what woman wants. To hear
the answer would undermine his own project of self-
construction in a way that would threaten him with loss of
mastery and loss of self. Thus, although he asks the
question, and although he admits to some perplexity about the
answer, he is not, in fact, able to hear the reply.
Since the male position requires evasion of Imaginary
fusion by finding Symbolic substitutes for Desire in
accordance with the paternal law that veils his lack, any
rendering of the feminine could only undermine his own
strategy by unveiling it. Male satisfaction does not include
the jouissance of a genuine fusion experience because
preference has been given to the Symbolic--the other is not
the Real other in her specificity, but a projection screen
upon which one can play out one's fantasies. Preference is
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to representations that replace concrete objects of
desire—abstract images that stand in for what was lost and
will be forever deferred through the Symbolic chain. Once
the category of woman is unveiled as a different strategy, a
different way of dealing with lack, rather than lack itself
that only the phallic male can fill, the male strategy of
displacing loss and lack onto 'woman' will no longer work.
Instead, men will have to find other ways of dealing with
lack. Articulation of the female position, while undermining
the tenability of the male position, could open the door to a
new relationship to origin and lack.
Due to having to mourn the loss of the mother in a way
the boy doesn't, the girl is forced to maintain the self
formed in fusion in other ways (Ragland-Sullivan 1986, 297)
.
Instead of basing her self on the fiction of whole self-
suf ficiency—that is, instead of assuming that the self she
formed in fusion with the mother can continue without the
mother, she accepts the loss of that fusion state and is more
open to finding that fusion state, or something like it,
elsewhere. That is, she accepts that the self formed in
fusion with mother is not her own self—but the two of them
as one. Thus, to rediscover that feeling of wholeness, she
will need to connect with others the way that she once
connected with mother. Instead of deferring substitutions
for the mother through the Symbolic chain she will adhere
less strictly to the paternal law (which after all guarantees
her nothing) and instead allow fusion to occur—other moments
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when through connection with another she can feel whole.
What she takes away from such fusion is not an identification
with an image that is actually outside of herself (and so not
actually her at all)
,
but the concrete feelings and
sensations of having been close to another. Feelings that
she can't necessarily repeat in other interactions a la the
schema L, but which reside in her unconscious in a fluid
manner, ready to be activated by other encounters that evoke
them
.
The female self-strategy is thus less subjected to the
Symbolic and the paternal law and more inclined toward
"Imaginary" fusion. With no promise of inheriting the
paternal law to inhibit her, she deals with loss in ways that
subvert that law. Fusion is not as taboo for her. She is
closer to the primordial unconscious, less afraid that fusion
experiences will confront her with castration. She thus has
a different attitude toward Imaginary fusion. An attitude
that can't be allowed full expression in the Symbolic if the
paternal law is to stand unchallenged. Contrary to Lacan's
view, however, the feminine does not have to be any more
ineffable or mysterious than the masculine. That it has not
yet found full expression in the Symbolic does not mean that
it can't be expressed. The task at hand is not to veil the
"mysterious" feminine in anymore veils than already cover it,
but to reveal the feminine as a particular strategy for
dealing with the problem of subjectivity that is different
from the male strategy. [13]
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Thus, Lacan gives a one-sided view of the picture.
While his insistence on the castration that we all share is
an important feature of his theory that undermines phallic
power by rendering its illusions more visible, Lacan has not
succeeded in stepping outside of the male position enough to
be able to characterize the female position as anything but
the negative counterpart, the other, of the male position.
In the next section I will explore a more positive
characterization of the female position with a look at Luce
Irigaray's book, Speculum (Irigaray 1985a).
3 . 3 Irigarav; Woman as the Specular Other
Luce Irigaray was excommunicated from the Lacanian
community for writing Speculum . Her critique of Lacan and
her valorization of the feminine was too radical to be
embraced by the Lacanian psychoanalytic community (Moi 1985,
127) . I will argue that Irigaray's position with respect to
femininity, radical as it is, finally falls into some of the
same assumptions she tries to avoid. her work is still
useful, however, for delineating the female position.
On the basis of our discussion of Winnicott and Mahler
in chapter 2 and of gender with respect to Lacan in the
previous section of this chapter, I will make some
preliminary claims before amplifying them with an examination
of Irigaray's work. My first claim is that the category
'woman' is a projection screen for playing out a male fantasy
of wholeness that is finally untenable, as well as a category
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representative of the lost joys (jouissance) of fusion
experiences
. My second, claim is that the female strategy
involves accepting the original loss and compensating for it
by repeating fusion experiences with others.
The male strategy denies the loss of mother— fusion and
continues to evade confronting it by finding Symbolic
substitutes that forever defer satisfaction. The loss, not
being dealt with, is displaced onto woman. 'Woman' is thus a
category associated with loss, fusion experiences, and the
possibility of confronting that loss along with the threat of
complete disintegration of self that that brings. It is the
fear of such disintegration that makes confrontation of
'woman' so hard from a male position. And yet even from the
male position, the experiences of fusion and the possibility
they hold for another way of dealing with lack, still remain
in the unconscious. The "deathwork" of Lacanian analysis is
one way of unraveling the layers of identification built up
on symbolic identifications that lead further and further
away from the concrete objects that originally satisfied in
symbiotic fusion. But fusion-experiences in the present
—
saying yes to fusion rather than rigidly adhering to the no
of the father--is another.
The principal function of the Symbolic is to mediate
between the Imaginary and the Real--that is, to process
experience as it is lived into meaningful form given the
narcissistic layers of identifications previously enacted by
the self. The unanticipated of the Real—the specificity of
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concrete experience, that which has not yet been made
articulate according to current meaning structures
(Juranville, 1984, 84-86) — is continually being made sense
of. But the Imaginary has a more important role to play in
this process than that which Lacan gives it. Imaginary
fusion does not happen just once, and then play itself out in
repetition through Symbolic substitutions. Not only do
Imaginary narcissistic identifications of the self motivate
the speech of the 'I', but fusion can continue to occur at
the Imaginary level that allow new gestalts to form, and
provide fresh impetus for narcissistic identifications. For
self-continuity to be maintained fusion has to be contained
within the context of one's past identity. But within given
parameters fusion can still occur.
The problem with the female position is that it can
remain inert—trapped in fusion, in dyadic experiences where
two form the whole and the new relationships this generates
with respect to the whole network of positions is lost.
Without the male strategy of deferment of desire, the
connections made in fusion experiences could not be
translated by the exchange and communication the paternal law
allows. But the assumption that the phallus is whole is no
longer needed. it was that assumption, that illusion of
self-sufficiency, that pushed men to leave mother behind and
seek their positions in the larger social group. To do so
they denied loss, pretended mastery, and drove themselves to
seek their desire by spinning out Symbolic chains--exchanging
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words and women. [14] Through abstraction, individuation was
established individuals could assert themselves as
individuals by seeing one another as signifiers easily
assimilated according to Symbolic rules. But as the
connections of the Symbolic order are established, the need
to fill in the picture with the specificity of concrete (as
opposed to abstract) differences that only fusion can bring
becomes more pressing.
Irigaray questions the paternal law in a way Lacan
doesn't. Instead of assuming that the father's law, the
phallus, the Symbolic, represent features of subjectivity
that, unfortunately or not, lead to the subordination of
women, she valorizes the female position. Her rendering of
the female position wrenches it out of the negative role of
other to the phallic position in order to give it a positive
characterization. I will make use of this characterization
to fill out what I believe Lacan has missed. Irigaray
counters Lacan's blindspot by depicting the male and female
positions in the extreme of their polarization. One the one
hand there is male specularization and the logic of the same.
[15] On the other, there is female pleasure and
heterogeneity. [16] Like Lacan, Irigaray doesn't believe
that the feminine can be spoken. Language is male. That is,
it operates according to a male economy of representation.
For women to speak, language would have to change.
Thus, Irigaray believes that there are two distinct
economies—one male, one female. [17] The male economy
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disallows the female one because it requires the category of
woman to be the negative inverse of 'man' if it is to
function. By filling out what Irigaray means by this male
economy of representation that operates according to the
logic of the same, we can fill out our picture of the male
strategy for self
—const itut ion . By examining Irigaray'
s
views on female pleasure, heterogeneity, and the possibility
of woman's language, we will get some clues as to how to
break through Lacan's impasse of female subjectivity.
Irigaray starts off her book. Speculum , with a
discussion of Freud's views on female sexuality. In the
style of mimicry she developed to speak the female without
reducing it to the logic of the same of typical theory, she
questions Freud's rendering of female development as an
aberration from "normal" male development. What Irigaray
wants to posit is that instead of one strategy for self-
constitution, there are two—but the female strategy has been
reduced to the male one, due to the blind spot of the male
position. According to Irigaray this blind spot is due to
the dream of symmetry (Irigaray 1985a, 13-129) — it is due to
the nature of the male strategy of self-representation that
it is blind to another strategy that takes a fundamentally
different approach.
Both Lacan and Irigaray agree that an infant is born
from the body of another, and that the primordial self of the
infant is first precipitated in symbiotic fusion with the
primary caretaker. Where Lacan and Irigaray disagree is on
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the nature of each individual's relation to this origin of
the self. While Lacan accepts the representation of that
relation according to what Irigaray terms the "logic of the
same," Irigaray is convinced that there is another way of
representing that relation. Because representing that
relation according to another, a feminine, logic would
disrupt and undermine male logic, it cannot yet be done
(Irigaray 1985a, 42-44)
. Yet Irigaray holds out the
possibility that through attempting to speak the feminine in
ways that subvert the male logic of language, women could
finally dispel the illusions of the male position.
We could thus say that Irigaray' s rendering of the logic
of the same, of the male economy of representation, is the
economy played out in Lacan's schema L. On Irigaray 's view,
man desires the same, the self-identical. he denies his
origin in the mother and determines his relation to origin
himself. That is, the origin of his primordial self in
fusion with the mother is relegated to the unconscious. The
layers of identifications built up on those unconscious
representations are linked to that self through the
signifying chains of the conscious and unconscious systems,
but this primordial origin of the conscious self is veiled.
The self is reconstituted in the dialectic of self/other
identifications that continue to occur, but man has lost
sight of the active role played by a real other that
originally helped create him. he projects imagoes that will
confirm his identity. To do this, he needs real people upon
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which to project those imagoes
—
people who will not challenge
them, thereby threatening his identity. Woman is the
socially sanctioned other. By conforming to the man's
imagoes, she insures the maintenance of his identity as the
same. he is thus free to continue to believe in the illusion
that he is whole, that he is the phallus that the other
desires, that his identity is not contingent upon the mother
that gave birth to him, or the other that reflects him back
to himself. The woman has abandoned her own relation to the
origin, to her birth, her self, in order to allow men to
inscribe upon her their relation to their origin, their
desire, their self-representations.
Thus, woman is required by the male position to be
silent, to be the other that will support the repetition of
his self-representations as the same. The primordial self
formed in mother-fusion is translated and transposed into the
Symbolic order through a layering of identifications
sanctioned by the paternal law. Anything that would upset
this economy of representation that repeats man as having the
same self is relegated to the unconscious. In this way a
stable, socially functioning identity is formed and
maintained despite the constant onslaught of chaotic
experience that besieges it. Anything that doesn't fit, that
can't be ordered according to the Symbolic rules of analogy,
resemblance and identity is dismissed. Experience is ordered
according to repetitions of identifications that support the
self as self-identical. Woman comes to be associated with
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the unconscious, the fusion—experiences of infancy and the
chaotic flux of experience that the self has mastered through
this logic of the same. In the puzzlement men express to one
another with respect to the question of what woman wants,
lies the dim awareness that the male strategy is based on an
-^-^-lusion the illusion that he seeks in the other recognition
of what he already is. If woman were to speak, to articulate
her female desire for contact, the connectedness with an
other that represents her relationship to her origin, man
could no longer posit himself as self-identical. Instead, he
would be forced to realize that he was created in and by
contact with another—that the other that recognized him in
fusion not only saw him as he was but, at least in part,
created him through the contact of that recognition.
According to Irigaray, that women don't have the
phallus, that they have instead a "nothing" where there
should be something is threatening to men because it
represents a hole in men's signifying economy (Irigaray
1985a, 50)
.
She suggests that this "nothing" might have been
interpreted as the symptom of an other libidinal economy that
would recall heterogeneity rather than the identical or
identifiable. Thus, she opposes two economies to one another
that we can delineate as her versions of the male and female
positions. In choosing to render these positions into the
"phallic" language of typical theory, I am flying in the face
of Irigaray's insistence on the ineffability of the female
position--at least in language as it stands. Irigaray feels
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that attempting to represent female desire and sexuality in
typical theoretical language can only reduce the feminine to
the male logic of the same and so deprive it of its
specificity. If there is not system of representations to
assist the girl in her conflictual relationship to her mother
and to her sex/organ (Irigaray 1985a, 68), it is for a
reason. The girl's relationship would have to be expressed
in another economy of representations than that of the schema
L.
I believe that this is only true given the extreme
polarization of the sexes as Irigaray depicts them. Just as
there are times when men relate to women as more than their
mirror reflection, there are times when women represent
themselves according to the logic of the same. If we insist
on the two extremes Irigaray describes as the extreme of two
positions with room for varying shades of grey in between, we
may see beyond the polarization of the sexes . Just as it is
helpful to relate Irigaray' s logic of the same to Lacan's
schema L, it is helpful to relate Irigaray 's notion of
heterogeneity to my earlier discussion of the deficiencies of
Lacan's account of the Imaginary and fusion-experiences.
What I would like to do here is characterize Irigaray 's
version of the male and female positions from that
perspective, although this may not be in keeping with her own
project
.
The male position : Upon discovering that he and his
mother are not one and that the self formed in fusion is thus
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at risk, he makes "the very place and space of being his own"
(Irigaray 1985a, 137) . That is, he denies the mother's
contribution to the self of fusion and makes his existence as
a human being one of his own making. He then "becomes a
prisoner of effects of symmetry that know no limit" (p. 137).
Barred from fusion-experiences due to his denial of the
other's part in the making of his self, he is doomed to
forever repeat that same self by setting up narcissistic
identifications of self with the other. For man, these
identifications must exclude activating any representations
of primordial connectedness with an other so that he can
maintain a self in separation from others. This means that
the other must repeat past identifications. Anything about
the other that might subvert these identifications must be
relegated to the unconscious. Nothing that would challenge
the boundaries of his self can be admitted. Instead the self
of the Imaginary will push the 'I' of speech to organize all
experience in conformity with the Symbolic rules of analogy
and resemblance. Boundaries remain fixed. The Real is made
intelligible by repeating the same self/other relationship
over and over again according to transformation rules that
relate the multiplicity of experience without endangering his
layering of self-representations. Thus, "Everywhere he runs
into the walls of his palace of mirrors" (p. 137) .
In "Plato's Hystera" Irigaray rereads Plato's cave
analogy as representative of the male position. The cave is
the womb, the empirical connection with the mother, and the
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fantasmatic images that lie at the subject's origins. In
leaving the cave, the subject is denying these origins lost
iri fluid darkness" and the "shimmering imprecision of
reflections" in order to replace them with "the neat, clear
cut, immutable, unambiguous categories that characterize,
divide up, classify, and order everything, every "being,"
according to rational intuition" (Irigaray 1985a, 281) . The
subject denies his origins in the mother in order to
represent his relationship to his origins as that of the son
to the Father. The Father is represented by the sun--"the
keystone supporting the whole
—
phallic—edifice of
representation that it dominates, illumines, warms, makes
fertile, and regulates by scattering its beams everywhere"
(p. 267) .
Thus, the shadowy reflections of mother-fusion are
relegated to the unconscious and denied, to be replaced with
the clearcut categories and interdictions of the Symbolic
order. Through the chain of associations created in
repetitions of the self that "pivot the scene around axes of
symmetry" (p . 259) the most recent layer of self-
representation maintains a link with the primordial self of
mother-fusion. But the shadows of the subject's origins are
denied so that he can maintain the illusion of a self that
was never merged with an other, a self that is forever self-
identical, able to take its place in the Symbolic order of
"being" where everything already is what it is, and
everything already has a place.
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fb^ald
—PQg i t iQn : Upon the loss of mother-fusion the
9i- r i is coerced by the Symbolic order into abandoning her own
relation to her origins—which is different from that of the
boy. Due to the need on the part of the male for a
cooperative other, she is forced into the position of having
"nothing" and submitted to the "projects and projections of
masculine consciousness" (Irigaray 1985a, 141). Thus:
By resubmitting herself to the established order,
in this role of delirious double, she abandons,
even denies, the prerogative historically granted
her: unconsciousness (p. 141).
The prerogative of unconsciousness is the prerogative of the
sex associated with fusion and loss; with representations
that are relegated to the unconscious because they are sunk
in shadows-—dreams and fantasies that don't conform to any of
the categories of the Symbolic (the realm of the clear-cut
and already-known)
. It is the specificity of women's
relationships to other women that allow this prerogative,
something about the nature of a girl's relationship to her
mother that is different from that of a boy's. Due to this
special relationship she is unconsciousness, "but not for
herself, not with a subjectivity that might take cognizance
of it, recognize it as her own" (p. 141) . thus, she is the
"reserve of "sensuality" for the elevation of intelligence,"
the "matter used for the imprint of forms" (p. 141) . Instead
of activating unconscious representations by associating them
according to the dictates of her own desire, she allows
herself to take on the identity of the other that will
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fulfill man's desire. That is, the layering of
identifications a woman builds up in the self/other dialectic
have more to do with the dictates of some man's own
search for lost objects associated with his mother than her
own
.
What is the special relationship to the mother and her
own origins that grants her the prerogative of
unconsciousness? What does it mean to have this prerogative?
How could it be represented if it weren't coopted by man?
Although Irigaray is wary of giving it expression in language
which operates according to the male economy of
representation, she gives us some clues. In "La Mysterique"
Irigaray "mimics" mystical literature to articulate a way of
relating that isn't based on the male logic of the same.
This kind of relating constitutes a "marriage of the
unknowable" where "everything is relentlessly immediate"
(Irigaray 1985a, 196)
.
Here two (whether it is a human
subject and God or two human subjects is not entirely clear
(who have no "possessions" are "wedded only in the abolition
of all power, all having, all being, that is founded
elsewhere" (p. 196)
.
The ranking of social positions as laid
out by the Symbolic order are left behind. Two come together
without the attributes assigned them by the place they take
as speaking subjects. Rather than placing themselves vis a
vis one another according to the self /other relationships
laid out by the Symbolic--relat ionships where the boundaries
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between self and other are fixed— "each becomes the other in
consumption .
"
Each will not in fact have known the identity of
the other, has thus lost self-identity except for a
hint of an imprint that each keeps in order the
better to intertwine in a union already, finally at
hand. Thus I am to you as you are to me, mine is
yours and yours mine, I know you as you know me,
you take pleasure with me as with you I take
pleasure in the rejoicing of this reciprocal
living—and identifying—together (p. 196) .
If we take this passage as an attempt to articulate the
desire specific to woman, we can contrast this female desire
to male desire. Male desire motivates the narcissistic
identifications of the schema L. The desire for the desire
of the mother is replaced by the desire for the desire of
objects offered by the paternal law as substitutes, i.e.,
recognition from others taken as ego ideals in the self/other
dialectic. For the speaking subject, the 'I' of speech has
translated the desire of the 'me' of narcissistic
identifications into the Symbolic order of language which
stakes out the social network of positions. The kind of
desire expressed in the above passage has nothing to do with
obtaining the desire of an other who has a given place in a
social network. In fact, this "female" desire is a desire
for another kind of connection where the boundaries of self
and other as laid out by the Symbolic melt, and two become
one in a fusion-experience reminiscent of mother-fusion.
This passage can be compared to our earlier discussion
of fusion-experience based on Winnicott and Mahler (chapter
2) . Fusion-experiences involve the melting of self/other
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boundaries—a way of relatedness that doesn't abide by the
rules of the Symbolic. The desire for the desire of an other
from its position as laid out by the Symbolic is not what is
at issue. Instead, the desire is for contact, for
connectedness—the kind of connectedness where the self/other
boundary breaks down and instead two desire as one. Through
a reciprocal attentiveness to the specificity of the other--a
specificity that defies all categorization by the Symbolic,
that eludes any articulation one could give it in terms of
attributes, properties and possessions available in the
Symbolic order—two merge desire by desiring exactly what the
other is in all his/her specificity. This kind of
attentiveness is thus an attentiveness beyond language in the
sense that it is a reciprocal responsiveness of two bodies
that may or may not find expression in conscious thought.
Just as the primordial fusion of primary caretaker and child
resulted in fantasmatic images associated with bodily
sensations eventually relegated to the unconscious, later
fusion-experiences based in body sensations can activate such
earlier sensations in a dialogue that may not be immediately
translatable into language. This reciprocal responsiveness
of two bodies allow the self/other boundary to break down and
the two to become one organism. Just as an organism
instantaneously communicates sensation from one area to
another, so do these "two" bodies. Just as an organism acts
as one, moving with a single goal or desire, so does the
desire of these "two" converge into one. In the desire for
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the desire of the other in his/her specificity, the pleasure
of the other rather than recognition is the goal. The
pleasure of each is instantaneously communicated to the other
via subtle body cues, and the desire of the two become one as
the mutual goal of pleasuring the other is satisfied and
communicated
.
Thus, the Imaginary realm is not merely a function of
"illusory" identifications with objects outside of oneself.
It is a real arena where body-sensations are communicated and
where desire is not for a particular "lost" object but for
the pleasure of merged desire. The "non-knowledge" of this
realm may find partial, and perhaps subversive, translation
into the Symbolic in the mode of sensat ion-ideas--"half
"
thoughts. Thoughts that are connected with the indistinct
meaning of body-sensation and have not yet attained the
clarity of the clear-cut distinctions laid out by the
positions of the Symbolic. These body sensations are
retained in the body (and so activated by experiences that
recall earlier experiences that evoked such sensations)
.
That is, body-sensations can be recalled by experiences that
reevoke them due to the signifying chains of representations
associated with them. These representations of body
sensations are part of the unconscious and so are grouped
according to the laws of primary process (condensation and
displacement) rather than those of secondary process. They
are connected with words, images and other representations
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that are associated with that earlier experience which they
represent
.
Body-sensations reevoked in the present can be given
conscious significance if attended to. The attunement of
another to one's body-sensations can activate them more
intensely. Thus, the body has a sort of language of its own—
-one that is neither distinct from, nor synonymous with,
actual speech. Women, with their desire for the
connectedness that makes two one organism, are more
conversant with the language of the body than men. While men
vie for the recognition that will place them within the
social network, women attune themselves to the more subtle
body signals that each in their specificity continuously send
out. Just as the mother learns to "read" her infant's
signals—the slight grimace that means they're about to cry,
the restlessness that means they'll soon be hungry--she
learns to read the body cues of those around her. And due to
the lack of representation for the desire for such
connectedness, this communication will usually take place on
an unconscious level--with neither mother, nor child, nor
man, stopping to bring this kind of connectedness to
conscious awareness. Furthermore, this kind of connectedness
is not peculiar to mothers. Every infant who has desired the
desire of its mother has had to learn the same kind of
responsiveness to the body-sensations of an other. it is
this kind of "non-knowledge" that is so difficult to
represent in terms of the logic of the same. For instead of
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a placing of two with respect to one another, it involves the
fusion of two into an organism that desires the same
pleasure. It is this pleasure of connectedness where two
become one, and the pleasure of the one is the pleasures of
the other, that is the pleasure of jouissance— a pleasure
that transcends boundaries and revels in immediate, "naive",
sensation, a pleasure that is unmediated by the social
network of positions of the Symbolic.
Despite the difficulty of translating this kind of
connectedness into Symbolic language, however, it has
traceable effects. In leaving the cave of his empirical
origins in the mother, man has "left the place, still based
in the senses, where the traces of his desires were
inscribed." But the effects of the body-based connectedness
of mother-fusion are still felt:
The wound suffered by being thus torn away might
leave scars in the memory. Reminders, rejoinders.
Passages, and hemorrhages, between sensible and
intelligible. Resulting in sensation-ideas, ideal
sensations. Any self-respecting philosopher avoids
confusion like that (Irigaray 1985a, 299).
The male position disallows the blurred boundaries of his
childhood. Instead, the male subject must leave the cave of
shimmering reflections and rediscover his "true" origin in
the bright light of the sun. people and things are more or
less perfect copies of ideal forms whose boundaries are
unambiguous and immutable.
Eclipse of the mother, of the place (of) becoming,
whose non-representation or even disavowal upholds
the absolute being attributed to the father. he no
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longer has any foundation, he is beyond all
beginnings (p. 307).
"Sensation-ideas" or anything hearkening back to man's
foundation in mother—matter and sense—experience that
respected no boundaries, would threaten the logic of the
same. To maintain the self /other relationship of
separateness where loss of the mother no longer poses the
threat of loss of self, experience must conform to fixed
categories. A woman, due to her different relationship to
her origins, is capable of a different kind of language.
When she is not co-opted by masculine speech she has a
different way of speaking.
Hers are contradictory words, somewhat mad from the
standpoint of reason, inaudible for whoever listens
to them with ready-made grids, with a fully
elaborated code in hand. Fo in what she says, too,
at least when she dares, woman is constantly
touching herself (Irigaray 1985b, 29)
.
The self that motivates the * I * of feminine speech, due to
that self's different relationship to the primordial self of
mother-fusion, is not bound by the same need to repeat the
same relationship of self and other in layers of narcissistic
identifications . Rather than translating that primordial
self into the Symbolic network of positions via the
transformation rules of analogy and resemblance, she is
"constantly touching herself." Identification with an image
outside of herself doesn't give her the contact she craves.
What she wants is the pleasure of connectedness, the
spontaneous response of her body to sensed experience that
defies all categorization. Since her identity doesn't depend
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on the logic of the same, she uses words differently. The
self that motivates her speech is a self with less respect
for the paternal law. it therefore makes less difference to
her whether or not she upholds it, whether or not her words
make "sense" according to the socially sanctioned Symbolic
code. her self is closer to the narcissistic self of the
unconscious the self that remembers mother— fusion and
connectedness, a self that refuses to accept Symbolic
substitutions. Instead of repeating a self/other
relationships that hearkens back to a precipitation of self
in mother /fusion she no longer remembers, she wants to feel
again the physical response of her body to an other or to the
discourse of her Other that would reevoke such forgotten
responses. When the * I * translates this self into the
Symbolic, it is not with the intention of finding that self's
position in the larger network of social positions. The
feminine intent is that of representing the spontaneous
response of the body to a concrete situation in order to give
it a local position with respect to other such responses she
may have had.
It is unclear why Irigaray thinks that woman's relation
to her origins is different from that of a man's. if both
precipitated a primordial self in fusion with a woman, then
the origins for both would seem to be the same. From her
discussion of the male denial of his origins in "Plato's
Hystera" Irigaray would seem to grant this. And yet woman is
coerced through submission to the Symbolic order to abandon
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female desire and a peculiarly female relation to origins.
On a Lacanian account, what makes women different from men is
the different position they take with respect to the phallus.
Each has to resolve the crisis of the castration complex, but
the way of resolving that crisis will differ. On Irigaray’s
account, woman would already seem to have a different
relation to the mother. Because she is unable to represent
this relation due to being coerced into playing man's
"delirious double" by the Symbolic order, she doesn't know
herself the way a man does (Irigaray 1985a, 141) . She is
denied the economy of representation that would reflect
female desire and sexuality. This suggests that female
desire and sexuality is essentially different from that of a
man's. Although some have argued that Irigaray is not
advocating an essentialist view of sexual difference, there
are certainly strains in her work that can be given an
essentialist reading. Unless some explanation is given of
why a girl's relation to her origins is different from that
of a boy's one could gather from Irigaray' s valorization of
female genitals (two lips—the sex which is not one [18])
that sexual difference is based in anatomy. That is, that
one has specifically female desire and sexuality due to
having female genitals.
The limitations Irigaray points to in the male position
are important ones. There are equally debilitating
limitations to the female position as Irigaray depicts it.
If wielding phallic power involves defining social
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relationships, the it's about time women wielded more of that
power themselves. If all of us were to take Irigaray's
advice, we might experience more of the female jouissance
that eludes our grasp from the male position, but we would
also have no more power than before. I see no point in
1 ® i ^ ing either position over the other. We need to
articulate the female position, and to explore the
possibilities for that position blocked by the male one. It
is my belief that doing so will get us past the impasse that
both Lacan and Irigaray leave us with—that is, how to make
sense of female subjectivity.
If we read Irigaray in light of Lacan's Symbolic and
Imaginary realms, we can find a way of accounting for the
difference in male and female desire that is contingent upon
the position one takes up with respect to the phallus
—
regardless of one's anatomy. This leaves open the
possibility that not only are both positions open to both,
but that they remain open throughout one's life. Both men
and women have had the experiences necessary for taking up
either posit ion--whether those experiences have been
relegated to the unconscious or not. Thus, the question
becomes one of why women tend to develop a different strategy
for maintaining the self in the face of loss of mother-fusion
and what that strategy is.
Chodorow gives us some clues as to why a girl's relation
to her mother would be different from that of a boy's that
allow us to avoid a biological explanation. While there are
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some problems with using her work to fill out Irigaray's
story due to differences in their theoretical frameworks, it
can be done. In the next section I will discuss Chodorow
from this perspective and offer my own view of a female
position--one that doesn't problematize the possibility of
female subjectivity in the same way that Lacan and Irigaray
do. By theorizing sexual difference as a difference in
strategies with respect to the problem of subjectivity, as
opposed to a difference in anatomy, I hope to pave the way
for examining how a conflict in strategies could manifest
itself in philosophical texts.
3 . 4 Chodorow; Woman as Nurturer
Nancy Chodorow, in her book, The Reproduction of
Mothering (1978), uses object relations theory in the attempt
to answer the question of how women today come to mother.
Chodorow is by training a sociologist. her perspective on
psychoanalysis and object relations theory is thus that of an
outsider using psychoanalysis to answer a question that
concerns her as a sociologist. By raising the question of
how women come to mother, Chodorow not only opens the
question of how the nurturing qualities of the primary
caretaker of children is reproduced, but of how women as a
gender are socially reproduced with the personalities
requisite to mothering, in contrast to men. Thus, the
question of the gender difference of selves is introduced,
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an<^ the question of the material conditions for the creation
of gendered selves becomes important. [ 19 ]
That there are two genders and a sexual division of
labor point to two kinds of subjectivity, two kinds of
possibility for selfhood. Thus far, men have been privileged
in cultural accounts and manifestations of self—at least in
the dominant discourse. Taking mothering as a legitimate
expression of self and exploring the conditions that allows
this kind of self to evolve is a step toward opening up other
possibilities of selfhood. As long as the male self is taken
as the paradigm of selfhood proper, we lose sight of the fact
that the masculine self is only one possibility for selfhood-
-and not the only one. The feminine self as a socially
reproduced gender, that is, a socially created category, is a
self deserving of a richer and more appreciative account.
Women are not "failed" men, but human beings with selves that
tend to be socially constructed in a way that is
systematically different from that of men. Chodorow's book
is one attempt to account for the material conditions of that
difference in the context of the family where it is first
produced
.
According to Chodorow's reading of object-relations
theory, the mother acts as an external ego for the infant,
providing holding and nourishment. In the earliest stages
the infant doesn't experience the mother as separate and uses
defensive mechanisms such as introjection to retain primary
identification. "Separateness during this early period
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threatens not only anxiety at possible loss, but the infant's
very sense of existence" (Chodorow 1978, 60)
.
The self originates in the inner physical experience of
body integrity, and the demarcation of that body from the
object world. This demarcation is achieved, as we saw in our
earlier discussion of Winnicott, through frustration. As the
infant is confronted with the mother's failure to anticipate
and satisfy its every need, anxiety spurs the development of
ego capacities.
The infant internalizes representations of aspects of
its mother to counter the anxiety of frustration. It comes
to define aspects of its self in relation to these
representations. Since the mother must help the child
achieve separation, she also evokes the child's ambivalence.
The process of separation and individuation thus provokes
frustration and anxiety in relation to the mother that the
infant must cope with if it is to achieve a stable sense of
self
.
Chodorow suggests that preoedipal experience is likely
to differ for boys and girls. In addition to resolving the
castration crisis differently, girls have a different
relationship to their mother. This difference is based on
the mother's unconscious attitudes toward her same-sex off-
spring. "A woman identifies with her own mother, and through
identification with her child, she ( re ) experiences herself as
a cared-for child" (Chodorow 1974, 47)
.
A mother is more
likely to experience her daughter as an extension of herself.
156
Thus, she discourages her daughter's process of separation
and individuation. On the other hand, she is more likely to
emphasize her son's masculinity in opposition to herself,
thus pushing him to individuate at an early age.
Both girls and boys develop a deep personal
identification with the mother during their early years. The
girls can maintain continuity with this identification based
on daily, on-going, concrete contact with someone who is the
same sex as themselves. Boys must replace this early
identification with a masculine one. Because fathers usually
work outside the home the concrete nature of their day to day
activities is a mystery. The boy must identify with a
fantasized masculine role. This often leads him to define
masculinity as that which is not feminine or involved with
women. He tries to deny primary identification with the
mother by repressing the feminine inside himself, and by
denigrating and devaluing whatever he considers to be
feminine in the outside world. The development of a girl's
gender identity doesn't involve this kind of rejection of her
primary identification with the mother.
Feminine identification is based not on fantasied
or externally defined characteristics and negative
identification, but on the gradual learning of a
way of being familiar in everyday life, and
exemplified by the person ... with whom she has been
most involved. It is continuous with her early
childhood identifications and attachments (Chodorow
1974
,
51 ) .
Furthermore, taking the father as her primary love-object
doesn't mean the girl completely rejects her mother. In
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she usually continues her relationship of dependence
upon and attachment to her.
The care and socialization of girls by women
ensures the production of feminine personalities
founded on relation and connection, with flexible
rather than rigid ego boundaries, and with a
comparatively secure sense of gender identity
(Chodorow 1974, 58)
.
Because the mother was also a girl, she tends to grow up
without establishing adequate ego boundaries or a firm sense
of self. This leads her to experience the same boundary
confusion with her daughter that she experienced with her
mother
.
These object-relational differences, and their
effect on defenses, splits, and repressions in the
ego, better explain the important differences in
masculine and feminine personality and the
important aspects of feminine personality that
emerge from the oedipus complex than does the more
conscious and intended identification with the same
gender parent (Chodorow 1978, 114).
What I take Chodorow to be suggesting here is that from
the start, male and female infants learn different ways of
handling the emergence and maintenance of self according to
the different problems in separating from an opposed-sex or
same-sex primary caretaker, in addition to unconscious
attitudes of the mother to the different sexes.
The Lacanian reading of psychoanalysis emphasizes the
linguistic aspect of the unconscious, thus suggesting that
the unconscious is accessible in our speech and writing.
American psychoanalysis tends to look to empirical data for
confirmation of theories about the genetic development of
people. Lacanian psychoanalysis looks at linguistic output
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to see how a self that is inherently contradictory and
fictional is currently maintaining its fictional unity.
Chodorow, with her emphasis on genetic development, misses
the revolutionary impact of the repressed feminine that
Irigaray makes possible through a radicalized Lacanian
reading of Freud. For Chodorow, women are finished products
of their past—there is a certain closure to the process
whereby their selves were formed. In Irigaray' s reading of
Lacan and Freud, the self is always provisional, always
subject to the conflict within it, thus leaving open the
possibility for radical change. It is this questioning of
the givenness of selfhood--whether one grants an initial
formative period or not—that I find exciting in French
psychoanalysis
.
Chodorow' s analysis is an empirical one. She starts
with the question of how women come to be psychologically
equipped to be mothers, assumes that there is a
social/cultural explanation for this, and pulls together the
empirical data as theorized by object-relations theorists to
explain it. her question is different from the question of
how subjectivity is possible. She assumes the self as
unproblematic— it is the formation of a particular kind of
self in a social context that she is concerned to explain.
She is not looking for the divided subject, but looking to
explain why the unified subject we have is as it is.
The self that Chodorow describes is determined in early
childhood and forever fixed in place. It develops and
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matures over time, but this development will unfold in the
social setting according to the dictates of the original
situation of early childhood. Instead of a system of
signifying chains that can result in a whole new
configuration of meaning upon the shifting of a signifier, we
have a self whose internalized representations cohere into
stable patterns. Thus, once the self is developed, it is not
threatened with constant disintegration and the notion of on-
going reconstitution of the self in each and every meaningful
word or act—with its implications for the possibility of
self-t ransformat ion--is lost.
This may be one reason why there is a pessimistic tone
to Chodorow's polemic for change. She advocates co-
parenting, and yet if it is women who are psychologically
equipped to become (even want to become) mothers and not men,
how are we to bring this change about? Although Chodorow
reclaims the unconscious as the aspect of Freud that American
psychoanalysis has tended to repress, she is still within the
American tradition.
Chodorow, however, does something that Irigaray does
not . She attempts to give a story about the material
conditions under which two initial situations for internal
object relations are formed—male and female. I do not
believe that Chodorow's analysis can be used as a universal
to explain patriarchy. The conditions she describes are
those of the nuclear family under capitalism. But given due
restraint with respect to its application, Chodorow's work
160
illuminate the structures that Lacanian psychoanalysis
tries to analyze.
What I'm interested in taking from Chodorow is not that
female selves end up being different from male selves, but
that a strategy for maintaining selfhood is put into
operation differently according to gender—and that this
difference in strategy continues to operate throughout one's
life. The interesting questions here are the material
conditions under which one initially creates a self--and how
those conditions still have ramifications in the way that we
recreate ourselves in the on-going process of being selves.
Irigaray talks about the repressed feminine, but Chodorow
fills out the picture of how that repression is' first set
into motion—and why it is that if anyone can speak the
feminine it is more likely to be a woman.
Developing Chodorow 's work to bring it in line with the
theory being developed here, we can characterize the male and
female solutions to the problem of separation and
individuation as two different strategies. Both males and
females have to deal with the anxiety of loss of mother-
fusion. Our characterization of the male and female
positions a la Irigaray gave us some clues as to how these
strategies differ. Chodorow allows us to fill out the
picture further by giving us some clues as to why and how the
girl's relationship to the mother and her origins differs
from that of a boy's.
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The male position: Due in part to the mother's
unconscious attitudes towards him, the boy is pushed toward
individuation. Not only does the castration complex confront
him with the no of the father, but the mother has already
been discouraging symbiotic fusion. In the situation of
fusion, two become one in the communication of body-sensation
that leads to the fusion of desire for the pleasurable body
state of both. Due to the mother's attitude toward an
opposed-sex child, she is less apt to prolong this situation.
She assumes the separateness of her child from herself at an
earlier stage of his development—and thus assumes that the
child's desires will be different from her own. She stops
expecting the child to pick up on her body-cues as intensely
and starts expecting that he'll become more difficult. His
desires will no longer seem as accessible to her, or vice
versa; she will expect less fluid communication along with
increasing conflict in the relationship. With the resolution
of the Oedipus complex, the boy will take his position as
"having" the phallus. The more subtle communication of
fusion already having been discouraged, he will be quick to
take up the compensation offered him--identif ication with the
father who upholds the Symbolic order.
Due to the abstract nature of a boy's masculine
identity, the male position as we have already laid it out is
natural to him. He is more comfortable building up layers of
narcissistic identifications in keeping with the logic of the
same because he's not entirely sure what masculinity means.
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The concrete, body based contact with his mother is with a
woman the opposite, inferior sex. His experiences of her
and mother-fusion cannot, therefore, be validated. Instead
he must come to distrust his body-based self and turn to the
abstract positions of being as laid out by the Symbolic for
guidance. He must "be a man" and learn how to get an other
to give him the recognition he needs to repeat his self/other
pattern. Because he cannot allow connectedness reminiscent
of fusion with his mother or other women, he adheres rigidly
to the transposition of the same self throughout the
conventional network of meaning encoded in language.
The female position : The mother sees her daughter as
the same sex as herself. It is therefore more likely that
she will continue to see her as an extension of herself.
Instead of pushing her away, she will continue to act as if
she and her daughter are one—one organism, communicating
body-sensation instantaneously via subtle cues, with one
desire. She not only continues to expect that her desires
are one with her daughter's, but that her daughter will
continue to conform to her desires. Thus, instead of
breaking fusion entirely, another kind of connectedness is
developed that is reminiscent of the intense body-based
communication of symbiotic fusion. To compensate for the
loss of fusion the boy learns the strategy of obtaining
recognition from others that fit his self/other pattern. The
girl compensates for her loss by maintaining connectedness
with others. Both feel terror at the prospect of finding
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themselves helplessly dependent and alone, cut off from the
source of nourishment and the origins of self. The male
strategy involves relying on the phallic power to obtain
recognition to compensate for this break. The female
strategy involves transferring the connectedness once only
felt with mother to others as well.
In taking on her position of "not having" the phallus
the girl accepts that she lacks, that she has been cut off
from the mother, that she thus has a nothing waiting to be
filled by another. With that acceptance comes a receptivity-
-an awareness of the other as subject, as desiring, and the
desire to fill in one's lack by listening to the other as
desiring subject. Accepting that she is not whole, not self-
sufficient, mere repetition of the same self in a self/other
dialectic based on recognition is insufficient. She wants
more, wants to know what another's desire is, what another
wants, and to conform to that desire and satisfy it in order
to regain the connectedness that she has lost. She is thus
receptive to the other that will form her, that will tell her
more about who she is by eliciting her desire to conform to
his/her desire, to fit. She needs an other to tell her who
she is because she admits that she doesn't yet know. When
she can anticipate some unarticulated desire of the other,
she also learns something about herself, something about
where she fits, due to the response within herself such
satisfaction evokes.
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Symbolic layers of identification are stripped away in
fusion-experience, leaving only the actuality of the moment,
of allowing a reciprocity to form that transcends all
labelling, all attributes that define one, all signifying
chains that conform to paternal law and one's position as
laid out by that law in the social network. Instead of
traveling all the circuits of one's Symbolic layering in
order to place the other with respect to oneself a la the
paternal law, there is a breakdown of that circuitry that
results in fusion, a merging of positions. Instead of the
Desire for contact deferred through the signifying chains
that determine one's position, there is the pleasure of
immediate contact. In the Symbolic each signifyer can
signify only through the position it takes up in opposition
to all other signifiers. In fusion there is contact.
Through a heightened awareness of the other that involves
minute adaptations to minute signals--signals that involve
body movements, tone of voice, gaps and pauses in speech,
etc., that 11 point to the other's desire, what would
constitute the other's other, what would feel like a "fit" to
the other, contact is made. While the subject thinks he
wants to merely repeat the relationships of identity where he
was subjected to the law of the father and its rules of
substitut iton, actually he wants to get all the way back to
the kind of immediate identity he had with the mother. The
mother who helped him articulate his desire by anticipating
it and giving him what satisfied before he asked for it.
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fusion can occur- without the man realizing it sine© the
woman is conforming to his other—he gets sustenance without
huving to change his identity
. When fusion is reciprocal,
both are transformed— real fusion occurs as both realize that
they both desire the same thing—to conform to the desire of
the other and be one as two. Instead of merely projecting an
imago, projection of an imago along with allowing oneself to
be imprinted with the imago of another is allowed. There is
a receptiveness to being the other for another that, when
reciprocated, allows one to transform one another's imagoes.
The unconscious, the nether side, the other, holds suspended
representational chains that work according to the logic of
primary process and heterogeneity. Fusion-experiences allow
new meaning to emerge in a different manner than the logic of
the same. Instead of translating the self through
repetition, transformation is allowed that doesn't overwhelm
all meaning structures through mutual shaping—each bouncing
off the other, thus mutually grounding one another. Instead
of a fixed anchor point for one who repeats a self-
representation, there are two beams orienting one another
without the need for a fixed anchor. Self-representations
become mutually adapting.
In the unravelling of identity layers through careful,
reciprocal attention to the imago projected upon you, the
patient looking for the point of contact, the point where two
imagoes can merge, fusion can occur without destroying self-
identity. A point of contact is found where space for new
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meaning is made. If too much new material is released from
the unconscious then chaos would ensue. But in the space of
Imaginary fusion mutually bounded by the Symbolic layers of
the other's other, only enough new material is released to
become what another desires. Patterning of the logic of the
same is maintained, but the self is transformed in the fusion
with another's desire.
Just as the extreme of the male position assumes the
imposition of a same self onto an other, the extreme of the
female position assumes the complete conformity to that
position of other. It is this position that Lacan describes.
Irigaray fills out what that position means in a more
positive way, without being able to make female subjectivity
much more plausible. On her view, woman as woman is still
unable to make herself understood. [20] I have used
Chodorow, with her description of the female sex as the sex
with "permeable ego boundaries, " the sex that operates on the
basis of relatedness rather than opposition, to fill out
Irigaray 's story in light of two strategies--male and female.
I think this can be extended to finding a way of envisioning
female subjectivity— a female subject who can articulate
female desire and female sexuality. Given that women learn
language, that they are subjects— if imperfect ones—who
operate according to the logic of the same of language, then
the question is, how is their use of the Symbolic different
from that of a man's. Irigaray has given us some clues, but
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she takes the extreme of the female position as her point of
departure. Using Chodorow's notion of connectedness, we can
see female subjectivity as a different position with respect
to the Symbolic one that allows the kind of Imaginary fusion
that the extreme of the male position cannot tolerate. Thus,
the description of fusion-experience I give above is not
necessarily of an experience that is and must forever remain
ineffable. Rather, such experience involves the ability to
suspend the Symbolic as a complete and closed system of
signifiers, in order to articulate experience locally— in a
way that may contradict and even wreak havoc with the broader
realm of positionality.
The female subject who wants the power denied the mute
feminine of Lacan's or Irigaray's characterization, in
addition to being the other for another, wants her desire
taken into account as well. In addition to being shaped by
the desire of the other, she wants the other to be shaped by
her own desire. She wants a receptivity to her desire, an
attentiveness to her other that will allow her to see her
reflection as well. Connection is made in the mutual overlap
where each is stretching equally, reciprocally transformed,
in order to fuse desire. Thus there is a merging of subject
and object. One feels both that one is the other for the
other and that the other is one's own other. In the space
thus created new meaning can arise—room is made in the
suspension of old categories for new categories and patterns
to form. In the playspace, the rules of the Symbolic order
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are suspended and traveling along the path of the logic of
the same isn't required.
The process doesn't require a human other. It can
happen any time the subject relinquishes the position of
imposing objectivity on the other, and allows the object the
status of subject—that is, allows the "object" to set the
boundaries on meaning. The subject allows herself to be
shaped by the object repetition of self-representations is
suspended in order to merge with the ob ject-as-sub ject
.
Thus, one's own self of repetitive identifications is left
behind, allowing the backlog of unconscious representations
not yet brought into the self-system [21] to be activated by
the object. The kind of process described in the mirror
stage continues throughout life, but not—as Lacan would have
it—as a mere repetition, a build-up of layers—but in a
build-up of fusion-experiences as well where we are affecting
and influencing through connectedness who we are.
Both Lacan's version of the Imaginary and Irigaray's
downgrading of the function of the logic of the same need
modification. Both the Imaginary and the Symbolic are
equally crucial in the maintenance of subjectivity. The
Symbolic order is composed of signifying chains that have
been exchanged and communicated over the social network of
individuals. Adhering to these chains, guaranteed by
paternal law that says no to fusion and so insures their
stability, thus guarantees stable identity. The nether side
of meaning threatens this order and subjectivity. This
169
netherside is the storehouse of representations that don't
fit the current Symbolic order. To lose these meanings would
be death, to unleash them would overwhelm. Imaginary fusion
recognizes them without having to incorporate them into
conscious meaning structures or the Symbolic. The female
position allows for a different order of meaning, one that
might conflict with the Symbolic order. It allows for a
suspension of disbelief, for the non judgmental merging of two
into one that requires a reciprocal shaping on the part of
both in order to fit one another and make contact. This
requires a suspension of the Symbolic order--not a "you are
like (or unlike) me" but a "I am you and you are me" that
takes place simultaneously; an oscillation of perspectives
that finally ends in merging both without losing either. The
Symbolic holds together representations in patterns that
relate them in particular ways--relat ionships where they are
laid out in time and space. The Imaginary suspends such
relationships, allowing an "irrational" fusion of
representations. The Symbolic sorts things out according to
"reason, " the Imaginary operates according to more local
positionality. It can thus hold representations
simultaneously, in a fullness that doesn't overwhelm because
no attempt is made to sort it out.
3 . 5 Self-Construction and the Production of Meaninqj—Take HI
Since both men and women are "castrated", what men
project onto the other (woman) to maintain their own unity
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gives us a clue to the difficulties that we all face in
trying to be subjects. Women are also subjects who have had
to develop another strategy to maintain subjectivity. There
are structural differences between a quintessentially
masculine" vs. "feminine" perspective. We can characterize
the difference as involving a different relationship of the
Symbolic to the Imaginary. The quadrature that Lacan
describes is that of masculine identity. A "feminine"
quadrature would place more emphasis on the Imaginary,
allowing fusions to take place that would subvert layering of
narcissistic identifications in the Symbolic.- We can thus
link the "masculine" perspective to the self-strategy that
defers satisfaction through the Symbolic chain we discussed
in chapter two. In turn, we can link the "feminine"
perspective to an alternate self-strategy that seeks fusion-
experience
.
The theory of self developed here has given some reasons
for why a female strategy of creating and maintaining a sense
of self might be different from that of a male self-strategy.
The problems presented to the female child were different
problems necessitating different solutions. One aspect of
this difference is reflected by the kinds of experiences that
are repressed as inappropriate to the self-image one is
attempting to construct. That we can delineate two gender-
linked self-strategies in this way presents interesting
questions for meaning-productive activity such as the
activity of writing theory. One question is how congenial
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theoretic language is to the expression of the repressed
"feminine." Another question is how this "feminine" realm of
experience threatens to emerge and subvert the works of the
men who are represented in the philosophical tradition.
Woman as other represents a category that stands in for
aspects of experience repressed by both men and women, but
particularly by men. This repressed material constitutes a
threat to the constitution of selves and to the social order
as we know it. And yet repressed material that needs release
does get represented through symptoms. A reading of a
philosophical text that examines its gaps and contradictions,
its blind spots and repetitiveness, what the text says as
opposed to what it does, is a reading that attempts to
"psychoanalyze" the text. How one positions oneself in one's
production of meaning is motivated as much by the need to
continually reconstitute one's identity as by the need to
communicate information to one's reader. Thus, these gaps
and contradictions can be read as conflicts in self-
constitution. Such a reading assumes that the self is not a
coherent unity, but that any self that is presented on a
conscious level is subverted by the unconscious in a way that
threatens its very existence.
By attempting to articulate fusion-experiences and a
female position that does enable subjectivity, I have
delineated a position that contradicts the male one. If,
then, a text attempts to speak from both positions, it is
bound to run into problems. It will seem contradictory and
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irrational" from the perspective of "correct," i.e., male,
theorizing. Fusion-experiences have been relegated to the
unconscious and woman in order to preserve order. Through
the building up of Symbolic meaning in a social context
individual experience is given meaning and selves are formed
that can take effective action. If too much of the concrete
experiences that evade such meaning structures at any one
time were not filtered out via the unconscious, chaos would
ensue. To lose these experiences on the other hand would
impoverish life, leaving us only abstract categories with
nothing to fill them. Fusion-experiences proved a means for
releasing some of this unconscious meaning into conscious
meaning structures. Women, being less attached to paternal
law, are more apt to enjoy these fusion-experiences that tend
to subvert the Symbolic order.
The male position involves denying fusion-experience--
even though it was through such experience that their
primordial selves were formed—and instead takes flight into
the Symbolic through the repetition of self in transposition
that rigidly avoids fusion. Fusion-experiences have to be
denied due to the male fallacy that they are self-suf f icient-
-the phallic whole that is desired by woman because he is
whole while she lacks. If her were to uncover his own lack,
to confront the fact that he isn't the phallus his mother
lacked, and he certainly isn't whole, but in fact is
confronted with lack himself, he would face loss of identity.
He would be threatened with mother-engulfment and chaos since
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the male position involves assuming that the seif he had with
the mother is his own self (which illusion he maintains in
repetition of the self /other dialectic)
. Women who know they
lack, are less threatened by the notion that they are only
whole selves in relation to others, that it is in
connectedness that they are whole.
An impasse between the two kinds of self-strategies can
be shown in the symptoms of a text that speak to what can't
actually be said due to the limitations presented by gender
categories. Aspects of the text can speak from the female
position, thus pushing against the confines of the male
position, only to cave in at certain pressure points.
Looking at the text's version of 'woman' and the 'other'
gives some idea of just how much in the way of fusion-
experience the subject signified in the text has relegated to
the other. One of the "lures," of the me is 'woman' —not
women themselves, but the various ways that women are
perceived. Lacanian theory gives us a way of understanding
how talk about the other can be revealing of ourselves and
our strategies of self-constitut ion--the repetition of
identity fixations that we use to maintain our self-identity.
What philosophers say about women can be shown to be more
indicative of their own intrasub jective experience than any
real truth about women. Woman as other, then, is a
particularly interesting category for understanding how these
men constitute themselves—the fixations that they repeat,
and the aggression that any threat to these fixations
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unleashes
. This in turn can allow us to analyze what these
fixations are trying to veil—the truth that an analysis of
the gaps in the text can reveal. Thus, if the identity
constituted by a text pushes against the boundaries of the
male position, the extent and content of that pushing will be
limited by the particular version of 'woman' (which according
to Lacanian theory and Irigaray is an unspecified category
from the male position that takes the form of male fantasy)
which the text represents.
In the next chapter I will explore this interpretative
strategy with examples from the work of three male
philosophers who take up different versions of a male self-
strategy
.
NOTES
[1] Although I think psychoanalysis and Lacanian theory
has explanatory force for patriarchal, capitalist societies
in the Western tradition I will not make "universalizing"
claims about its explanatory force for two reasons: 1) I want
to avoid imposing my story about the self upon individuals
who don't feel it speaks to their experience, in keeping with
the feminist sensitivity to experiences that may be alien to
one's own (see chapter one, section 1.5) and 2) I think any
story
. about gender is subject to continual change and
revision over time since gender categories are social
constructions rather than categories based on essential
differences between men and women.
[2] In addition to Freud's depiction of the male path to
selfhood as the norm (see my discussion of Irigaray's
critique of this view in section 3.2), women have been and
still are denigrated for being less "developed" than men.
There is a long tradition of this kind of denigration in
philosophical literature (see Osborne 1979, Mahawald 1978,
and Okin 1979) as well as in other forms of culture
(literature, popular culture, religious institutions, etc.).
[3] The key works I will be dealing with in the
following expositions of Irigaray and Chodorow will be
Irigaray's Speculum and This Sex Which I Not One (Irigaray
1985a; 1985b) and Chodorow' s The Reproduction of Mothering
(1978) .
[4] "Disguised as reflections on the general conditions
of man's Being, the philosopher's thinking depends for its
effect on its specularity (its self-reflexivity) ; that which
exceeds this reflective circularity is that which is
unthinkable . It is this kind of specul (ariz ) at ion Irigaray
has in mind when she argues that Western philosophical
discourse is incapable of representing femininity/woman as
other than as the negative of its own reflection." Toril Moi
on Irigaray (Moi 1985, 132)
.
[5] "...for women the level of what is ethically normal
is different from what it is in men. Their super-ego is
never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its
emotional origins as we require it to be in men." From "Some
Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction
Between the Sexes" (Freud 1963, 193)
.
I will discuss
Irigaray's critique of this bias in Freud's thought in
sect ion 3.2.
[6] See Mitchell's "Introduction— I" and Rose's
"Introduction— II" in Mitchell and Rose (1985), as well as
the essays by Lacan on feminine sexuality that are gathered
in this book.
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[7] See, for example, Mitchell and Rose (1985) and
Ragland-Sullivan (1986, chapter five)
.
[8] Also, see gallop (1982, 22) : "So the man is
'castrated' by not being total, just as the women is
'castrated' by not being a man. Whatever relation of lack
feels, lack of wholeness, lack in/of being, is projected
onto woman's lack of phallus, lack of maleness. Woman is
then the figuration of phallic 'lack'; she is a hole."
[9] In the following discussion the male position is
derived from the exposition of Lacan given in chapter two and
the female position is derived from my earlier discussions of
Lacan as well as discussions of 'woman' in Lacan from the
following sources: Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986, chapter 10),
Freeland (1986), Gallop (1982), Lacan (1975), Mitchell and
Rose (1985), and Ragland-Sullivan (1986, chapter 5).
[10] "There is no such thing as the woman since her
essence ... she is not all" (Mitchell and Rose 1985, 144).
Also see Ragland-Sullivan (1986, 297), Gallop (1982, 23) and
Irigaray's "Any Theory of the "Subject" Has Always Been
Appropriated by the "masculine"" (1985a, 133-146)
.
[11] Benvenuto and Kennedy make the following comment on
Lacan's notion of woman's iouissance (enjoyment): "She has a
surplus of enjoyment which cannot be integrated into
language, unless it is placed under a prohibition, such as
the law of castration. Might the woman, who after all does
not risk much when faced by the threat of castration..., be
partly exempt from the pursuance of this law?" Also see
Freeland (1986) on this point. We will find that Irigaray
picks up this notion of female pleasure in positing a logic
different from the male "logic of the same" (see section
3.2).
[12] According to gallop (1982, 43) Stephen Heath starts
his article (Heath 1978/79) "by informing us that ' Encore .
Lacan's 1972/73 seminar (is) devoted to "what Freud expressly
left aside, the Was will das Weib ? the What does woman
want?"'" Of course, to devote a seminar to this question
implies that Lacan thinks he knows the answer to this, but
strangely enough, he's not interested in encouraging women
themselves to speak on the subject. For more on this point
see Freeland (1986)
.
[13] Cynthia Freeland, in "Woman: Revealed Or Reveiled?"
criticizes Lacan for holding a romantic view of woman and
comments that "Lacan leads the way not to women who voice
their heart but to women who embrace their inability to do
so, rejoicing in their own mysteriousness" (1986, 69)
.
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[14] For more on women as objects of exchange, see
Irigaray's "Women on the Market" (1985b, 170-191).
[15] In addition to Irigaray's Soecnl nm (1985a), also
see "The Power of Discourse" (Irigaray 1985b, 68-85)
. Also
see Toril Moi ' s discussion of these concepts (Moi 1985, 131-
143) .
[16] See Speculum (Irigaray 1985a) passim, and "Cosi Fan
Tutti" (Irigaray 1985b, 86-105)
.
[17] See "The Power of Discourse and the Subordination
of the Feminine" and "The "Mechanics" of Fluids," both in
Irigaray (1985b), as well as "Any Theory of the "Subject" Has
Always Been Appropriated by the "Masculine"" in Irigaray
(1985a) .
[18] "Woman "touches herself" all the time, and moreover
no one can forbid her to do so, for her genitals are formed
of two lips in continuous contact. Thus, within herself, she
is already two--but not divisible into one(s) —that caress
each other." From "This Sex Which Is Not One" (Irigaray
1985b, 24) .
[19] See my exposition of Harding's account of feminist
gender theory in section 1.4 for a reiteration of this point.
[20] "I can thus speak intelligently as sexualized male
(whether I recognize this or not) or as asexualized.
Otherwise, I shall succumb to the illogicality that is
proverbially attributed to women. All the statements I make
are thus either borrowed from a model that leaves my sex
aside--implying a continuous discrepancy between the
presuppositions of my enunciation and my utterances, and
signifying furthermore that, mimicking what does not
correspond to my own "idea" or "model" (which moreover I
don't even have), I must be quite inferior to someone who has
ideas or models on his own account—or else my utterances are
unintelligible according to the code in force. In that case
they are likely to be labeled abnormal, even pathological."
[21] See footnote [10] of chapter two.
CHAPTER 4
SELF-CONSTITUTING ACTIVITY IN PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS:
THREE EXAMPLES
4 . 1 Introduction
According to one common sense approach to the nature of
the self, I am a unique individual with a relatively coherent
and unified world-view that I continually refine and correct
as incoming "facts" require. Thus, I might think as a child
of five that it's the car rather than the driver who knows
how to get to where we want to go, but I learn by the age of
ten that if the driver doesn't know the directions we'll get
lost. I'm the same individual at ten that I was at five, but
I know more about myself and the world I live in.
This view of the self posits me as a substance whose
attributes, such as bodily appearance and items of knowledge,
may change over time, but who endures from the moment of my
birth (or some arguable point in time in the womb) to my
death. As a child I have relatively primitive categories in
which I arrange the incoming data provided by my senses
.
These categories become more refined (allowing a more nuanced
break-down of data) and more sophisticated (with respect to
cross-referencing of data) as one becomes older. At five,
cars are in the same category of animate objects as cats and
dogs and human beings; at ten, they've been moved into the
category of inanimate objects manipulated by people. This
view of the self assumes that my knowledge of the world will
build in a systematically meaningful way--that a subject who
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endures throughout time will orient herself with respect to
the world which is the object of her knowledge and desire.
One feature of existentialist philosophy is an emphasis
on concrete lived experience as opposed to the abstract
categories in which we organize and generalize our particular
experiences. On this view the self as an enduring substance
is cast into doubt—my self is no more than an abstract
category I use to organize the whole range of experiences
that seem to belong to me. The concrete particularity of
experience that can't be contained within our categories
becomes threatening since it implies that there's always an
excess, as supplementarity, of existence that we can't
account for. If there is no enduring substratum to
ourselves, if we're no more than the series of concrete
experiences located in a body that continually changes, then
who are we? What kind of stability and coherence do we have?
What kind of meaningful action can we take?
In the face of a growing awareness that we don't have
the immediate access to either the world or ourselves that we
thought, philosophers such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and
Sartre struggled with the question of who we are and what
makes our lives meaningful. With the emphasis of the
concrete particular over the abstract came an emphasis on the
self as action, rather than a self whose actions are mere
attributes of an enduring substratum. The self came to be
seen more as an on-going process than as a thing that
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processes. As such it was less clear where the self ended
and the world began
.
Where does the self end and the world begin if the
abstract category of 'self' is no more than a construct we
invent? How do we distinguish a subject that is a process
rather than an entity out of the flux of experience? Instead
of a fixed subject processing input, we are faced with the
prospect of a self that is no more than a continuous stream
of sensation on the verge of melting into a vast sea of
sensations—a subject without background, with no means for
distinguishing her own outline in a chaos of bodily
sensations. In such a chaos there can be no inner or outer,
the ability to reflect upon a stable image that provides one
a centering point is lost, and subjectivity is swallowed in a
ceaseless flood of sensation that is neither controlled nor
directed
.
The old dichotomies of sub ject/ob ject and self/other are
thus brought into question. In the texts of these
existential philosophers a new kind of subjectivity struggles
to emerge--a subjectivity that sees itself as the creative
process of constituting a self from a superabundance of
sensation; a self that is always in question, always
contingent, always on the verge of disintegration; a self
that cannot be taken as a given but which must be continually
chosen; a self that must be held accountable for the choices
it makes in choosing itself. But in the struggle to
articulate a new kind of subjectivity that leaves behind the
181
category of substance in order to affirm itself as
continually becoming, old categories are used as landmarks.
To stabilize a self that might otherwise be threatened with
complete extinction, thus rendering human agency impossible,
each of these philosophers ends up reaffirming the very
sub j e ct / ob j e ct dichotomy that he had been in the process of
undermining
.
In the last two chapters I have developed the notion
that there are two, gender-linked strategies that take two
different approaches to the problem of how to organize self
and a world out of a chaotic range of sensations. I
suggested that one strategy made the abstract categories of a
socially sanctioned Symbolic order primary, while the other
strategy made the pleasure of connectedness with an embodied
other primary. i suggested that in a culture where
psychoanalytic theory has explanatory force, the former
strategy could be characterized as "masculine" and the latter
strategy could be characterized as "feminine." [1] My
characterizations of the two strategies have drawn upon the
Hegelian idealist tradition as well as a psychoanalytic
theory (i.e., Lacan's) and feminist theories that make use of
that tradition. Whether these characterizations apply
equally well in all situations for all philosophical
traditions is a question that I leave open. What I want to
explore in this chapter is whether or not the theory of
gender-linked self-strategies that I have thus far developed
could be brought to bear in an interesting way on
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philosophical texts also based in the Hegelian tradition.
Attempts to subvert abstract categories in favor of a
connectedness that defies self /other dichotomies could thus
be read as attempts to more fully incorporate a feminine
ss 1
f
— s t rategy into one's theorizing, while reversions to
self/other dichotomies could be read as the effects of a
masculine self-strategy.
I have thus far given a polarized version of the
difference in two gender-linked, self-constituting
strategies. Due to the correlat ivity of self and world
argued for in chapter one, groups of people with
fundamentally differing self-strategies will live in
different worlds—that is, they will have a different
perspective with their own epistemological standpoint. Thus,
self-constituting activity is also world-constituting
activity. In addition to grounding the emergence of
differing self-strategies in the child-rearing practices of
Western society, psychoanalytic theory opens up the
possibility that we all have both self-strategies available
to us. Since masculine identity is the "norm" for full-
fledged personhood in Western society, it is the feminine
self-strategy that is culturally devalued. We have seen, in
chapter three, how this cultural devalorization and the
masculine need to repress the primordial self of mother-
fusion encourages repression of possibilities for a different
kind of self-strategy. Self /world-constituting activity
continually strives to make sense of a chaotic array of
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sensations and symbolic input. For the theorist who attempts
to enlarge his perspective to include as wide a range of his
lived experience as possible, it is likely that the
alternative, feminine" self—strategy will be brought into
play, and that this alternative self-strategy will create
problems for his masculine identity.
In the last two chapters I have delineated masculine and
feminine self-strategies. In this chapter I will give
examples of male and female positions from which a text can
speak. That is, taking the production of theory as a self-
constituting activity as well as a meaning-reproducing
activity, we can say that the "voice" of a text is situating
itself with respect to a whole network of social positions.
In the last chapter I characterized what such positioning
might mean when it comes to gender. Having characterized
"masculine" and "feminine" self-strategies that position one
as male or female in the social hierarchy of positions
(Lacan's Symbolic order), we can give a philosophical text a
gender-sensitive reading. By "gender-sensitive" I mean a
reading that will highlight how gender categories inform both
the position from which the text speaks (the self the
speaking 'I' of the text puts forth) as well as the
theoretical perspective the text presents. Given my
assumption, taken from Lacanian theory, that any speaker of
language is "decentered, " I assume that there is no one
position from which the 'I' of the text speaks, and that the
text will manifest "symptoms" that speak to conflicts in
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positioning. "Symptoms"—gaps, contradictions, puzzles—of
the text can be read as a conflict between the position from
which the 'I' attempts to speak and unconscious forces that
undermine or subvert that position. We should be able to
resolve some of the puzzles these symptoms present— i . e
.
,
explain their presence in the text—by analyzing the gender
categories put forth by the text, and by examining the puzzle
in light of a conflict between two kinds of self-strategies.
The kind of reading I am proposing here is
"deconstructive" [2] in the sense that it focuses on gaps and
contradictions in the text rather than assuming textual
integrity and explaining away contradictions as mere
aberrations in what is presumed to be a coherent whole. It
is not deconstructive in the sense that it attempts to
explain those contradictions via a coherent theory. That is,
I want to explain the "symptoms" of a text in a way that will
render them intelligible via a theoretical framework that the
author himself lacked. Thus, rather than proliferating the
possible meanings of the text into infinity with no way of
valuing one interpretation over another, I want to interpret
symptoms of the text in light of the broader project of
understanding how gender informs our identities and our
perspectives as theorists.
On the view being put forth in this dissertation,
writing theory is both a self-constituting as well as a
meaning-producing activity. In addition to communicating
meaningful content to the reader, a text tells the story of a
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subject in communication with him or herself. Both positions
that I outline here are positions taken up by the text with
respect to the other (the reader) and the Other (the site of
representations of lived experience not incorporated into the
conscious self— system)
. We can trace the strategy a subject
utilizes in positioning him or herself with respect to the
reader as well as with respect to his or her unconscious by
examining the text that that subject has produced. The two
positions I delineate here are related to polarized versions
of two self-strategies that I have argued are gender-linked
at least in social contexts where psychoanalytic theory can
be said to have explanatory force.
Generally speaking, our examination of these two self-
strategies has led us to the following schematic rendering of
the two positions:
"Male" : The speaking 'I' or grammatical subject of the
text is positioning itself in keeping with two constraints.
On the one hand what is articulated needs to make sense
according to socially sanctioned codes. On the other, a self
with some sort of continuity needs to be continually
reconstituted. On the Lacanian view discussed in chapter
two, this means that in addition to stringing together words
in a way that will have some significance to other members of
the speaking community, the 'I' is motivated by the 'me' to
retain self-continuity and self-coherence. The primordial
'me' is the ego originally precipitated out of identification
with one's primary caretaker. A male self-strategy maintains
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continuity with this ego by seeking objects that will confirm
his self by repeating past self-other patterns. that is, the
'me' is looking for the lost "objet a" that is associated
with the lost mother of mother-fusion. Through a complicated
series of substitutions this lost object of primordial fusion
with another has been translated via cultural codes into
objects of current desire.
The child originally learned to compensate for the loss
of mother-fusion by using symbols to fill in for that loss,
and by coming to desire the desire of the other. The boy,
being of the sex that is not castrated, had, or rather would
inherit, what the mother wants—the phallus, primordial
signifier of desire. He can be, or hope to one day be, that
which doesn't lack, and therefore that which can fill in his
mother's lack. The gaze of the other is the gaze that
desires him, the gaze that confirms him as self-sufficient
and whole. As upholder of the paternal law, he is entitled
to cultural substitutes for the lost mother, the other that
originally reflected him back to himself. To maintain self-
continuity he will find cultural substitutes that will
reflect back a self in keeping with the self of mother-
fusion. This means that the speaking 'I' will always be
positioning itself with respect to an other that will provide
the 'me' with the kind of recognition that it craves, the
other that will confirm the same self by repeating a past
self-other pattern. Such a self-strategy assumes that the
self is self-suf f icient--if it weren't, it couldn't be what
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the mother desired. This self, being self-sufficient, must
deny any dependence on the other and posit the other's gaze
as only affirming what is already there—the same, self-
sufficient self. For this strategy to work, objects of
desire must conform to the other of the subject's self-other
pattern. This positioning of self with respect to an other
may take many different forms via complicated translation in
keeping with Symbolic codes, but the 'me' will strive to
maintain the same relationship between self and other.
From this position there is reverence for and rigid
adherence to what Lacan calls the Symbolic order— socially
accepted categories that generalize and universalize
experience. The motivating force of the self-strategy
associated with this position is the desire to repeat
self/other positioning. Here, one seeks to position oneself
with respect to an other within socially sanctioned codes in
a way that retains associations with the self formed in
mother-fusion. That is, one seeks cultural substitutes for
the other originally played by mother that are sanctioned by
paternal law within the Symbolic order. The speaking 'I' of
the text will position itself with respect to others
explicitly or implicitly referred to in the text, to the
reader as other, and to the subject's own Other—the
unconscious. All such positioning will abide by pre-
established categories of the Symbolic order.
"Female” : Since the girl is already castrated and
therefore doesn't have the same need to deny dependence on
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another, she has a different self-strategy open to her. Her
relationship to her primordial self assumes that it took two
to make the pleasure of mother-fusion possible. Since the
paternal law doesn't guarantee her objects to fill in for the
lost mother in the same way it does for a boy, she tends
toward another kind of compensation. Instead of needing to
affirm the same self by finding an other to reflect back a
self that she recognizes, she seeks to re-experience the
pleasure of mother-fusion. She admits her dependence on the
other and remains in a state of receptive responsiveness to
the desire of the other. Thus, rather than seeking cultural
substitutions for the lost mother in keeping with Symbolic
codes, she seeks contact with an other that may require her
to violate both the demands of the 'I' that would produce
meaning in conformance with Symbolic codes, and the 'me' that
would add the additional constraint of conformance to past
self-other patterning.
From this position there is a relative lack of regard
for the Symbolic order. The socially sanctioned categories
which encode experience are subverted, if need be, in
deference to a spontaneous response to the specificity of
experience that eludes those categories. The subject
speaking from this position tends to subvert the Symbolic
order— she is more concerned with maintaining responsive
attentiveness to the desire of the other than she is with
"making sense" . What she attempts to communicate will have
significance to the specific other she addresses, but this
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significance will take the form of shared pleasure with an
other rather than positioning with respect to an other in the
Symbolic order. The specific others she addresses are the
others explicitly or implicitly mentioned in the text, the
reader as other and the subject ' s own Other—the unconscious
.
Rather than repeating past self /other positioning via social
sanctioned categories, the speaking 'I' will attempt to break
down categories in order to respond to the other's desire to
be recognized/reflected in all his/her specificity.
These characterizations represent two extremes. To
follow out the effects of gender categories in a particular
text we can examine the specific content the theorist gives
to the category 'woman.' 'Woman,' on the Lacanian view, is
an empty category filled in by man. [3] She is man's other,
what he is not, she who can affirm his self-sufficiency.
What he projects onto her is often what he feels he himself
cannot be and still be a man. It can thus give us clues as
to the particular form the gender categories of the text
take .
The "male" and "female" positions I characterized very
generally above will be filled out differently by different
theorists according to their particular gender categories.
Taking the above characterizations as two ends of a
continuum, each theorist will be able to conceive of a range
of positions in between that will fall under his categories
of "male" or "female." The two self-strategies I have
190
described in a polarized, mutually exclusive form thus turn
out to have varying degrees of overlap according to the
gender categories that inform a text. That is, I have argued
that both self-strategies are available to both male and
female persons. How far one can go in conceiving of a man
using what I've called a "female" self-strategy or vice
versa, and how far one can go in conceiving the possibility
of & person who makes full use of both self
—strategies, will
hinge on the conceptual barrier posed by one's gender
categories
. How a particular text fills in the category of
'woman' can give us a clue as to where that conceptual
barrier for a given text is. This, in turn, can help explain
why the attempt to use two self-strategies in a text ran into
conflict due to the need of the speaking 'I' to maintain a
masculine identity.
I have picked a specific text to focus on for each
philosopher to underline the particular way I am linking
gender, identity and the production of meaning. I am not
trying to psychoanalyze the author of the text—the flesh and
blood philosopher who if put on a couch might free-associate
far beyond the confines of a particular text . What I am
doing is taking a particular text as a particular attempt on
the part of the flesh and blood philosopher to both create a
self and produce meaning. It is thus the particular identity
put forth in the particular production of meaning of a text
that I'm interested in. And it is how gender affects this
identity and the content of the text that I want to examine.
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One could, of course, then correlate the various identities
put forth in the various texts of a given author--do all
those identities speak from the same position? what factors
play into any shifts in position that may occur from text to
text?—but for the purposes of this dissertation I will put
those problems aside.
For each text I look at I have broken my analysis down
into four parts. In the introduction I lay out what I see as
the male and female positions of the text
—
places where the
'I' of the text is using a masculine self-strategy and where
it is using a feminine self-strategy—according to the
general characterizations of these two strategies given in
chapters two and three. This means establishing the
particular philosopher's terminology for what I take to be
his version of what Lacan calls the Symbolic order, and the
"feminine" forces that threaten that order. In the second
part, entitled "The puzzle, " I lay out the puzzle presented
by the text that I want to address. The puzzle will be some
problem in the text that challenges our notion that the text
was written by a completely unified, rational subject whose
intentions and motivations were transparent to him. Rather
than explaining the puzzle away as an aberration in order to
argue for what the author "really" meant to say, I will use
the puzzle as an indication of conflict in the position from
which the 'I' of the text attempts to speak.
In the third part, entitled "'Woman,'" I lay out what
content the text gives to the category 'woman.' This will
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help us to locate the conceptual barrier presented by the
particular form gender categories take in the text that
prevents the incorporation of the two extreme positions we
^ave characterized into one. I leave it entirely open
whether or not we ever could incorporate the two positions
entirely (thus leading us beyond gender distinctions
entirely? ) , but I am interested in how far a particular text
goes in using both self-strategies and where use of the
feminine self-strategy is curtailed due to gender categories.
In the fourth part, entitled "The positions," I make use
of the analysis of the text's category 'woman' to fill out
specific content of the two positions and their self-
strategies according to the particular gender categories of
the text. I then explain the puzzle described in the first
part as a conflict in these self-strategies. The use of a
feminine self-strategy, despite "unconscious" forces that
come out in the symptoms of the text, must be curtailed in
order to maintain a "masculine" 'I'. Thus, although this
feminine self-strategy continues to exert effects (the
symptoms of the text) it cannot be incorporated into the self
put forth by the speaking 'I.' I then make some suggestions
about what kind of self and what kind of theoretical content
might have emerged as a solution to the puzzle if the
conceptual barrier presented by the particular gender
categories informing the text had been broken down.
What I am trying to get at with this kind of reading is
how our gender categories affect our identities and our
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perspective in the world. Do philosophical texts espouse
timeless truths that are gender-neutral, or does the presence
of a male-identified voice create certain limitations in
perspective that we can articulate and explore?
Characterizing an alternate self—strategy to the typical
"male" strategy of our traditional views of theory allows us
to release the repressed "feminine" of a text. My contention
is that if we took an alternative approach that valued
contact and fusion rather than translating desire into the
Symbolic, our approach to our own identities and to language
would be different. This alternative could then be seen as
having a logic of its own just as valid as the male logic.
The following explorations of particular texts written
by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre are not meant as a
definitive response to the question of how gender categories
inform the production of meaning. They are meant, rather, as
initial forays into possible approaches to philosophical
texts that could take this question into account. I am using
these "gender-sensitive" readings as examples of how the
account of self-constitution I developed in chapters one, two
and three could be applied in the interpretation of
philosophical texts. Perhaps the most "radical" claim of my
reading sis that the theoretical content of the text might
have been different if the speaking 'I' had not been
motivated by the need to maintain a masculine identity. Once
released from the conceptual barrier of the text's gender
categories, further development of a line of thought in the
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text that was unavailable to its author becomes more
apparent. To highlight this particular perspective, I have
chosen to relegate references to pertinent secondary
literature to footnotes
. I believe the interpretations I
give here can be supported and complemented by other
interpretations extant in the literature. Since my concern
with gender categories, however, is not in keeping with most
of that literature, I will restrict the main body of my text
to clarifying the kinds of questions and insights a gender-
sensitive perspective might elicit.
4 . 2 Kierkegaard: FEAR AND TREMBLTNC4
Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship is particularly
interesting in light of my project. In taking on various
authorial personae Kierkegaard tries on, and discards,
various positions in the spectrum of male positions. In
doing so he is underlining the active positing that goes on
in taking up any position. In the leap that can come only
from a personal decision made in the concrete setting of a
particular situation, one takes up a position in the
aesthetic, ethical or religious spheres. [4] Kierkegaard
does not refer to this positioning with respect to gender
categories. But by looking at one of the personae he takes
on in light of our discussion, we can relate his positioning
with respect to his spheres of human existence to our
positioning with respect to the extremes of the male and
female positions. [5]
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In what follows I will place Johannes de Silentio, the
pseudonymous author of Fear and Trembling (Kierkegaard 1983)
,
in the spectrum of male positions. I will look at his
position as a rendering of a male position pushing against
the gender barrier. Although the whole question of the
relationship of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works to himself
is an interesting one [6]
,
I am here interested in what I
will take to be an exploration of a possibility in male
positioning
.
Silentio' s perspective in Fear and Trembling is that of
an ethical man with enough understanding of the religious
sphere to attempt to articulate its perspective. [7] He is
thus striving to articulate a perspective that he knows is
beyond his own. The exact nature of the relationship between
the perspectives of the ethical and religious spheres is
debated in the literature on Kierkegaard, but it is generally
agreed that Kierkegaard considered the religious perspective
more "advanced" than the perspective of the aesthete or the
ethicist . To approach this perspective beyond his own
Silentio makes use of two terms that we can correlate to our
polarized schema of male and female positions. First, there
is the "universal"--the universal, socially accepted
categories that encode values and communicate experience in a
way that is readily understood by other members of society.
[8] This term can be correlated to Lacan's symbolic order—
both concern socially accepted categories of thought to which
members of the society must defer in order to position
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themselves with respect to others. The ethical realm, for
Silentio, is the realm in which one situates oneself with
respect to others in regard both to one's ethical
responsibility and to one's production of meaning. [9] This
can be compared to Lacan's use of the term "Symbolic order"
to refer both to a hierarchy of social positions that involve
taking up certain responsibilities to others who occupy other
positions in that hierarchy, as well as to the order of
language and the communication of experience. [10]
Second, there is the "paradox of faith"—a movement of
faith that takes one out of the ethical sphere into a
religious realm where the categories of the universal can be
suspended due to the demands of faith. This constitutes
taking up what I call a female position. That is, the person
in this position will defy Symbolic categories in the
concrete context of a relationship with another. This
paradox can take one not only beyond the duties encoded in
the universal, but can take one beyond language itself as
socially acceptable categories become inadequate for
expressing the experience of the religious person in this
paradox. We can correlate this terminology to "feminine"
forces that defer to concrete relationships and experiences
that cannot be captured in the general categories of
language
.
Silentio himself, of course, does not qualify these
terms with adjectives like masculine or feminine. What I
hope to show in the following pages is that correlating his
197
terminology with two gender-linked self-st rategies in this
way light of an examination of his category of 'woman'
will help us resolve a puzzle in this text in an interesting
way
.
The pyzzle: In Fear and Trembling Silentio discusses the
paradox of faith in the context of the story of Abraham and
Isaac. In this story God commands Abraham to sacrifice his
only son. Abraham proceeds to do so, only to be reprieved by
God at the last moment. [11] While most accounts of the
story emphasize Abraham's willingness to obey God's
incomprehensible demand [12], Silentio emphasizes the double
movement of Abraham's faith. Not only does he resign himself
to Isaac's death in obeying God, but "by virtue of the
absurd" he never stops believing that God will keep his
promise of making him the father of nations through Isaac.
Silentio repeatedly says that Abraham's movement of
faith is beyond him: "I cannot make the movement of faith, I
cannot shut my eyes and plunge confidently into the absurd"
(p. 34). He can only marvel at Abraham's greatness without
making the movement himself. To help us, his readers, do the
work of understanding just how great Abraham was, he presents
some poetic sketches in the Preliminary Expectoration and in
Problema III that intimate the incomprehensibility of
Abraham's faith. None of the stories are meant as analogies
to Abraham. They are told "only in order that in their
moment of deviation they could, as it were, indicate the
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boundary of the unknown territory" (p. 112)
. In these
sketches Silentio explores the difficulties of relationships
that would take one beyond the universal of the ethical
realm. The single individual has the ethical task of
annulling his singularity in order to express himself in the
universal that applies to everyone (p. 54)
.
Asserting
himself in his singularity before the universal is a sin.
The impulse to do so puts the individual into a spiritual
trial "from which he can work himself only by repentantly
surrendering as the single individual in the universal" (p.
54) . In each sketch a lover feels the impulse to defy the
universal due to a relationship with a loved one. [13]
Why is it that Silentio digresses in order to give a
series of sketches of unconsummated male/female relationships
before returning to his discussion of Abraham's God-
relationship? One could respond that the comparison of love-
relationships and God-relationships is a "natural" one due to
its history in the Christian tradition and due to the deeply
personal nature of such relationships. But in the context of
my concern with the importance of the other to self-
constituting activity, Silentio' s use of these sketches to
intimate Abraham's faith bears further attention. First,
there is the series of self/other, lover/beloved
relationships that Silentio abandons one by one with no
solution. A God-relationship is the only one with a solution
to the problem of connection—even if Silentio still despairs
of understanding how such a connection was effected. In his
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struggle to understand a position (i.e., the religious one)
beyond his own, he struggles to understand positions vis a
vis embodied others that are also beyond him. What kind of
struggle with respect to his own self/other positioning is
Silentio engaged in here, and why is it only in the context
of 3 God- re lat ionship that he can articulate the successful
connection of a self (i.e., Abraham) with an other (i.e.,
God) ?
Silentio, in his insistence on the lack of analogy
between these sketches and the story of Abraham, wants to put
the God-relationship in a class by itself— it is only in the
context of a God-relationship that a suspension of the
ethical is justified. But- the puzzle of why Silentio chose
these particular sketches to help us understand Abraham,
remains. I will argue that Silentio 's reading of gender
categories makes it problematic for him to conceive of taking
up the feminine position with respect to anyone except God.
On the one hand, he wants to move away from the masculine
position of appealing to fixed categories as the ultimate
justification for meaning and action. On the other hand, he
cannot allow the chaos that would result if those categories
were permitted to crumble. He is thus caught in the dilemma
of wanting to maintain both positions at once. He does this
by maintaining a masculine position with respect to other
human beings, and positing the possibility of a feminine
position with respect to God. If his gender categories had
not prevented him from doing so, the kind of connectedness he
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posits in a God-relationship could have been posited in
connectedness with other human beings as well. This kind of
connectedness, in turn, could allow new meaning to be
translated into the universal that could result in social
change
.
In the rest of this section I will present five sketches
from the Preliminary Expectoration and Problema III with the
following questions in mind: When does Silentio feel that the
impulse to assert singularity against the universal is
justified? and How do the male/female relationships he looks
at relate to Abraham's relationship to God?
The situation of the sketch in the Preliminary
Expectoration is as follows:
A young lad falls in love with a princess, and this
love is the entire substance of his life, and yet
the relation is such that it cannot possible be
realized, cannot possibly be translated from
ideality into reality, (p. 41)
Silentio doesn't say why the relation can't be realized. He
only says that upon examining the conditions of his life, the
thoughts the lad convenes and scatters come back and "explain
that it is an impossibility" (p.42). The lad is thus
presented with the dilemma of desiring something his rational
understanding tells him he cannot have. [14] Not being a
"frog of the swamp" he doesn't merely give up his love, but
undertakes the movement of infinite resignation.
In this movement he concentrates "the whole substance of
his life and meaning of actuality into one single desire"
(p.42) . This focuses him so that his soul isn't dissipated
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into multiplicity. [15] He will recollect his love in pain,
but his infinite resignation will reconcile him with
existence :
His love for that princess would become for him the
expression of an eternal love, would assume a
religious character, would be transfigured into a
love of the eternal being ... (p . 43) .
Although his desire is denied fulfillment in actuality, the
knight of infinite resignation makes consummation possible by
expressing it spiritually. Thus, the "desire that would lead
him out into actuality but has been stranded on impossibility
is now turned inward" (p.44) . From this point onward it no
longer matters what the princess actually does, although if
she too chooses to become a knight of infinite resignation
these "two will in all eternity be compatible" despite the
failure to actually consummate their relationship. [16]
If the lad were to make the double movement of the
knight of faith, he would make the additional movement of
affirming that he would get the princess by virtue of the
absurd. The absurd lies beyond the proper domain of the
understanding. It defies human comprehension:
So I can perceive that it takes strength and energy
and spiritual freedom to make the infinite movement
of resignation; I can also perceive that it can be
done. The next amazes me, my brain reels, for,
after having made the movement of resignation, then
by virtue of the absurd to get everything, to get
one's desire totally and completely--that is over
and beyond human powers, that is a marvel, (pp.47-
48)
Silentio presents this sketch to give a concrete example
of the difference between the knight of infinite resignation
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and the knight of faith. The movement of the former he can
follow, it is the movements of the latter that bring us to
the border of the unknown. The lad of the sketch loves a
princess that he cannot have. He feels the impulse to defy
the universal since it thwarts his desire. Having the
spiritual strength of a knight of infinite resignation,
however, he submits his singularity to the universal and
renounces his love, only to give it expression in spiritual
inwardness. Thus, he converts action that would defy the
universal into spiritual expression that leaves the universal
untouched
.
It is only once this movement involving submission of
the individual to the universal is made, that the further
movement of faith could justify the suspension of the ethical
that would allow actual consummation of the relationship.
But since such a movement defies rational understanding or
any attempt to communicate its justification in words,
Silentio can only marvel at the possibility. The knight of
infinite resignation demonstrates his spiritual power by
refusing to give up his love at the same time that he adheres
to his ethical task of remaining within the universal. In
exercising this power he has, however, gone beyond the
ethical by developing a spiritual inwardness that allows him
to maintain the love denied him by the universal. Thus, his
love for another has led him to assert his singularity by
taking a first step in achieving a relationship with the
absolute that is higher than the ethical. It is no until he
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can make the movement of faith that the lad is able to
translate his impulse into the universal by marrying the
princess, despite the fact that according to his rational
understanding such a union is forbidden
.
This relationship of the knight of faith to the princess
int imates Abraham's relationship to God. Just as the lad
manages to translate his love for the princess into actuality
by virtue of the absurd, so does Abraham translate his love
for God by believing God will keep his promise. Both put the
relationship with another above the universal, believing that
the connection with the other would be consummated despite
all rational evidence to the contrary. It is in the context
of this relationship that they assert the singularity of
their experience against the universal that mediates
individual existence in society. Silentio grants that if the
lad were a knight of faith, he could have the princess in
actuality, but he can't himself conceive such a happy ending.
We will see in the four sketches of Problems III that he
continues to explore the assertion of singularity against the
universal within the context of male/female relationships.
He will increasingly emphasize the difficulty of determining
when one is justified in consummating a relationship that
brings one in conflict with the universal. In the first
ideal case of the Preliminary Expectoration, Silentio assumes
for the purposes of illustration that the knights described
actually make the movements of infinite resignation and faith
that justify asserting singularity to varying degrees. In
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the sketches I will now explore, the individual's
justification will be more problematic.
In the first sketch of Problema III:
The bridegroom, to whom the augurs prophesied a
calamity that would have its origin in his
marriage, suddenly changes his plans at the crucial
moment when he comes to get his bride
. .
. (p . 8 9)
The bridegroom must decide what to do. To remain silent and
get married would be an offense to the girl since she would
never assent to an alliance that would cause him harm. To
remain silent and not get married would also be an offense
against the girl. Ethics demands disclosure of the
individual; it therefore demands that he speak. [17] If the
pronouncement of the augurs was public property he could
speak because the suspension of his commitment to the girl
would be superceded by a higher ethics . Everyone would be
able to understand that the consummation of their
relationship had to be viewed in light of the higher ethical
consideration of a divine sign. To be silent in such a case
would be to place himself as a single individual higher than
the universal, and so to forsake the individual's ethical
task to "work himself out of his hiddenness and to become
disclosed in the universal" (p.82).
If, however, the will of heaven had come to his
knowledge privately, then he could not speak. In being put
into a purely private relation to the will of heaven he would
have been placed as the single individual in an absolute
relation to the absolute (p.93)
.
Here again we approach the
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unknown territory of the paradox in the context of a
male/female relationship. The groom wants to consummate his
love for the bride. The will of heaven would seem to frown
on the union. The groom's impulse is to gratify his desire.
This could mean defying the universal (if the information
came through an augur) or it could mean complying with the
universal at the expense of his relation to the absolute (if
the information was private knowledge)
.
In the sketch of the lad and the princess the question
was how to make the ethical relative to the absolute. It was
assumed that both knights had some sort of relationship to
the absolute. But this relationship could not obviate the
need for a relationship to the ethical. Justification of
asserting oneself against the universal could come only after
submitting to the universal and making the movement of faith
that put one in an absolute relationship to God. In this
sketch we have the additional problem of one's ethical
commitments to others. The groom has already pledged he
would marry the bride. It is thus not merely a matter of
consummating his love, but of a promise made to his beloved.
It would put him outside the universal to break such a
promise unless there is a higher ethical consideration that
supercedes that promise. [18] If, however, the information
was private knowledge, then doing his duty to the absolute
places him outside of the universal. he cannot hope to make
the singularity of his experience understandable, and the
bride will feel wronged. This gets us closer to Abraham's
206
dilemma whose faith put him outside the universal when God
requested what was, in ethical terms, murder. Here a
relationship with the absolute puts the groom in conflict
with a relationship that is in the ethical.
In the second sketch, a merman sees Agnes standing on
the shore and wants her as booty. That is, he wants to
seduce her and make her one of his conquests— "he cannot give
himself faithfully to any girl, because he is indeed only a
merman" (p. 95)
.
He calls to her and elicits what's hidden
in her. She "trusting with all her soul ,... gives herself to
the stronger one" (p.94). Because of the power of her
innocence—the absolute confidence with which she entrusts
her whole destiny to him—he is crushed. He cannot seduce
her; he can never seduce again. Instead he struggles with
repentance and his desire for Agnes. Due to his guilt about
having wanted to seduce Agnes a love-relationship with her is
outside of the universal. Agnes fell in love with him in all
innocence, thinking that he loved her. The merman agonizes
over what to do. Silentio lists some alternatives opened to
him. [19] 1) He could tear Agnes's love away from her by
belittling her and making her love ludicrous. He would
remain silent about his anguish at treating her thus with the
assistance of the demonic, putting himself as the single
individual higher than the universal:
The demonic has the same quality as the divine,
namely, that the single individual is able to enter
into an absolute relation to it . This is the
analogy, the counterpart to that paradox of which
we speak
. (p . 97
)
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2) He could return to the universal, becoming a tragic hero
by speaking and crushing Agnes with the knowledge that he
could never make her happy. 3) He could remain in hiding
(e.g.f by going into a monastery) and hope that Agnes would
be saved by taking an absolute relation to the divine. Or,
4) he could be saved by Agnes, become disclosed and marry
her. For the last option he would have to have the spiritual
power to make the movement by virtue of the absurd after
having made the infinite movement of repentance (p.99).
Silentio assumes that the lad and the groom share the
desire to carry out the ethical task of translating
themselves into the universal. [20] Their dilemma is how to
go about that task and when that task should be suspended in
the interests of an absolute relation to the absolute. [21]
Here Silentio adds the dimension of guilt. The merman is
guilty of wanting to seduce an innocent girl and take her
outside the universal— for he had no intention of making the
ethical commitment of marriage to her. Her loving trust that
he is good and will keep them within the bounds of the
universal disarms him. [22] He feels guilt and tries to find
a way to right his wrong. [23] She fell in love with him in
all innocence. The ethical way to translate that love is
marriage. But marriage means disclosure of his guilt which
could crush her if he doesn't have the spiritual power to
first make the movements of repentance and faith.
The merman comes to realize that his original impulse to
seduce Agnes was wrong. He repents having wanted to take
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Agnes outside of the universal. He wants to save her, even
though he's not sure he can save himself. Saving the both of
them, and in addition consummating their relationship, seems
to him (and Silentio) a miraculous act. Thus, just as God
moves Abraham to assert his singularity against the universal
in a relation to the absolute, Agnes moves the merman to
assert his singularity by consummating a love within the
universal when he is outside of it. [24] Both Abraham and the
merman would defy rational understanding by asserting their
experience of connectedness with another against the
universal that denies comprehensible translation of that
connectedness. If Abraham were to disclose his singular
experience in the universal he could only say "I'm murdering
my son." If the merman were to disclose his experience he
could only say "I'm seducing her." The difference between
the two is that Abraham was originally in the universal and
the merman outside of it. But both are faced with the
dilemma of when it is justifiable to consummate a
relationship that requires asserting oneself against the
universal
.
In the third sketch,
The young Tobias wishes to marry Sarah, the
daughter of Raguel and Edna. But his girl has a
tragic background. She has been given to seven
man, all of whom perished in the bridal chamber.
(p . 102
)
The evil demon who loves Sarah has killed all seven of her
previous bridegrooms on the wedding night . Due to no fault
of her own, Sarah has been "defrauded of the highest
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bliss.
. . unlimited., unbounded, uninhibited devotedness"
(p . 103) . She has been unable to give herself to a lover and
unable to express herself in connectedness with another in
the universal by getting married (p.106).
Silentio says that although many would say Tobias was
the hero of this story for having the courage to brave the
danger of the evil demon, he thinks Sarah is the hero:
what love for God it takes to be willing to let
oneself be healed when from the very beginning one
in all innocence has been botched.
. . .What ethical
maturity to take upon oneself the responsibility of
permitting the beloved to do something so
hazardous! What humility before another person!
What faith in God that she would not in the very
next moment hate the man to whom she owed
everything! (p.104)
Despite the fact that a situation beyond her control has
placed her outside the universal, making it impossible for
her to consummate a relationship, she is still willing to let
herself be "saved"—to receive the love of another in all
humility trusting that that love would bring her back within
the bounds of the universal
.
While Silentio grants this to be a heroic act in a
woman, he seems to feel that it would be even more
problematic for a man:
Imagine Sarah to be a man, and the demonic is
immediately present . The proud, noble nature can
bear everything, but one thing it cannot bear--it
cannot bear sympathy. In it there is a humiliation
that can be inflicted on a person only by a higher
power, for he can never become the object of it by
himself, (p.104)
The man who chooses the demonic closes himself up within
Instead of -translating himself into the universal,himself
.
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mediating himself into the idea of society (p. 106 ), he
remains silent, hidden, undisclosed. He is lost in the
demonic paradox in which he takes an absolute relation to the
demonic. People such as Sarah are in the paradox by virtue
of being set outside the universal by nature or a historical
situation
:
they are by no means more imperfect than other
people, except that they are either lost in the
demonic paradox or saved in the divine paradox
(p. 106 )
Due to being outside the universal and the difficulties for
translation this poses, they feel the impulse to assert their
singularity by taking a relation to the absolute. They could
refuse translation, remaining undisclosed to any other
including God, thus losing themselves in the demonic. They
could also make an infinite movement that maintains their
singularity in spiritual inwardness at the same time that it
submits them to the demands of the universal, and then
through the movement of faith be saved in an absolute
relation to the divine. In the latter case, it would be due
to a belief in connectedness with another that defies
rational understanding that they would be brought back within
the universal. In Sarah's case, it is her humble willingness
to receive love from a man despite the knowledge that she is
outside of the universal, that allows her to believe she
could be saved. Although, in imagining Sarah as a man,
Silentio seems to be saying that this kind of receptivity to
a human other is also possible for a man, he qualifies this
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with the notion of the demonic. If Sarah had been a man, it
is much more likely that he would become demonic and refuse
to disclose himself.
In Abraham s case, it is the same humble willingness to
receive love Sarah shows to a man that Abraham shows to God
that allows him to believe God will keep his promise despite
his violation of the universal in murdering his son. As in
the last sketch, both Abraham and Sarah defy rational
understanding by putting connectedness above the universal.
Again, the difference between the two is that Abraham was
originally in the universal while Sarah was outside of it.
This time, however, it is not due to sin but due to
circumstances beyond her control that Sarah is outside the
universal. Thus, there is an even closer parallel in the
dilemma faced by both of asserting connectedness above the
universal
.
In the fourth sketch, Silentio introduces his version of
Faust, "the doubter (par excellence)
,
but he has a
sympathetic nature" (p.108) . The security and joy men live
in are not grounded in unreflected bliss rather than the
power of the spirit. Thus, Faust, as a doubter, is able:
to rouse men up horrified, to make the world totter
under their feet, to split men apart, to make the
shriek of alarm sound everywhere (p.109)
But due to his sympathetic nature:
he remains silent... he tries as much as possible to
walk in step with other men, but what goes on
inside himself he consumes and thus brings himself
as a sacrifice to the universal (p.109)
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Because doubt has destroyed Faust's actuality for him,
and because he would rather remain silent in order to
sacrifice himself to the universal than throw everything into
disorder, he does not tell Margaret of the love he feels for
her . Margaret is innocent
. To express his love in the
universal he would have to disclose himself. This he cannot
do without wreaking havoc with the universal, due to his
doubt. If he remains silent about his doubt, ethics condemns
him for evading the task of translating his hiddenness into
the universal. He can only get authorization for his silence
by becoming the single individual who as the single
individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute.
To do this he must make his doubt into guilt
.
Here we have a man who is tempted to defy the universal
neither due to sin or to circumstances . Faust is in the
throes of an infinite passion that pushes him beyond it. The
question here is whether or not he can justify expressing his
doubt and thus pushing others beyond the universal as well.
Since the ethical demands disclosure, it would seem he must
speak. But if he can make his doubt into guilt and make the
infinite movement that would both maintain his singularity in
spiritual inwardness and submit him to the universal, he
could get authorization for his silence.
Faust's relationship with Margaret is less at issue in
this sketch than the others we've looked at. But here again,
the question is of connectedness versus the maintainence of
the universal. Consummation of a relationship with another
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would mean disclosure of his doubt. Such disclosure would
not only put him outside of the universal, but would put the
other outside of it as well. Making an infinite movement
would authorize his silence by putting him into an absolute
relation with the absolute, but it would also make
consummation of a relationship with another human being
impossible. Here again we approach Abraham's dilemma.
Abraham maintained connectedness with God, but at the expense
of his ability to communicate with the human beings closest
to him about what he was doing. Abraham's God-relationship
justified the suspension of the ethical, but by virtue of the
absurd, by his faith in God, Abraham believed he would be
brought back within the universal. With the substitution of
the ram for Isaac, God did. Without such assurance that only
the divine can give, Silentio seems to imply, it is better to
be silent
.
In all the sketches I have looked at, the lovers have
agonized over how to justify action that puts oneself or
another outside of the universal, the ethical standards that
one can rationally understand as being applicable to all.
Silentio grants the possibility of such justification in only
one case--the context of a God-relationship where one will be
brought back within the universal by virtue of the absurd.
That is, in humbly receiving love from an often
incomprehensible God, one opens oneself up to possibilities
for being brought back within the universal beyond rational
understanding
.
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In the following section I will briefly comment on the
category of 'woman' that emerges in these sketches. This
will orient us for a discussion of the male and female
positions of the text laid out in the next section.
IWQmgn
'
: Silent io makes no general comments about 'woman
as such, but by looking at the position of the five women of
the sketches we will be able to establish the parameters for
the conception of 'woman' at work in Fear and Trembling .
In the sketch of the young lad and the princess woman is
seen as a focusing point. The lad’s love for the princess
becomes the "substance of his life" (p.42). If the lad is a
knight of infinite resignation or a knight of faith (as
opposed to a slave of the finite)
,
he will "have the power to
concentrate the whole substance of his life and the meaning
of actuality into one single desire" (p.42)
.
Thus, it is
desire for a woman that gives the lad the focus necessary for
making a movement of the infinite that will promote his
spiritual growth. In the following sketch, the bride awaits
her groom in maidenly modesty and humility as he agonizes
over whether or not to tell her about the calamity prophesied
by the augurs. The merman elicits what's hidden in Agnes,
thus enticing her to entrust her whole destiny to him in
absolute confidence (p.94). Sarah has the humble love for
God that allows her to love the man willing to let her give
herself to him despite the danger presented by the evil
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demon. Faust views Margaret in "all her adorable innocence"
(p.109) .
In all the sketches the woman is the focal point for the
man's agony in deciding whether or not the relationship
should be consummated. The woman, in her love for the man,
surrenders herself to his decision. She is innocent, or at
least more innocent than the man. He evokes feelings in her,
and she responds without reflection. She is prepared to
receive the man's love without any agonizing over whether or
not consummation of the relationship is outside the bounds of
the universal. And she will accept the man's judgment about
such matters without question—despite the pain it may cause
her. The man has full responsibility for making an ethical
judgment about the appropriateness of consummation. He will
weigh her pain in making his decision, but finally it is up
to him to decide. Thus, the 'woman' that emerges from these
five sketches is a woman prepared to give herself absolutely
to the man she loves. She is also incapable of judging
ethical boundaries and depends on the man to guide her
behavior in accordance with the universal. This may not be
Silentio's final position on 'woman as such, ' but we will see
that the degree of responsibility each of the men in the
sketches we've looked at takes in coming to a decision about
the relationship, and his unwillingness to share any of that
burden with the woman involved, indicates an inability to
take up a feminine position with any but a divine other
.
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Pqs it iQns : For Silentio, the duty marriage presents is a
weighty one. If one is married, one is bound to disclose
oneself to one's wife, and one is also bound to honor the
institution of marriage and the social relations that go with
it as those relations are laid out in the universal. 'Woman'
presumably has an easier time with honoring the commitments
of marriage since she is willing to sacrifice everything in
love for her husband—she lets him determine the parameters
of her commitment, and she trusts that he will set those
parameters according to the universal. It is the man's duty
to uphold the universal so that his wife can unfold and
expand within an appropriate space, one in keeping with the
universal. Thus, if he is going to go beyond the universal,
he has to do it on his own. It wouldn't be fair of him to
subvert her when she was trusting him to evoke responses from
her that were in keeping with social parameters.
Although Silentio recognizes a "higher" calling than the
universal, each and every subversion of the social categories
that make it up must find its agonizing justification in the
deep soul-searching of a God-relationship. In such a God-
relationship, all one's actions are scrutinized to determine
whether one is willfully trying to put the single individual
before the universal. It is only if, after submitting
oneself to the universal, one discovers that one is faced
with an incommunicable ordeal (where the ethical poses the
temptation to subvert one's absolute duty to God) rather than
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a spiritual trial (where singularity poses the temptation to
subvert the ethical), that such a subversion is justified.
To maintain connectedness with God Abraham needed to
suspend the ethical. Just as the men in the sketches
discussed earlier were faced with the dilemma of confronting
women they loved with suspension of the ethical, so did God
confront Abraham with suspension of the ethical. The women
would have subverted the universal in their love of the men
—
just as Abraham did in his trusting acceptance of God. The
problem for the men was in whether or not they could ask such
a thing of their women. And whether or not they could
receive new parameters themselves by playing the feminine
position with respect to God. In the sketches of Agnes and
Sarah, Silentio intimates the possibility that a woman could
save a man, just as God saved Abraham. If man could receive
woman the way that Abraham received God, he could, perhaps,
have overcome the dilemma presented to him by the universal.
This intimation is subordinated to the discussion of a
relation to the divine, however. And these stories are not
meant as complete analogies. They only hint at the
difficulty that Abraham faced in accepting new parameters
from God that involved suspension of the ethical. Thus, what
Abraham could do with respect to God, the merman, or Sarah
"imagined as a man" (cf. p.104), perhaps would have liked to
have done with respect to their women, but couldn't. That
is, they wanted to be able to take up a female position with
respect to their women. They wanted to put aside their role
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as maintainer of the ethical, and subvert the ethical by
allowing the women to play the role of subject to their
other. Through trusting acceptance of the other, they could
believe that even though the relationship didn't make sense
according to the universal, their desire for connectedness
would be granted by virtue of the absurd. And she, not being
bound by the universal in the same way as he, would, due to
her love for him, grant him his desire in connectedness
despite the restrictions of the universal encoded in rational
understanding
.
Silentio's dilemma is that his conception of masculine
identity dictates that 'man' can only play the role of other
to God. He can't play woman's other since as a man his role
is to play subject, to make others his other according to the
Law of the Father which he has inherited. The only one who
can subvert that Law is God— a greater father who can reteach
him the Law according to his dictates. Only to one "higher"
than himself can 'man' subject himself as a 'man', and the
only one higher than himself is God. Silent io can't support
the idea that another human being could provide him with
parameters that would subvert his current conceptual and
ethical categories and provide him with new, more fitting,
categories for the specificity of his experience, because as
a man his role is keeper of the law.
Silentio expresses his male allegiance to the Symbolic
and his sense of duty towards it, in his characterization of
the ethical. One does not subvert the Symbolic wihout cause.
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And the only cause that can sanction the subversion of the
Symbolic is God the Father above, the creator of the Law.
Thus, he allows for a way of subverting the Symbolic, a way
finding categories more in keeping with the specificity of
life, without incurring "disrespect" for the Symbolic, that
we will see exemplified in Nietzsche. He grants an
irrational element to life in the form of the commands of a
divine father. But, in his allegiance to the subjectivity of
God, he is not willfully creating new values, rather he is
playing the other to God's subjectivity. he is playing the
dutiful son. He is obeying God even though in all humility
he doesn't comprehend God's wishes. He doesn't expect to be
able to understand according to his rational and limited
human understanding. Instead he responds with the same faith
a woman shows her man when she takes on the form he gives
her, conforming to his desire rather than insisting that he
take on the form of her desire. In that way she is stretched
beyond her own understanding and creates new meaning in her
attempts to understand his desire.
On this reading, the paradox Silentio discusses is the
receptivity of man to another, the taking on of the role of
other by man. The dilemma of all five sketches is that the
universal in the normal sense of the word cannot be
maintained. New meaning has to be found. The relationship
can only be consummated if a new context for it can be
formulated. In all these sketches there is something that
makes the relationship unacceptable according to the
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standards of the Symbolic. In all these sketches Silentio
only has contempt for the suggestion that such an anomaly
should render the beloved unlovable. Instead one is
presented with the paradox of the unsuitability of the lover
according to the parameters of the Symbolic, and the question
of how a solution is to be found to allow the concrete
specificity of the love expression despite the constraints of
the Symbolic that forbid it. For the relationship to occur
the Symbolic must be subverted. The question is, when is
such a subversion justified and how must it be carried out?
In all cases— including Abraham's— it is due to love of
another whose desire is not in keeping with that of the
Symbolic that one is tempted to subversion. Only Abraham is
really justified in subverting the Symbolic. The problem of
the others is that they are trying to play God to a woman,
they want to subvert an other to leave the parameters of the
Symbolic behind. This is not justifiable. In a human to
human relationship one or the other must play the subject.
And whoever does so must do so in keeping with the Symbolic.
Just as a man would have to forsake his role as maintainer of
the Symbolic to let a woman save him, so would a man have to
forsake that role to let himself conform to God's desire in
faith. I would suggest that it is here that Silentio
believes the analogy between the sketches and Abraham's faith
ends .
In playing the female role with respect to a human
beloved, Silentio believes that 'man' would be undermining
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himself as a male. This is the only way, however, that he
can subvert the Symbolic. He presents us with the intriguing
suggestion that the only justifiable way to create new values
is in the context of a relationship where one takes on
another's desire. But in delineating this way out of
complete conformity to the Symbolic, he has to posit this
feminine position with respect to another as a relationship
with one higher than himself, a Father higher than the Law,
one who creates that Law—God himself—before he will allow
the possibility of man taking on such a role.
Due to his conception of gender categories and his need
to maintain a masculine identity, Silentio has to make the
dissimilarities between the situations of the sketches and
Abraham's situation more striking than they actually are.
Silentio delineates a way of subverting the Symbolic within
the context of a love-relationship that would keep the chaos
of complete disruption of all universal categories at bay,
but he limits his insights in keeping with his need to
maintain masculine identity by limiting the possibilities of
such subversion to a God-relationship. This limitation
destroys the possibility for such subversion within the
context of human relationships that respect the concrete
specificity of connectedness over the categories laid out by
the Symbolic. It also closes off the possibility of
translating new aspects of human experience disclosed in
connectedness with human others into the Symbolic. As long
as one believes one can have one's desire by virtue of the
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absurd only with respect to a divine other, the status quo of
the Symbolic is safe. What is incomprehensible will remain
untranslatable and hence nonsubversive. It is only when such
faith is taken with respect to human others that the
possibility emerges for generating new meaning in
connectedness. [25]
4 . 3 Nietzsche; BEYOND GOOD AND F.VTT,
For Nietzsche, the concepts we use to communicate our
experience and the values by which we live are human
creations imposed upon a chaotic flux in order to give
ourselves ballast. [26] We can correlate Nietzsche's values
and concepts to Lacan's Symbolic order. Life in all its
concrete fecundity is a Dionysian chaos that is completely
beyond the generalizing scope of language. [27] Here nothing
is like anything else and there is no way of distinguishing
one "thing" from another. [28] It is only via a system of
values and concepts encoded in language that some stability
can be imposed upon this chaos and that one can take on both
an identity and a position vis a vis other things and other
human beings. Unlike Lacan, Nietzsche emphasizes a creative
moment in which the will to power subverts old moralities in
order to create new ones. [29] Thus, rather than being
structured by language in the way a Lacanian subject is,
Nietzsche's "free spirit" subverts conventional language in
keeping with his will to power.
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Thus, we can correlate Nietzsche's notion of the will to
power that would defy the Symbolic order to a feminine self-
strategy that doesn't prioritize the Symbolic. While the
feminine self
—strategy I characterized in the last chapter,
however, sought fusion-experiences—contact with an other
through the fusion of desire—Nietzsche's notion of the will
to power makes no reference to desire for contact with an
other. It does make contact with the subtleties of
experience that would defy conventional categories. In
listening with the "third ear" the "free spirit" attends to
aspects of experience that a less noble soul ignores in his
reduction of experience to that which can be communicated to
others. [30] The free spirit attempts to capture this
experience in language despite the risk of being
misunderstood by, or incomprehensible to, others. he thus
puts language at the service of subtle nuances of bodily
sensations and feelings rather than ignoring aspects of his
experience that don't fit into a preconceived world-view:
Our eye finds it more comfortable to respond to a
given stimulus by reproducing once more an image
that it has produced many times before, instead of
registering what is different and new in an
impression. The latter would require more
strength, more "morality" (From Beyond Good and
Evil . #192 Nietzsche 1968b, 295)
.
[31]
Nietzsche emphasizes a creative aspect of human
existence that Lacan tends to overlook, but he cannot finally
account for the creation of new meaning he claims is
possible. The will to power, being an irrational force,
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cannot of itself impose order. [32] if the concepts and
values encoded in language stabilize our identities and our
world, then the destruction of the old moralities can only
lead to nihilism. [33] And yet, the old moralities were,
according to Nietzsche, human creations. How could we now go
about creating a new, more life-affirming, morality? I will
suggest in what follows that Nietzsche took up a female
position in Beyond
—GbQd and Evil in that he refused to give
the Symbolic order the reverence granted it by a more
masculine self-strategy. But I will also suggest that it was
the inability to assert the alternative strategy of seeking
fusion-experience with others that led to his nihilistic
conclusions. Nietzsche, like Silentio, feels the need to
respond to something in experience that pushes one beyond
conventional language. Part of what characterizes a female
sel f-strategy is the need to respond to nuances in concrete
experience that defy generalization. Significance is given
to these nuances in the shared pleasure that comes from
satisfying another's desire. Nietzsche had as much
difficulty as Silentio in taking up a female position with
respect to an embodied other. Unlike Silentio, however, he
had no recourse to a divine Other. His attentiveness to
aspects of his experience that eluded categorization thus
lacks the parameters set by an other's desire. [34]
Although he could talk of attending to nuances of
experience not accounted for in the categories of language,
he could not account for how such nuances could be given
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meaning. I will suggest that such new meaning that brings
new aspects of experience into the self one posits as well as
into one's view of the world, can only come about through the
responsiveness of an other. For new meaning to emerge, one
needs the mirroring response of an other that brings that
meaning into the relational structure of the self. That is,
a self can only exist in relationship to others, in a
position with respect to other selves. This means that the
self has meaning only with respect to others, and thus that
only those aspects of experience that have some relationship
to others can be incorporated into the subject's sense of
self. Those aspects of experience that remain unrecognized
and unattended to by others will not be brought into the
subject's sense of self since it will not relate to the
positioning of that subject with respect to others. Once
such aspects have taken on meaning for others, however, they
also take on meaning for the subject. Thus, meaning cannot
be generated in a vacuum since it is the by-product of a
positioning process that determines the subject's place with
respect to the world.
The puzzle : In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche wants to
push us past the old morality that would oppose good to evil.
In Nietzsche's revaluation what is normally considered "evil"
is the "free spirit's" "good." The Christian ethic of "all
equal before God" and democratic egalitarianism are both
aspects of a slave morality that would reduce everyone to the
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level of the common man and so prevent the evolution of the
human race. To counter this disease, Nietzsche wants us to
go beyond the old dichotomy that would label anyone who
inspires fear as "evil" (#260) . We need to encourage a new
type to appear, a higher, nobler man who will create a new,
more life-enhancing, morality:
The noble type of man experiences itself as
determining values;
. . . it is value-creating . . . . In
the foreground there is the feeling of fullness, of
power that seeks to overf low, . . . the consciousness
of wealth that would give and bestow (#260)
.
To prepare the way for this higher man, Nietzsche ("ourselves
who are their heralds and precursors, we free spirits" #44)
,
wants to reveal any and all moralities as human creations at
the service of the will to power. Far from being a code of
unchanging ideals that hold "true" for all time, moralities
are sets of concepts and values created by human beings to
promote life. [35]
To understand human beings we need to "descend into the
depths" (#23) and understand psychology as the doctrine of
the development of the will to power. The body is "but a
social structure composed of many souls"' willing is a
question of the rank of commanding and obeying within this
structure; and morals is "the doctrine of the relations of
supremacy under which the phenomenon of "life' comes to be
(#19) . One's morality bears witness to who one is by
determining "what order of rank the innermost drives of his
nature stand in relation to one another" (#6)
.
The strong
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spirit will be that spirit who due to his morality is more
able to discharge his strength (#13) . Rather than
splintering his strength in a conflict of competing drives
his values will discipline those drives to come together in
an upsurge of strength.
Thus, instead of the old dichotomy of good and evil,
Nietzsche introduces the new dichotomy of "strong" and
"weak." Along with this new dichotomy go the dichotomies of
noble/contemptible, higher/ inferior and healthy/sick.
Nietzsche hopes to prepare the way for a new kind of human
being, one who can break the constraints of a morality that
has grown too restricting and therefore life-denying. Such a
higher man would create the new morality necessary for
developing as yet undreamed of aspects of human potential.
[36] In the place of the old concepts of good and evil
Nietzsche hopes to create if not the new morality, at least
transitional concepts and values that will facilitate the
evolution of man he envisions.
The puzzle I want to explore here is why Nietzsche
introduces these new dichotomies as if they work better than
the old dichotomy of good and evil . In what follows I will
argue that the dichotomy of strong and weak is undermined by
the text. We could say that this is no surprise since
Nietzsche is trying to get us beyond all dichotomies.
Instead of explaining away discrepancies in his text by
positing an author behind the text who "intentionally"
undermined himself, however, I'd like to return to the text
228
itself. In light of my project, an 'I' that confidently
proclaims a clearcut distinction between the strong and the
weak is also attempting to position itself as a subject with
respect to those categories. That those categories shift in
conflicting ways speaks to a conflict in positioning of the
speaking 'I' of the text. Exploring this conflict in light
of the theory of self thus far developed could thus give us
insight into difficulties encountered in attempting to move
beyond such dichotomies.
By distinguishing between the strong and the weak, the
noble man and the herd animal, Nietzsche attempts to
distinguish those who represent the higher hope of humanity
from those who should be sacrificed to that higher hope. The
question is, do these new dichotomies that Nietzsche
introduces do the work he wants them to do? I will argue
that they don't. In making these distinctions Nietzsche
seems to shade his concept of the will top power in different
ways. At times the strong manifest a will to power that is a
procreative life force that affirms and reveres all life:
the ideal of the most high-spirited, alive, and
world-affirming human being who has not only come
to terms with whatever was and is, but who wants to
have what was and is repeated into all eternity,
shouting insatiably da capo (#56)
.
At other times the strong manifest a will to power that is an
appropriating life force that is intrinsically and inevitably
domineering and exploitative:
"Exploitation" does not belong to a corrupt or
imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the
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SSSence of what lives, as a basic organic function;
it is a consequence of the will to power, which is
after all the will to life (#259)
.
Which interpretation of the "strong" and the will to power we
take will have repercussions for our interpretation of
Nietzsche s higher man. Can there only be one such higher
man the one who manages to overpower everyone else and is
therefore doomed to solitude? Or can we envision a community
of higher spirits who can live in peaceful co-existence? [37]
Nietzsche would seem to want the latter. he talks of
the reverence in which a noble soul will hold his equals— "it
honors Itself in them and in the rights it cedes them"
(#265) —and ends Beyond Good and evil with an Aftersong that
appeals for new friends that he, as a precursor of the higher
man, can so revere. But the search for others that are
equally "high," "free," or "noble" as himself is fraught with
peril. The distinctions he so boldly makes in some places
are undermined in others. In contrast to a clear-cut
distinction between the strong spirits that will naturally
come to command the inferior human beings whose place is to
obey, Nietzsche distinguishes a noble soul that needs
cleanliness and solitude from the herd that would corrupt
him. In an odd reversal it becomes the herd who is strong.
The herd have the same words for the same species of inner
experiences; "those more select, subtle, strange, and
difficult to understand, easily remain along, succumb to
accidents, being isolated, and rarely propagate" (#268).
This points to a conflict in Nietzsche's thought. The noble
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soul is playing a dangerous game. he is a lover of the great
hunt who would probe the human soul and its limits, its
unexhausted possibilities (#45) and yet, "it might be a basic
characteristic of existence that those who would know it
completely would perish" (#39)
.
Thus, strength comes to
teeter on a fine line between the spirit who can command due
to the self-discipline of drives that results in an up-surge
of will-to-power
,
and the spirit who dares to break down his
internal ranking of drives to probe the "truth" that he is:
in which case the strength of a spirit should be
measured according to how much of the "truth" one
could still barely endure—or to put it more
clearly, to what degree one would require it to be
thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted,
falsified. (#39)
If one were to probe all the "heights, depths and
distances" of the range of inner human experiences (#45) one
risks the danger of perishing— losing one's ability to act,
one's meaning, one's identity in an overwhelming multiplicity
of experience he can no longer control with his fictions.
Although we need a new morality more in keeping with the
demands of the will to power, in leaving the old moralities
behind we run the risk of oblivion. Thus, at the same time
the noble soul is strong— strong in his attentiveness to the
pulse of life which pushes him to discard old values—he is
also weak--weak in his inability to leap up in new strength
before destroying his old foundations for action. This
weakness makes it impossible for him to command, and turns
his health into a sickness that dooms him to solitude. The
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noble soul who loves the great hunt and would pass through
the "whole range of human values and value feelings" (#211),
who would look down from the advantage of this perspective
and create new values, is forced into silence. To speak in
the words suited for common experiences, the experiences
shared by the many, would destroy what was rare, strange and
subtle in him. The very pulse of life that moves him beyond
those words also proves to be his weakness. In isolation to
avoid corruption of his delicate rareness, the noble soul
shrinks from contact and awaits the new friends who will
strengthen his new and higher perspective in the community of
shared experiences
.
The question is, how is this community to be formed?
Again, we come back to Nietzsche's notions of "strong" and
"weak." If the strong spirit is the spirit who creates new
values, the spirit who commands, who imposes his values on
others, then won't the "true" higher man be the higher man
who manges to impose the values he creates upon the rest? if
such is the case, then each noble soul must sit in solitude,
struggling to create his new values alone, and finally brave
the corrupting influences of the common man in the attempt to
impose his creations on the world.
I don't think Nietzsche had this vision. And I think he
was aware of the conflict at work here. Towards the end of
Part Nine the subsections strike a more personal mode. In
#278 the wanderer calls out for "Another mask! A second
mask!" and in #280 he says, "He is going back like anybody
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who wants to attempt a big jump." in the following sections
I will explore Nietzsche's concept of 'woman' in Bevond Hood
££<3 Evj-1 and give an analysis of the female and male
"positions" of Nietzsche's text on the basis of our earlier
discussion of those terms. It will be my contention that
Nietzsche goes a long way toward breaking down old
sub j ect /ob j ect dichotomies but that his introduction of new
dichotomies is an attempt to save the oppositional self-
strategy of masculine identity. An examination of his
concept of 'woman' will demonstrate how his reading of gender
categories relates to this attempt. I will then explore
other alternatives he might have taken given he could have
freed himself from gender categories entirely and adopted a
new self-strategy.
' Woman
'
: Towards the end of Part Seven, Nietzsche
devotes eight subsections to "a few truths about "woman as
such"" with the stipulation that one keep in mind "how very
much these are after all only--nu£ truths" (#231) . Throughout
his words, Nietzsche goes further in deconstructing the
category of 'woman' than either Kierkegaard or Sartre. [38]
In the Preface of Beyond Good and Evil he asks "Supposing
truth is a woman—what then?" with the implication that the
attack he proceeds to make on those who assume there is an
absolute Truth waiting to be unveiled and possessed goes for
those who would win 'woman' as well. [39] He is thus far
from unaware that the role that man would have woman play is
233
based on illusion. If there is an absolute Truth behind the
confusing array of appearances waiting to be revealed, then
man has a focus point, a goal by which to orient his search
for knowledge. if there is the essential 'woman,' the not-
man, behind the veils she hides herself in, waiting to be
possessed, then man has the ultimate answer to all that he
feels himself to lack. Truth will heal his ignorance, woman
will make him whole—the problem was to find them both. Once
found they could be possessed and man would finally want no
more. On this view, at least man knew what he was looking
for and could even measure his progress on the way to his
goals. But what if both Truth and 'woman' were illusions,
illusions that he himself had invented? Then he is set
adrift upon the sea of appearances with nothing to guide him-
-no goal, no direction, no meaning. [40]
To compensate for the loss of the illusion of Truth as a
realm of eternal ideals men could strive to reflect ever more
perfectly, Nietzsche introduced the will to power and
emphasized man's ability to play the creator himself. [41]
The old ideals had always been illusions anyway. We need
fictions to orient ourselves and our actions, to organize our
drives into a unified upsurge of life. [42] The trick is to
compensate for the loss of an anchor in Truth with a new
awareness of our will to power and our ability to create the
fictions that would best enhance that will to power. What
then of 'woman'? Is she free to abdicate from her role as
Holy Grail, free as well to play the creator, to create the
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illusions that will best serve her own will to power? Yes
and no. On the one hand, Nietzsche gives woman credit for
having always seen through the illusion of 'woman' and put it
to their advantage: "what is truth to a woman?...—her great
is the lie, her highest concern is mere appearance and
beauty" (#232)
.
On the other, to take the next step and
discard the illusions given her by man for illusions more to
her liking will lead to her degeneration:
As she... takes possession of new rights, aspires to
become "master" and writes the "progress" of woman
upon her standards and banners, the opposite
development is taking place with terrible clarity:
woman is retrogressing
. (#239)
Because Nietzsche has equal disdain for the scientific
man who remains bound by conventional "truths" rather than
letting himself go and flowing with the great currents of a
free spirit (#206), one could argue that he only wants to
make sure woman doesn't do herself the same disservice. But
a careful reading of Beyond Good and Evil points to more than
that. Not only does Nietzsche not want woman to make the
same mockery of herself man already has, he wants woman to
continue to play her role of being man's illusion:
Let us men confess it: we honor and love precisely
this art and this instinct in woman—we who have a
hard time and for our relief like to associate with
beings under whose hands, eyes, and tender follies
our seriousness, our gravity and profundity almost
appear to us like folly. (#232)
And he exhorts man to make sure she continues to play this
role :
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A man.
. .who has depth, in his spirit as well as in
his desires .. .must conceive of woman as a
possession, as property that can be locked, as
something predestined for service and achieving her
perfection in that. (#238)
In #194 he distinguishes three types of men according to what
they take as really possessing a woman. The third type
incorporates the first two's signs for "having": 1) the use
of the woman's body; and 2) the knowledge that "the woman
does not only give herself to him but also gives up for his
sake what she has or would like to have"; with : 3) the
knowledge that "when she gives up everything for him, (she)
does not possibly do this for a phantom of him," because:
He wants to be known deep down, abysmally deep
down, before he is capable of being loved at all;
he dares to let himself be fathomed.
Thus, a woman's desire for self-reliance is one of the worst
developments of the general uglification of Europe (#232)
because it is in the best interests of man's will to power
that she renounce her own will and desire. It may be an
illusion that there is. a "something Eternally-and-
Necessarily-Feminine" (#239), a "something more refined and
vulnerable, wilder, stranger, sweeter, and more
soulful ... something one has to lock up lest it fly away"
0#237a)
,
but if this illusion is necessary for the
development of the higher man, then it is an illusion we
should keep.
Again we are returned to Nietzsche's notions of "strong"
and "weak." If the higher man is to be a creator of values
then to distinguish himself from those inferior to him he
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must not only create those values, but impose them on those
he has subjected to his will. On this reading of the will to
power as domination only the one who imposes his morality
will have the opportunity to manifest an upsurge of strength.
Those around him--such as women and slaves—must be
sacrificed to his superior ability to create and impose on
others the values that will expedite his own will to power:
to a being such as "we are" other beings must be
subordinate by nature and have to sacrifice
themselves. (#265)
It is only when such a being has settled whether or not
another being is of equal rank that:
it moves among these equals with their equal
privileges, showing the same sureness of modesty
and delicate reverence that characterize its
relations with itself (#265).
The same problem of determining one's rank with respect to
woman arises as did earlier with respect to the "weak." If
woman is to be possessed, her desire subsumed by man’s, her
illusions put in man's service, then presumably she is
"weak." She is not part of Nietzsche's "we free spirits."
Her reasons for shame (such as superficiality and petty
presumptuousness) should continue to be kept "repressed and
kept under control by fear of man" (#232) . Clearly it is not
to her that we look in our watch for the higher man. Thus,
to allow her to attempt the creation of values could only
lead to retrogression. Woman can and should chase away
worries, fathom man's depths, and play into his faith that
within her lies concealed a "basically different ideal" that
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must be maintained and protected (#239) . All these roles are
based on illusions that will give him some relief from his
struggles and even help him on his way. But only he is
capable of the great hunt that will lead the human race to
its higher glory. [43]
With this discussion of 'woman,' we obtain some
additional clues to the problem of distinguishing the
"strong" from the "weak." According to Nietzsche's doctrine
of will to power, all who can should, and must, struggle to
manifest as much of their will to power as possible— such is
life. The only constraints on that struggle are the need to
maintain orienting fictions and the mastery of others
stronger than oneself. Thus, far from surrendering her
desire for the sake of man, woman should be struggling for as
much self-reliance and self-mastery as it is in her power to
achieve. If man can keep her in his service, then so be it--
but to ask her to sacrifice her own will to power voluntarily
is not in keeping with Nietzsche's conception of will to
power. That is, it is one thing to suggest that the noble
souls will come to command due to a superabundance of energy,
but it is another thing to suggest that a group of human
beings (i.e., women) should prefer to help man find the
fictions best suited to his will to power rather than attend
to the pulse-beat of her own. Presumably, it is the desire
to render such service that Nietzsche is thinking of when he
worries about her unlearning her fear of man . She unlearns
her fear of man: but the woman who "unlearns fear" surrenders
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her most womanly instincts" (#238); "what is the meaning of
all this if not a crumbling of feminine instincts, a
defeminization?" (#239)
.
This brings us to another point. If Nietzsche's
"strong" spirit turns out to be not so strong, and if
sacrifices need to be made by the "weak" if the "strong" are
to become stronger, just what is the relationship between the
strong and the weak? Why does Nietzsche want woman to
continue to play her womanly role? Why wouldn't it be better
for the whole human race to struggle for self-reliance and
self-mastery, letting the best man win—the higher man being
he who was the culminating achievement of the struggle of a
multitude of wills to dominate? Or is something else needed
for the "strong" to become strong, something already hinted
at in the previous section, something that would undermine
the distinction between strong and weak entirely?
In the next section I will relate Nietzsche's text to
the two positions I laid out in the last chapter. I will
argue that Nietzsche's notion of the will to power represents
an attempt to speak from the female position. In his
attention to the pulse of life that defies categories, to the
continual becoming that can't be contained, he attempts to
take into account aspects of experience denied by the extreme
of the male position. [44] This attempt brings him up
against the limits of masculine identity. If woman is to
exercise her feminine instincts in his service, then he must
be man enough to subject her to his service, to command. And
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yet how can he command when faced with the danger of the
great hunt--his own dissolution?
My contention will be that despite his breakdown of the
category of 'woman' Nietzsche still cannot allow himself to
exercise what he refers to as "feminine instincts." What,
for him, falls under the category of "feminine instincts"
indicates his version of gender categories. That what he
puts in that category is what he is not—what's forbidden to
him as a man--indicates an oppositional self-strategy at
work. By laying out the elements of the text speaking from
the two positions, and examining the conflict already alluded
to in the last section and this within this framework, I hope
to go beyond Nietzsche's new dichotomy of strong and weak.
Questions motivating my analysis are, what constitutes
"feminine" or "weak" instincts for Nietzsche, m instincts he
won't allow himself; and how would these instincts enable him
to surrender his solitude for a community of free spirits?
The positions : In Part One, Nietzsche undermines the
notion of a fixed human essence by looking at human beings as
a process that makes use of concepts and values to enhance
the development of will to power . Out of the vast range of
possibilities open to a human being, who that human being is,
her identity, is an effect of her morality--that which ranks
her instincts so that the order of command is clear, conflict
between instincts is reduced, and action is facilitated. By
undermining Truth, dogmatism and Platonism he intends to
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challenge the belief that there are eternal, transcendent,
road-maps in the sky by which to guide our identities and our
actions. For Nietzsche, not only are there no such road-
maps, but our real guide is the surging process of life
itself, the will to power in whose service we create our
concepts and moralities rather than vice versa. [45]
Nietzsche's concept of will to power can be seen as a
way of representing the source of individual life in chaotic
flux. As such, it can be seen as his version of the origin
—
not a gift from God the Father above who beckons us onward,
but the underground turbulence of life in all its bewildering
multiplicity. Phenomena are not the pale reflection of an
eternally unchanging realm, but the result of a chaotic,
irrational upsurge of life forever struggling to surge ever
higher and more forcefully, taking the most expedient, rather
than most "rational," forms for getting there. Thus, there
is no such thing as a "soul," a "motive," a "law," a "right"
or a "wrong"—there is only the will to power that creates
the concepts and values that will feed its continual need to
grow and expand.
The recognition that all rankings, all boundaries, all
categories, are created undermines and subverts the authority
of the Symbolic order of social meaning in favor of the
concrete specificity of life. The recognition of the guiding
force of the will to power is the "feminine" recognition that
life is growth and becoming and that the Symbolic order
should be subordinate to becoming— life-enhancing rather than
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life denying. Nietzsche speaks from the female position in
his attentiveness to the pulse of life that defies all
categorizations and that says no more than "I want to live."
It is that pulse of concrete living things that the feminine
responds to—the "indiscriminate" response she makes to
enhance the chances of any living thing simply because it
makes that appeal. [46] In valuing the will to power over
morality itself, in saying that the latter should serve the
former, Nietzsche is taking the female position of putting
the concrete specificity of actual living things before the
preservation of eternal ideals. he is advocating the
destruction of an outmoded Symbolic order that impedes rather
than fosters the growth of the human beings subject to it.
In doing so, he is listening with a "third" ear, an ear that
can tune into the subtleties of experience that elude the
symbolic--exper iences that would take humanity higher if
given the nourishment they deserve. it is this kind of
sensitivity a woman gives to her loved ones, attending to the
inarticulate longing of each, giving them a hearing, and
through her mirroring, giving new aspects of experience, of
life, the response it needs to give itself form.
But this attempt to incorporate aspects of the female
position into his work put Nietzsche into a quandary. The
oppositional strategy of masculine identity relies on the
repetition of fixed relationships for continuity. the
Symbolic order is a static order of fixed positions by which
one can place one's self and others. To maintain self-
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it y one must have a certain group of people (i.e.,
women and subordinates) flexible enough to conform to the
other of one's self /other pattern. To navigate the broader
realm of social relations one builds up layers of
identifications that replay one's self /other pattern through
inversion and analogy according to the Law of the Father.
Thus, defying the Symbolic Nietzsche is defying the very
order that sustains his identity. Nietzsche is referring to
just this dilemma in speaking of the dangers of the hunt.
How can he defy the mechanical repetition of fixed patterns
and sterile concepts for the subtle richness of experiences
that elude it without perishing in the attempt? His response
is to brave the danger of chaotic flux "like a man." Single-
handedly he must boldly go forth, leaving the charted realm
of the Symbolic order behind, and create a new order all on
his own. he will be "strong," he will be "noble," he will
play the "creator" all on his own, making his own map of
positions as he goes.
Thus, Nietzsche's new dichotomies and his order of rank
can be seen as aspects of the male position. They are
attempts to maintain identity through the imposition of one’s
own creations, the imposition of a new self/other pattern
that one can repeat in the same way one could repeat the old
one. That this strategy cannot work is attested to by the
contradictory nature of these dichotomies. In a world of
flux and becoming how can any fixed self/other pattern hold?
If one is to navigate this new realm of life experience that
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follows no rules and adheres to no order, one needs a new
strategy. We all know of such a strategy--we
' ve all
experienced a time where each and every moment was new and
there were no patterns to repeat—and yet we managed to
create an identity from a realm of chaotic flux that served
to order the whole of our existence. I'm referring, of
course, to infancy. To create a new identity, one more
responsive to the subtler aspects of life that elude the
Symbolic order as we know it, one might take some hints from
that earlier experience. In his fresh responsiveness to
elusive aspects of experience I think Nietzsche has, but in
his need to maintain the male illusion of self-sufficiency he
has overlooked another self-strategy and the vital role
played by connectedness in that strategy. To brave chaotic
flux "like a man" requires overlooking that self-strategy
because it requires exercising those "feminine instincts"
Nietzsche is so loath for women to give up.
The extreme of the male position would have us ignore
chaotic flux in order to crank out mechanical patterns based
on the repetition of pre-fixed categories. The extreme of
the female position involves surrendering to that flux to the
point of losing all sense of self, of things, of continuity
or order at all. Nietzsche, by trying to incorporate more of
the female position into the male one is struggling to bring
order to flux—to maintain ap identity and meaning while
being faithful to every last nuance of concrete life.
Finally an impossible task, and he knows it. But at the very
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least he wants us to do a better job of it than we're doing,
he wants us to leave behind some of our old guideposts to
find a morality in keeping with a new range of subtleties,
aspects of human experience that once attended to could allow
new forms of life to flourish. The "man" with the masterful
and domineering will to power imposes order upon flux. He is
the great hunter who leaves the Symbolic behind to play
creator in an uncharted realm. it is the woman with her
"feminine instincts" who has no wish to impose her will.
Instead, she surrenders the desire for order and mastery and
gives herself up to the life around her—not a surrender of
her will to power, but a surrender to the responses life
evokes from her, responses that defy all order and all
categorization. A woman who finds her perfection in service
to a man is a woman who has forsaken the repetition of a
self/other pattern to let a man evoke whatever response comes
forth. it is thus that a man can feel himself fathomed to
his depths, his every move, his every thought, reflected in
her responsiveness to him as if she were his mirror.
It is this same responsiveness that is a crucial feature
of the mother/infant dyad from which the infant's original
self is precipitated. Here, the reciprocal responsiveness of
the two form a whole in which meaning is generated in the
interest of life. The infant, rather than repeating a
self/other pattern of its own, conforms to the other of the
mother's self /other pattern. If the mother is reasonably
nurturing, the self/other pattern she imposes will not be
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that of the extreme male position, but one that is responsive
to the infant's cues and bodily needs. Thus, although she
structures her experiences via the Symbolic order, she will
ignore or subvert that order in the interest of enhancing the
life of the infant. A man who finds a woman to possess will
obtain some of the benefits of the infant /mother
relationship. her responsiveness will mirror him the way his
mother did, allowing him a similar feeling of connectedness,
of being known ("fathomed")
. But if he cannot leave aside
the need for repetition of a fixed self/other pattern, if he
cannot brave the terrors of flux within the safety of
another's embrace, he will never be able to leave the
restrictions of the Symbolic order behind.
What Nietzsche has overlooked in his call for the higher
man is that the only way the human race can evolve is
together. No one man can do it alone--no matter how "strong"
or "noble." There's a simple reason for this. Human beings
form and maintain their identity in connectedness. The only
way for them to change that identity is in connectedness.
Thus far men have been able to veil that fact by denying
their dependency as infants as well as their continuing
dependency on the others in their lives willing to give them
the attentive responsiveness they need. If we all desired
only to make others conform to our fixed self /other patterns
we would starve for human contact and lose the richness of
life. If we all desired only to conform to another's
self/other pattern we would lose all stability. In trying to
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find a meeting ground for flux and order, Nietzsche, I
believe, was struggling to create a new identity, a new
subjectivity for himself one that could both respond to the
nuances of life as well as make sense of it. On the way to
new subjectivity his need to maintain a masculine
identity ran him into an impasse. Narrowing the distance
between the poles of male and female threatens not only any
neat categorization of gender but also our tried and true
strategies for maintaining self-identity. In braving that
task Nietzsche has shown us some of the pitfalls involved—as
well as given us suggestions for where to go from here.
Although Nietzsche himself did not achieve the evolution to
the higher human beings he envisioned, he has indeed helped
to pave the way for their coming.
4.4 Sartre; BEING AND NOTHINGNESS
In Being and Nothingness (Sartre 1956) Sartre also
emphasizes a creative moment that determines a Symbolic order
rather than saying we're structured by the Symbolic. He thus
moves away from a male position that would revere the
Symbolic as is. Instead he emphasizes the free acts that
give rise to Symbolic orders—categories that order
experience in light of an individual project. [47] Sartre
also talks about the way one's free acts are given social
meaning by the other who externalizes one's acts. here he is
also approaching a female position by recognizing that others
play a role in the creation of meaning (versus a male
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position that would deny the part played by the other)
. He
sees this as a completely negative moment, however.
I will suggest that although Sartre takes a female
position insofar as he refuses to defer to a socially
sanctioned Symbolic order, he has not managed to substitute a
desire for fusion-experiences for the masculine self-strategy
of revering the Symbolic order. Instead he tries to
substitute individual Symbolic orders. Like Nietzsche, he
expects each individual to create a law unto himself—
a
Symbolic order of his own that may or may not conflict with
the socially sanctioned Symbolic order. Unlike Nietzsche,
however, Sartre doesn't advocate receptivity to new feelings
and bodily sensations that may subvert one's categories.
Instead he assumes that subversion of socially sanctioned
categories must be done through the assertion of categories
structured by one's fundamental choice of being. [48] Thus I
will suggest that Sartre proposes that the law of categories
represented by the Symbolic order should come from each
individual
.
The puzzle : Sartre ends Part Four of Being and
Nothingness with the following passage:
Each human reality is at the same time a direct
project to metamorphose its own For-itself into an
In-itself-For-itself and a project of the
appropriation of the world as a totality of being-
in-itself, in the form of a fundamental
quality. . . .Thus the passion of man is the reverse
of that of Christ, for man loses himself as man in
order that God may be born. But the idea of God is
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contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain. Man
is a useless passion (p.784).
Sartre s pessimistic conclusion that humanity's fundamental
project is contradictory and therefore unachievable stems
from his view that consciousness cannot be its own
foundation. Humans want to transform the negating activity
of the for-itself (consciousness) that distinguishes them
from inert matter into a self-causing substance. Mere for-
itself is nothingness— it gives the in-itself (brute
existence) meaning by revealing it in the light of an end
that has not yet been achieved. [49] Thus, it introduces
possibility into the fullness of being that is sufficient
unto itself. But in so doing, human reality also posits
itself as a lack--as a being that is not yet what it is. [50]
Its fundamental project is to retain the freedom of making
choices between its possibilities, and yet to attain the
self-sufficiency of a complete being that no longer lacks.
Hence, Sartre's alternate description of this project as the
project of being God. [51]
The puzzle I propose to investigate here is the
question: why is the Sartre of Being and Nothingness so drawn
to a project that he claims to be doomed to failure? Through
a careful reading of Part Four of Being and Nothingness we
will find that Sartre overlooks a fairly obvious way in which
human consciousness can be its own foundation. In the
remainder of this section I will sketch out his views on for-
itself, being-for-others , and the project of becoming in-
itself-for-itself in order to highlight the dilemma as Sartre
249
sees it. In the following section I will relate his
discussion of appropriation and the quality of 'slimy' to the
category of 'woman' that emerges from his text. In the final
section I will argue that it is his rigid adherence to gender
categories that blocks him from resolving the dilemma he
depicts, despite the suggestions implicit in his text for
just such a resolution.
Sartre posits a split between for-itself and in-itself.
Human consciousness is consciousness &f something. This
something is transphenomenal being. [52] That is,
consciousness reveals phenomena in light of the possibilities
it projects before it. Thus, phenomena are revealed only in
light of a concrete, individual project. But the being of
such phenomena is beyond all individual projects. This in-
itself :
is an immanence which can not realize itself, an
affirmation which can not affirm itself, an
activity which can not act, because it is glued to
itself (p . 27 ) .
It is beyond all negation or affirmation, passivity or
activity, transition or becoming:
It is full positivity. It knows no otherness; it
never posits itself as other-than-another-beinq .
It can support no connection with the other. It is
itself indefinitely and it exhausts itself in being
(p.29)
.
For-itself, on the other hand, is an escape from the in-
itself that gives the latter meaning:
It is only because I escape the in-itself by
nihilating myself toward my possibilities that this
in-itself can take on value as cause or motive.
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Causes and. motives have meaning only inside a
projected ensemble which is precisely an ensemble
of non-existent s . And this ensemble is ultimately
myself as transcendence (p.564).
Human reality perpetually puts its being into question. It
thereby opens a hole in the heart of being by considering
itself in the light of non-being. That is, by nihilating
what it is by projecting itself towards possibilities that it
isn't, it gives meaning to itself and its situation. My
place, my past, the things around me, are all interpreted in
light of the end toward which I project my possibilities.
Each human project has its own empirical shape, but all share
the fundamental project of becoming in-itself-for-itself
.
this fundamental project can take different forms according
to the type of relation to being a for-itself .adopts . That
is, the for-itself projects an ensemble of non-existent s in
light of its initial choice of a particular kind of relation
to being. Choices of concrete objects of desire are
integrated as secondary structures into this totality.
Although the initial choice can be changed, such a change
can't be achieved through mere reflection. In fact, merely
willing a change would be in bad faith. [53] It is action
taken in the spontaneous upsurge of the for-itself that most
accurately reflects one's project in its totality.
Each for-itself finds itself in a world that includes
others. These others also have the freedom to nihilate what
is in light of their possibilities. [54] When I see an Other
in the distance:
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suddenly an object has appeared which has stolen
the world from me. Everything is in place;
everything still exists for me; but everything is
traversed by an invisible flight and fixed in the
direction of a new object (p.343).
When there is no Other in my vicinity the world stretches out
around me according to my. project, things are understood as
obstacles or as helpful in light of the possibilities I am
reaching for. I am the center of my world. But when I see
Other on the horizon I become aware that my perspective is
not the only one. The Other has his own perspective, one
that, for example, places the bench that's 30 feet from mg. as
2 feet from him . Furthermore, the for-itself is responsible
for revealing the Other's conduct in the world as techniques
(p.668)
.
[55] As I watch the Other sit on the bench I turn
what he lives as a free project into a technique that exists
outside of him. The world:
is revealed to me... by collective and already
constituted techniques which aim at making me
apprehend the world in a form whose meaning has
been defined outside of me (p.657).
By manifesting certain techniques, I manifest my membership
in various collectivities such as the human race, a nation,
or a professional or family group. But in choosing my acts I
always go beyond the internal technical organization that
expresses my memberships, toward myself—the transcendent me
of my individual project. Thus, although the for-itself
gives the Other an exterior that make objective rules of
human conduct, this conduct is always grounded in the free
acts of individuals with individual projects.
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As a for-itself living with other for-itselves, I am
aware of other freedoms that create perspectives different
from my own, and that can exteriorize my behavior in light of
their own projects. Giving an outside to another's behavior
gives that behavior meaning that can form techniques I can
choose to take on or reject in living my own project. Thus,
a new dimension of being arises--being-for-others
:
by means of the upsurge of the Other there appear
certain determinations which I am without having
chosen them.
. . .All this I am for the Other with no
hope of apprehending this meaning which I have
outside r and, still more important, with no hope of
changing it. Speech alone will inform me of what I
am (p . 671 ) .
The situation that I reveal in the free choice of my project
is alienated from me and comes "to exist as a form in itself
for the Other" (p.673)
.
Because I exist as a for-itself for
other for-itselves, I can be freely apprehended by them in
light of ends that are not my own. Because the Other
apprehends me as an Other-as-ob ject
,
reducing my free conduct
into an objective form, he limits my freedom. The Other
tells me who I am and although there are an infinity of
attitudes I can assume with respect to what I am told, I
cannot not assume some attitude. The things others say I am
(e.g., ugly, brilliant, a coward, a Jew) cannot actually
refer to me since I am a free nothingness which projects
itself toward its possibilities. But I can choose to
interiorize such "unrealizables" by incorporating them in the
structure of my free projects (p.678)
.
These unrealizables
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can't be realized because as a being that lacks and is always
projecting itself toward what it isn't, I am never a
completed being that can see myself from the outside.
Instead, I am always waiting for a "repose which would be
and no longer a waiting for being... that is, evidently,
a plenitude of the type "in-itself-for-itself "" (p.688).
Death, far from enabling me to attain this repose, is
the triumph of the Other's point of view over my own:
Death reapprehends all this subjective which while
it "lived" defended itself against exteriorization,
and death deprives it of all subjective meaning in
order to hand it over to any object i ve meaning
which the Other is pleased to give to it (p.696)
.
As long as I am alive I can escape what I am for the Other.
I can demonstrate that whatever the Other discovers about me
can be surpassed by projecting myself toward other ends.
Thus, I can prove that "my dimension of being-for-myself is
incommensurable with my dimension of being-for-others"
(p.695). But once death has cancelled out my possibilities,
I exist only thought the Other. I can no longer nihilate my
outside with the absolute, subjective positing of a freedom
that interprets itself and its world in the light of its own,
freely chosen, project.
The ultimate goal for the for-itself is not death, but
being as for-itself (p.723) . That is, it wants to be a being
which is what it is (rather than always be projecting itself
toward what it lacks) , but it also wants to be this as
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consciousness. The fundamental value guiding this project
is :
the ideal of a consciousness which would be the
foundation of its own being-in-it self by the pure
consciousness it would have of itself (p.724).
Thus, the for-itself wants to be an in-itself that founds its
existence by constituting that existence in the free choice
of itself. Like the in-itself such a for-itself would be
complete, lacking nothing, a full positivity. But unlike the
in-itself, such a for-itself would choose to be exactly what
it is and constitute its very existence in the making of that
choice. Like God, such an in-itself-for-itself would be a
self-causing being, completely free and always choosing, yet
already realized and always complete.
For Sartre, the project of becoming in-itself-for-itself
is doomed from the start. Since "(C)hoice and consciousness
are one and the same thing" (p.595) and since in-itself is an
immanence which can not realize itself, the two realms of
being are radically opposed. Consciousness can't found
itself because it must choose itself by projecting itself
toward non-existent s . Once it failed to pose such
transcendent ideals it would lapse into the inert immanence
of an in-itself that cannot choose. The only way to escape
the in-itself is to negate it. The only way to escape the
Others that would give it an objective form not of its
choosing is to negate that form by continuing to engage in a
project of its own choice. And yet, if for-itself can give
others an outside meaning, revealing an Other in the same way
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it reveals in-itself, then a natural solution to the project
of in-itself-for-itself emerges. Although an individual for-
it self may not be able to found its own consciousness,
perhaps an interlocking network of human consciousnesses
could. Obviously Sartre did not see this as a possibility.
[56] In the next section I will explore how his conception
of gender may have precluded such a possibility, and in the
final section I will explore it further in light of the male
and female positions revealed in his text.
LWQma n * : Like Kierkegaard, Sartre doesn't discuss "woman
as such, " but he mentions women and the feminine in enough
places for us to reconstruct what 'woman' means to him, at
least within the confines of this text. The sections most
pertinent to our present topic are found in chapter two of
part four. In this chapter Sartre introduces his conception
of "existential psychoanalysis." Unlike traditional
psychoanalysis, Sartre does not propose understanding human
behavior by tracing its origins to sexuality or the will to
power. Instead, he proposes understanding human behavior in
light of the original way in which each individual has chosen
his being. Since the fundamental human project is to become
in-itself-for-itself
,
desire of what I lack can be understood
in the light of this project of being that which no longer
lacks. An empirical study of concrete desires will indicate
various approaches to this project. A "thousand empirical
examples" (p.736) show that desire comes in three categories-
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to do, to have, to be. "To do" reduces to "to have" (p.742)
which reduces to "the desire to be related to a certain
object in a certain relation of being " (p.751). [57] Thus, a
discussion of appropriation reveals various ways of
approaching the ideal of in-itself-for-itself
.
Sartre discusses various kinds of appropriation. In all
forms of appropriation, for-itself attempts to become its own
foundation by appropriating an object that is indifferent to
consciousness (thus an in-itself) at the same time that it
represents for-itself by belonging to it (thus an in-itself-
for-itself)
. A thing that is mine is m£, because possession
of a particular object means " to have for myself ; that is, to
be the unique end of the existence of the object" (p.752)
.
Because possession means I have exclusive rights on utilizing
the objects I possess in light of my own project, I found my
possessions in their being by creating their meaning. Since
this creation is an emanation of the transcendent me of my
chosen possibilities, the object is me. Thus "(I)n
possession, I am my own foundation in so far as I exist in an
in-itself" (p.755).
In the appropriation of objects of knowledge:
What is seen is possessed; to see is to
deflower . . . .The unknown object is given as
immaculate, as virgin, comparable to a whiteness
.
It has not yet "delivered up" its secret; man has
not yet "snatched" its secret away from it.
I transform the known into me by appropriating it in the form
of a thought that receives its existence from me. And yet
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because it is also an objective fact that will never lose its
form, at the same time that it is "assimilated, transformed
into myself, and. . .entirely me." it is also "impenetrable,
unt rans formable
,
entirely smooth, with the indifferent nudity
of a body which is beloved and caressed in vain" (p.740)
In the appropriating activity of the scientist, the
artist and the sportsman, the object of appropriation
(knowledge, artistic medium or physical environment) appears
"simultaneously to be a kind of subjective emanation of
ourselves and yet to remain in an indifferently external
relation with us." In such activity we attempt to found the
existence of an in-itself that is me because it is mine:
The "mine" appeared to us then as a relation of
being intermediate between the absolute interiority
of the me and the absolute exteriority of the not-
me . There is within the same syncretism a self
becoming not-self and a not-self becoming self
(p.751)
.
Furthermore,
Each possessed object which raises itself on the
foundation of the world manifests the entire world,
just as a beloved woman manifests the sky, the
shore, the sea, which surrounded her when she
appeared. To appropriate this object is then to
appropriate the world symbolically (p.760).
In the drive to become that which doesn't lack, for-itself
wants to appropriate not only a particular object, but the
world. As long as I am choosing myself by negating what I am
in order to project myself toward what I am not, I cannot be
in-itself. But if I can appropriate the whole world, I can
found my own existence in the in-itself. That is, I can
reveal all that is in light of the free choice of a
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transcendent me that turns out to be exactly what the in-
itself is .
But appropriation is merely symbolic. The objects I
make mine are only symbolic representations of me. No matter
how many objects I appropriate, I am still only nothingness
—
a free for— itself that must be what it is not. Appropriation
of others in sexual relationships is as doomed to failure as
the appropriation of knowledge of things:
the lover's dream is to identify the beloved object
with himself and still preserve for it its own
individuality; let the Other become me without
ceasing to be the Other (p.740)
.
This "impossible synthesis of assimilation and an assimilated
which maintains its integrity" (p.739) can never come to
pass. As long as for-itself can choose itself only by
negating itself in light of what it isn't, for the Other to
become me, (s)he would have to become the nothingness of a
for-itself
.
The attempt to attain in-it self-for-it self through
appropriation takes an interesting twist in Sartre's
discussion of the "slimy." [58] In the third and final
section of chapter two, Sartre proposes a psychoanalysis of
things (p.765). Things have qualities that reveal being in
certain ways
.
If we bring out the ontological meaning of
qualities, we can understand how particular qualities
symbolize being. We can then better understand an
individual's original choice of being by noting the
particular attitudes he takes with respect to particular
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qualities
. To give us an idea of how such an ontology might
work, Sartre explores the meaning of the "slimy." Here,
appropriation fails, and the "mine" that related absolute
interiority with absolute exteriority turns into "a
possibility that the In-itself might absorb the For-itself"
(p.776). That is, the project to attain in-itself-for-itself
is reversed into the attack of an in-itself on the for-itself
that would "draw the For-itself into its contingency, into
its indifferent exteriority, into its foundationless
existence" (p.776).
Just as Sartre's discussion of appropriation was laced
with references to women as objects to be possessed, his
discussion of the slimy is laced with references to the
feminine that would engulf one. Both discussions refer to a
realm of being between the absolute freedom of the for-itself
and the absolute immanence of the in-itself. Making
something "mine" was a symbolic attempt to bridge the two
realms that led to failure. The "slimy" symbolizes a being
"in which the for-itself is swallowed up by the in-itself"
(p.783). This ambiguous substance is "between two state"
(p.774). Ironically, while attempts to bridge the two realms
in an appropriation that would lead to in-it self-for-it self
are doomed to failure, attempts made by the in-itself to
swallow up the for-itself seem more likely to succeed. While
references to women and the feminine in the discussion of
appropriation refer us to the ideal, if doomed, project of
becoming in-itself-for-itself , references to women and the
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feminine in the discussion of the slimy refer us to dangerous
aspects of an ambiguous being between two states. In the
former 'woman' was in the appropriate relationship to for-
itself, in the latter 'woman' threatens to derail the for-
itself's project entirely. In possession the for-itself
remains the assimilating and creative power:
It is the For-itself which absorbs the In-itself.
In other words, possession asserts the primacy of
the For-itself in the synthetic being In-itself-
For-itself. yet here is the slimy reversing the
terms; the For-itself is suddenly comprnmi seri . . . . Tt
is a soft, yielding action, a moist and feminine
sucking .... I am no longer the Master in arresting
the process of appropriation (p.776).
Thus, "(S)lime is the revenge of the In-itself. A sickly-
sweet, feminine revenge" (p.777)
.
The slimy offers a horrible image because we are haunted
by the image of a consciousness become slimy. Such a
consciousness would be held back from the freedom of a for-
itself projecting itself toward its possibilities. It would:
be slyly held back by the invisible suction of the
past and... would have to assist in its own slow
dissolution in this past which it was fleeing,
would have to aid in the invasion of its project by
a thousand parasites until finally it completely
lost itself (p.778).
This type of being doesn't exist anymore than the in-itself-
for-itself, but just as the latter is an ideal toward which I
project myself, the former is an "Antivalue" from which I
flee. This antivalue represents the kind of being I don't
want to become, "a threatening mode of being which must be
avoided" (p.779).
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Through these discussions we can begin to make sense of
Sartre's refusal to explore the possibility that human
consciousnesses could found one another. it is one thing for
a for-itself to attempt to appropriate the in-itself. It is
entirely another for it to allow itself to be appropriated.
The moment for-itself allows itself to be held back by a
"moist and feminine sucking, " to allow its free project to be
invaded by a "thousand parasites," it is compromised. The
only acceptable way for a for-itself to approach the project
of becoming in-itself -for-itself is by retaining mastery
throughout. Such a reading of the project naturally dooms it
from the start. A for-itself that is forever fleeing in-
itself by insisting on its freedom to negate everything that
is, will never be able to repose in the objective form
granted it by another. And yet, in his description of the
Antivalue, Sartre himself suggests the form that such repose
could take. In the next section I will set the ultimate
value of the in-itself-for-itself against the anti-value of
the slimy by relating them to the male and female positions
of our interpretive framework. I will argue that
incorporation of the anti-value of the slimy with the value
of the in-itself-for-itself could resolve the dilemma
presented by man's "useless passion."
The positions : Sartre's concept of the
transphenomenality of being moves him away from the extreme
of the male position and brings him closer to a female one.
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The in itself exceeds all categories since there are as many
ways of illuminating it as there are for-itselves to
illuminate it. Reality exceeds the social categories used to
define it. The specificity of my life goes beyond those
categories. The human conduct of particular for-itselves is
given objective forms by others who perceive that behavior
fr.om the outside. Such exteriorization of what were free
acts gives rise to a Symbolic structure of techniques and
characteristics with social significance. But all that can
be said about another's conduct is an exteriorization of that
conduct. It distorts it by giving it an outside meaning that
cancels out the free upsurge of an individual project. In
taking various attitutdes to the Symbolic, the various
techniques and meaning structures available to one, each
person surpasses the Symbolic in choosing his or her own
particular relation to being. The original choice of one's
relation to being sets the parameters for all one's other
choices. It is not a rational choice in the normal sense of
the word. There are no possible grounds for making such a
choice since it is the choice itself that constitutes one's
end and thus one's situation in light of that end. That is,
it is this choice that reveals the in-itself and gives it
meaning
.
Sartre's emphasis on one's absolute freedom of choice
challenges the Symbolic's authority to tell me who I am. I
do not create a self by taking up a position granted me by
the Law of the Father— I create a self by projecting myself
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toward my own possibilities. I reveal and interpret the
positions laid out in the Symbolic in light of an end of my
own choosing. It is because I'm making the choice I make
that the positions of the Symbolic appear to me as they do.
Sartre rejects any transcendental source of values. My
values do not come from God, the Father, Platonic ideals, or
others. Even though meaning structures may exist outside of
me, I surpass them in living out my own choice of being. The
transcendent me I project in light of the fundamental
relation to being I have chosen informs my attitudes to these
meaning structures. Thus, in choosing or rejecting the
positions the structures that embody social relations offer,
I pass beyond them.
My freedom can only be experienced from the inside. Any
attempt to characterize it from the outside can only cancel
it out by freezing my choice of being into a technique with
an objective form. It can not capture the moment of choice
in which I hurl myself toward a future of my own making, or
the possibility that my relation to being could be
transformed at any moment, given my next act, my next choice.
Thus, my interior life defies all description in the
Symbolic. The moment that one's life is exteriorized from
the viewpoint of the other, my possibilities are
extinguished. The only thing one cannot choose is whether or
not one is free. I am condemned to freedom. When I try to
evade my freedom I am in bad faith. To avoid bad faith, I
must accept that the choices I make are finally beyond
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rationality and beyond the comprehension of others. I must
accept a freedom so absolute that it has no foundation, no
court of appeal for the fundamental choice of being it
makes. [59]
Sartre moves away from the male position of someone
enthralled by transcendental ideals that come from above, to
a female position with respect to one's own freedom. In both
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard there is the feminine element of
letting go and allowing themselves to be formed—Nietzsche in
his receptivity to the subtlety of experience, to new
feelings and sensations that would subvert categories, and
Kierkegaard in his receptivity to an incomprehensible God.
Sartre emphasizes nothingness, the nothingness that
distinguishes the for-itself from the in-itself and thereby
saves it from being meaningless matter. [60] Sartre thus
narrowly confines his move toward the female position. All
three grant a lack of rational foundation for ultimate
values, but while Nietzsche confronts a seething array of
conflicting forces and Kierkegaard confronts the
incomprehensible will of God, Sartre confronts nothingness.
We do not simply take up a position in the Symbolic, we
choose one. And in choosing such a position we authorize it
in light of our fundamental project. We have nothing to
guide us in choosing our project. We reject the security of
being inheritors of the Law of the Father, only to assert
that it is our freedom that creates that Law. Thus, Sartre
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rejects the authority of the Symbolic in order to assert the
y of each individual to create a Law unto himself.
There is a price to be paid for making this move. In
fact, far from feeling supremely confident with this new
position of power, Sartre is terribly burdened with the
responsibility that goes along with it. [61] Now, being a
person means not only upholding the Law of the Father, it
means creating it. He must continue to stake out an
identity, but with the understanding that the Symbolic given
him as aid and support is a fraud. It cannot tell him who he
is or how to be because no matter what position he takes up
in it, his choice surpasses it. Sartre has reoriented the
project of subjectivity by saying that each one of us must
posit our own ideals, posit our own transcendence—and take
complete responsibility for it. But, it is still non-
existent ideals that pull us away from the in-itself, that
allow us to escape the in-itself by negating it. On Sartre's
view, each one of us must become the Father of the Law on our
own. Having granted a transphenomenality to being that ever
threatens to overflow the categories of thought, and having
done away with the possibility of a transcendental grounding
from above (God)
,
or an instinctual upsurge for grounding
from within (such as the will to power) , Sartre is left
staring straight in the face of a world that threatens to
absorb him entirely with only the negating power of
nothingness to protect him. [62]
266
The slimy is ambiguous, soft, between two realms. It
threatens to appropriate the for- itself, to turn the for—
itself into the in-itself. It is a feminine sucking that
lures the for-itself into forgetting tis freedom and its
responsibility for creating a Law unto itself. If the for-
itself allows the slimy to trap it, it will fail to attain
its ideal of in-itself-for-itself
,
and instead it will be
drawn to the anti-ideal of a being in which the
foundationless in-itself has priority over the for-itself
(p.778). Both ideals involve an intermediate being between
two realms of being. And yet Sartre sets them at opposite
poles--one is an ideal to be attained, the other an ideal to
flee. The question is, how different are the two ideals?
Feminine slime is soft and leechlike. It wants to be an
individual, and yet allows itself to be dissolved into its
past. It invites the for-itself to appropriate it, but then
compromises the for-itself' s appropriating activity. the
anti-value of the slimy draws the for-itself into a realm of
being where the for-itself' s freedom is put into doubt. It
is no longer creatively appropriating an object in light of
its own project, it is being appropriated. Its freedom is
contaminated and the radical split between in-itself and for-
itself is compromised. The value of the in-itself-for-itself
draws the for-itself into a realm of being where the for-
itself 's freedom remains intact and the radical split between
in-itself and for-itself is maintained. [63]
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Sartre undermines the authority of the Symbolic and
moves toward a female position. 'Woman'— soft and leechlike,
tending toward dissolution—beckons him to receive her, but
he must refuse the invitation. She may accept the ambiguous
status of being between two realms, of being both
appropriator and appropriated, but he cannot. He can take up
a position of receptivity that goes beyond all rational
categories only with respect to his own freedom. The pull to
forsake his male role is apparent, but he resists the
temptation by setting up the slimy as an anti-value.
Instead, he heads resolutely toward an ideal that will allow
him to keep his oppositional self-strategy intact. Leech-
like sucking is feminine. Letting one's project be invaded
by a thousand parasites is feminine. In rejecting such
feminine strategies Sartre closes out the possibility of a
new approach to the ideal of in-it self-for-itself
.
If I could accept such feminine strategies, I may not be
able to achieve the status of the in-itself in my continual
projection of myself towards a transcendent me. But I could
freely choose to be founded by other consciousnesses. In
receptive attentiveness to another's desire I could allow
myself to be appropriated, to be the in-itself that fulfilled
that other's current lack. I could appropriate an other by
giving him or her meaning in light of my own project. At the
same time I could allow myself to be appropriated by him or
her by taking on the meaning (s)he gives me in light of his
If both for-itselves involved remained trueor her project
.
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to their original choice of being, but allowed the concrete
form secondary choices take to be shaped by the other, they
could form a reciprocal relationship. Both would be in-
itselves for the other, but both would also exercise their
free choice as for-it selves . Two individuals could find the
meeting point between two free projects that could grant both
repose, if both were receptive to conforming to the desire. of
the other within the parameters set by their own projects.
Each would then be an "emanation" of the other, at the same
time that they remained in an "indifferently external
relation" with the other due to having a project of their own
that remains unaffected by the other's project. Together
they would be in-itself-for-itself--all consciousness, yet
complete and self-causing. Obviously, such a state of repose
could not last for long. But if one took Sartre's project of
becoming in-itself-for-itself as a project for humanity as a
community rather than for humanity as individuals, we resolve
Sartre's dilemma. A community of consciousnesses each with a
unique perspective, each revealing various aspects of other
for-itselves and fulfilling various lacks, could conceivably
achieve a state of self-causing repose. It may not be a
"realistic" project, but it is not the hopeless deadend of a
"useless passion."
4 . 5 Conclusion
In the next chapter I will delineate two poles that
represent the extremes of male and female positioning and the
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se ^ ^“Strategies correlated with these two poles. To do so I
will make use of the discussion of alternate self-strategies
of chapter three, as well as of insights gleaned from my
readings of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre. Here I will
draw some tentative conclusions from the readings of
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre given in this chapter.
Ki$ rkggflflr(j : We saw that for Silentio, subverting
Symbolic categories involves deferring to the desire of an
other. That means using a feminine self-strategy that values
satisfying the desire of an other over maintaining Symbolic
categories. A masculine self-strategy would sacrifice
connectedness for maintaining a self that was positioned in
the Symbolic.
Once we relate the universal to the Symbolic and the
position of Abraham to a female position that values
deferring to the desire of the other—being what that other
desires—over maintaining the Symbolic, we can go on to say
that such a priority can lead one to be "taken out of the
universal," and fill out what that means. Thus, we can see
how the female position can jeopardize one's standing in the
Symbolic order and therefore jeopardize one's identity.
Letting another's desire inform one can take one beyond the
universal without destroying one's identity if one receives
the desire of the other with faith that one will be returned
to the universal.
Nietzsche : While Kierkegaard doesn't address the
question of how one goes about changing Symbolic categories,
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Nietzsche does. Correlating Nietzsche's values and concepts
to the Symbolic, we can take the female position as one that
chooses to prioritize something other than those values and
concepts. Symbolic categories are created not through
attentiveness to the desire of an other, but through
receptiveness to subtle messages of the body. This relates
to the desire for body connectedness and responsiveness
discussed in chapter two as well as our discussion of
Irigaray's "sensation-ideas" in chapter three.
Sartre : Our reading of Sartre revealed a
characterization of a masculine self-strategy that is afraid
of losing its legitimacy. If he can't maintain a masculine
self-strategy with respect to woman, he will become what she
wants and so lose the ability to position himself. Unlike
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Sartre doesn't take up a female
position to either God or body-sensations. he needs to
impose categories upon the world. He thus can't see the
feminine self-strategy as a viable alternative, which means
that any break-down in the masculine self-strategy will lead
to a failure of identity.
NOTES[1]
Again, I am deliberately leaving the applicability
of my characterization of "masculine" and "feminine"
strategies open. I believe that Freudian and Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory is the best theory we have to explain
how selves are formed and maintained. This does not mean,
however, that it is "correct" in any universal sense of the
word. Just as feminists have taken issue with other
feminists for purporting to have the story about women's
experience (see chapter one, section 1.5), feminists have
taken issue with psychoanalysis for purporting to have the
story about how human beings become socialized persons
. Just
as purporting to have the story about 'woman' cancels out
important differences among women, so does purporting to have
fch.e story about self-constitution cancel out important
differences in self-constituting activity.
I believe that Freudian and Lacanian theory is an
important and effective tool in trying to understand the
constitution and maintenance of selves in patriarchal,
capitalist societies with some form of the nuclear family
(i.e., family positions that include a father, a mother, and
children) . but I do not want to close out the possibility
that it may work better for some cultures than others, some
time periods than other time periods, and that in some times
and places it may not work at all. I do not have space in
this work to investigate that possibility further, but I do
not think that possibility detracts from the appeal of
psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis was developed in Western
patriarchal, capitalist culture from the 19th century onward,
and despite any reservations I might have about proclaiming
anything approaching universal applicability before further
investigation, I feel it has received adequate confirmation
of its applicability in and by the culture that developed it
to warrant endorsing it.
Also see my footnote ([1]) on a similar point in chapter
three
.
[2] A "deconst ructive " reading is a reading that is in
the post-structuralist tradition, especially as exemplified
by Derrida. I use this term here because it speaks to a new
kind of interpretive strategy more in keeping with the
Lacanian view of the self as radically contingent and
"decentered" that I have been developing here. For more on
deconstruction and its influence on the interpretation of
texts, see Derrida (1978), Dews (1987), Felman (1982), Harari
(1979), Leitch (1983), Moi (1985), Silverman and Inde (1985),
Sturrock (1979) and Taylor (1987)
.
[3] Mark Taylor, in commenting on a paper I gave on the
Kierkegaard section of this chapter, said that the Lacanian
notion of 'woman' is inseparably bound to the Real and that
which eludes binary oppositions. To understand the Lacanian
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notion of 1 woman 1 we would thus need to think through the
Lacanian notion of the Real
. Woman as the Real is the
Goddess, the figure for what can't be figured, that which is
the condition of the possibility of sexual difference as
such, an other of a more radical sort than the other of a
male/female opposition—an other that is always already
excluded from the Symbolic order and yet always speaking
through that order. Taylor's comments on 'woman' lead him to
posit Kierkegaard's God as a Goddess; Kierkegaard's divine
Other is the maternal Other rather than the transcendent
father
.
As I mentioned in chapter two, footnote six, I have not
had the space in this work to do Lacan's notion of the Real
justice. Although I find Taylor's comments suggestive--
especially in light of the ambiguity of positioning with
respect to female and divine others that I will be exploring
in Fear and Trembling— I feel that they enhance rather than
challenge the interpretation of Fear and Trembling I give in
this chapter. To suggest, as Taylor suggested, that Lacan
and Kierkegaard are more interested in the moment of the Real
that is irreducibly other, a moment that can't be
domesticated in self /other relations, and to assert that the
Real is irreducibly other (as Taylor did)
,
speaks to the male
positioning of all three. Woman as the Real, as Goddess, as
irreducibly other—the maternal Other that is not oneself--
this is precisely the kind of opposition I am challenging in
positing both the possibility of connectedness between
embodied others as well as the possibility of generating new
meaning in the playspace of such connectedness.
[4] It is misleading to say decisions in Kierkegaard's
sense are made in the aesthetic sphere since the aesthete
prefers to reflect on possibilities, but Kierkegaard also
thinks that at this stage there is no actual self to take a
position up. See Taylor (1975, 128-130) .
[5] Discussions of the differences among the three
spheres, their interrelationships, and the positions taken up
by various Kierkegaardian pseudonyms, that I have found
useful in writing this section include: Dunning (1985),
Mackey (1971), Malantschuk (1971) and Taylor (1975).
[6] Thompson (1967) suggests that Kierkegaard in writing
his pseudonymous works was engaged in a form of self-therapy
designed to provide him relief from the misery of his life.
Others (e.g., Croxal 1956 and Taylor 1975) have emphasized
Kierkegaard's characterization of these works as a form of
"indirect communication" designed to enable the reader to
come to a subjective understanding of possibilities for
existence. Although Thompson's reading strikes me as a bit
crass (reducing Kierkegaard to a patient on the couch) , the
idea that Kierkegaard was engaged in his own process of self-
transformation in the act of writing, at the same time that
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he was encouraging his readers to engage in that process, is
in keeping with my claim that the production of meaning is
also a self-constituting process.
[7] Dunning claims Silentio's point of view is an
ethical interpretation of how the religious stage differs
from the ethical (1985, 124)
.
[8] For discussions/characterizations of the two
Kierkegaardian concepts, the 'universal' and the 'ethical'
that I have found useful, see Robert Perkins' "For Sanity's
Sake: Kant, Kierkegaard, and Father Abraham," Merold
Westphal's "Abraham and Hegel," Paul Holmer's "About Being
and Person: Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling . " and C. Stephen
Evans' "Is the Concept of an Absolute Duty toward God Morally
Unintelligible?" all in Perkins (1981)
.
[9] This reading of the ethical realm as involving duty
as well as communication is borne out in Fear and Trembling
by Silentio's emphasis on revealing oneself: "his [the single
individual's] ethical task is to work himself out of his
hiddenness and to become disclosed in the universal"
(Kierkegaard 1983, 82). See also David Wren's "Abraham's
Silence and the Logic of Faith" and Mark Taylor's "Sounds of
Silence," both in Perkins (1981) .
[10] See Lemaire (1977) for a discussion of Lacan's
'Symbolic' as a term referring to both a hierarchy of social
positions as well as symbolic/linguistic codes. Some have
argued against any such "facile" correlation. Since I am
arguing here that a social position is the function of taking
up a position as a grammatical subject within
symbolic/linguistic codes, however, I feel the correlation is
warranted
.
[11] The story of Abraham and Isaac is given in Genesis
22:1-18. Biblical comments on it include Hebrews 11:17-19
and James 2:21-23.
[12] For a historical discussion of some interpretations
of the Abraham/Isaac story preceding Kierkegaard's see Louis
Jacobs' "The Problem of the Akedah in Jewish Thought" and
David Pailin’s "Abraham and Isaac: A Hermeneutical Problem
Before Kierkegaard," both in Perkins (1981).
[13] The positioning of the beloved as the other in the
following discussion is not entirely unproblematic. I am
primarily interested in the analogy/disanalogy of
lover/beloved relationships with the Abraham/God
relationship. It is due to loving someone the lover cannot
have according to the strictures of the universal that he
feels the impulse to defy the universal, just as it is
Abraham's love for and desire to maintain connectedness with
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God, that lead Abraham to defy the universal. As we will
see, however, in the discussion of the sketch about the
lad/princess relationship, the lad as the knight of faith can
get the princess "by virtue of the absurd," just as Abraham
can get his son back "by virtue of the absurd." Here the
lover/beloved relationship is more in keeping with the
Abraham/Isaac relationship than the Abraham/God relationship.
That the only sketch Silentio gives which suggests any
possibility for consummation of a male/female relationship
involves the ambiguity of situating the beloved in the Isaac-
position rather than the God-position undermines that
possibility. Just as Abraham can't communicate his
connectedness with God to Isaac, the lad can't communicate
his connectedness with God to the princess. This leaves full
translation of their union into the universal an
impossibility
.
[14] On the terms of the theory of self I'm developing
here we could put this situation as follows: Given who he is
and who the princess is, connection between the two is
forbidden. The self/other patterning the lad uses to
maintain self-continuity doesn't allow him to have the
princess as an object that can satisfy his desire. For the
connectedness of satisfied desire, either the lad or the
princess would have to shift positions. Such a shift of
position would involve a rupture in identity that would defy
rational self-understanding. And yet, he loves the princess
as an embodied other in a way that defies all such
positioning
.
[15] Again, on my terms, we might put this thus: He
constitutes himself as a self that desires this other, the
princess . Instead of cancelling out his felt response to the
princess by denying his love, he chooses to remember her,
despite the disruption this causes his self/other patterning.
[16] On my terms: His self /other patterning vis a vis
embodied others remains the same, but he retains the self
created in contact with the princess by maintaining a
spiritual inner self distinct from the outer self that
navigates the universal of social positionality.
[17] Mark Taylor argues in "Sounds of Silence" (in
Perkins 1983) that while silence is a necessity in the
immediate moment of the aesthetic sphere and in the religious
sphere, the ethical person must speak: "The absence of
individual selfhood and the inability to use language
necessitate the silence of aesthetic immediacy .... The direct,
unmediated radically privatized individualized relation of
the believer to God cannot be conveyed in the universal
categories of thought and language" (p.186); "the ethicist
argues that a person is duty bound to speak, to come out of
concealment and to reveal publicly the ground of his deeds.
Silence is a moral transgression in which one refuses to
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express himself in terms of universality and clings to
particularity" (p.180).
[18] This point is made by Silentio's sketch of the
story of Agamemnon (Kierkegaard 1983, 87)
.
Agamemnon is a
"tragic hero" rather than a knight of faith because his
actions are readily intelligible to us. It was tragic he had
to sacrifice his daughter, Iphigenia. Killing her is not inkeeping with the ethical commitment to love one's daughter.
But since he did it due to the "higher" ethical consideration
of saving a whole city, we can accept his act as an act of
sacrifice
.
[19] For a discussion of the merman's four alternatives
in terms of silence see Taylor’s "Sounds of Silence," in
Perkins (1981)
.
[20] In my terms, such translation comes down to taking
up a position as a subject that is intelligible to oneself
and others
.
[21] Again, in my terms, the interests of an absolute
relation to the absolute would be the desire for the pleasure
of connectedness with an other that defies the possibilities
for positioning available to one in the Symbolic.
[22] As an aesthete the merman is engaged in poeticizing
the woman to be the other that will satisfy his lust. Her
innocence disarms him into wanting to make a commitment to
her. This takes him into the ethical sphere.
[23] C. Stephen Evans (1983) argues that the ethical
person committed to maintaining commitments and living up to
an ethical ideal is doomed to failure and thus doomed to feel
guilt for being unable to become what she's taken
responsibility for becoming. Such guilt pushes the ethical
person into the religious sphere due to the realization that
the only way toward salvation from sin (one's inevitable
failure to be all one could be) is through the grace of God
—
i.e., through recognition of one's dependence on an Other.
[24] As an aesthete, the merman has no self. He's at
the mercy of fleeting desires. His positioning is that of
one who attempts to avoid all positioning entirely. For
discussions of this kind of positioning of the aesthete in
terms of a failure to achieve selfhood, see Taylor (1974)
.
[25] Dunning (1985) demonstrates that self-development
from one sphere of existence to the next can be traced in the
pseudonymous works as a complicated dialectical development
of inner and outer natures and of self and other that
(ideally) ends up in the sphere of existence Kierkegaard
calls religiousness B. On his view, one's inner and outer
natures are furthest apart in the aesthetic and religious
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spheres of life, and are closest together in the ethical
sphere. Commentators on Kierkegaard have criticized him for
stressing the inwardness of religiousness B (the ultimate
goal of selfhood) in a way that renders any prospect for
community problematic. For example, Mackey comments: "the
existence of other men presents him [the religious man] not
with a public in which he is firmly set as a part sustained
by an organic whole, but only with further possibilit ies--
beckoning, tempting, or threatening—that he must take into
the gamut of his inner life.... His own inwardness is the only
reality .. .with which he is properly occupied" (1971, 190).
[26] This comes out most clearly in the Birth of Tragedy
(Nietzsche 1968b) where Nietzsche draws a distinction between
the Dionysian and the Apollonian. In this work he seems to
suggest that the Dionysian is the primal state of existence--
a state of pure undifferentiated flux ("...the
objectification of a Dionysian state ... represents ... the
shattering of the individual and his fusion with primal
being" (65); "...the primordial contradiction and primordial
pain in the heart of the primal unity .. .beyond and prior to
all phenomena" (55) )
.
It is therefore real in a way that the
Apollonian attempts to organize that flux are not: "For
Apollo wants to grant repose to individual beings precisely
by drawing boundaries between them and by again and again
calling these to mind as the most sacred laws of the world,
with his demands for self-knowledge and measure" (72) ;
"...the Apollinian tears man from his orgiastic self-
annihilation and blinds him to the universality of the
Dionysian process, deluding him to the belief that he is
seeing a single image of the world" (128) .
[27] With the renewed interest in Nietzsche there have
been updated readings that argue that Nietzsche went beyond
an Apollonian/Dionysian dichotomy. That is, although
Nietzsche, in his earliest work, The Birth of Tragedy , seems
to argue that "reality" is ultimately chaotic and anything we
say about it no more than a dream or illusion, his later
works go beyond even this appearance/reality split to assert
that there is nothing beyond appearances. Thus, people like
Nehemas (1985) and Megill (1985) argue that Nietzsche's
per spect i vism comes down to an aesthetic theory of truth.
Nietzsche associates Dionysian chaos with the
"feminine": "...by the mystical triumphant cry of Dionysus
the spell of individuation is broken, and the way lies open
to the Mothers of Being, to the innermost heart of things
.
From The Birth of Tragedy (1968b, 99-100)
.
Also see Kelly
Oliver's discussions of the "feminine" in Nietzsche (1984,
1988) . In keeping with my reading of the female position as
a position that attends to bodily sensations of the other in
order to satisfy the other's desire, I am taking Nietzsche s
concept of Dionysian chaos as life-experience . beyond the
generalizing scope of language. Thus, my notion of Dionysian
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chaos is not something beyond appearances, a reality out of
our reach. Rather, it is intrinsic to human experience.
Also see Jean Granier's "Nietzsche's Conception of Chaos" and
"Perspectivism and Interpretation," both in Allison (1985).
[28] See the section of "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-
Moral Sense" published in Nietzsche (1968a) and Hinman's
article on Nietzsche's view of metaphor. Hinman argues that
Nietzsche felt all concepts were metaphorical since no two
experiences are the same. Thus, Nietzsche breaks down the
distinction between literal and metaphorical language: "the
categories and concepts in terms of which we order experience
have no more epistemic justification than other metaphors,
except for the fact that we have forgotten their metaphorical
origins and let them harden into normative measures of
reality itself" (Hinman 1982, 189) . Also see Kofman (1972)
.
[29] "With a creative hand they reach for the future,
and all that is and has been becomes a means for them, an
instrument, a hammer. Their "knowing" is creaf i na . their
creating is a legislation, their will to truth is — will to
power " From Bevond Good and Evil . #211 (Nietzsche 1968b,
326) . Also see #260 of Beyond Good and Evil and "On the
Thousand and One Goals" in Thus Spoke Zarathustra .
[30] See Beyond Good and Evil . #246. Schutte comments:
"one might say that the self engaged in authentic
understanding of itself needs to have a fine ear for the
tunes that the body and the unconscious are playing in it and
for it" (1984, 46)
.
In a talk Kofman gave at a Nietzsche
conference (U. Mass., Amherst, spring, 1986) she referred to
Nietzsche's "third ear" as the intuitive ear of woman that
situates itself beyond metaphysical oppositions of truth and
error, good and bad, clarity and obscurity. See Lorraine et
al (1986)
.
Also see Derrida's discussion of Nietzsche's
"ear" in Otobiographies (1984)
.
[31] All quotes from Nietzsche in the text are from
Beyond Good and Evil (Nietzsche 1968b) . I will cite section
numbers from this work rather than page numbers from now on.
[32] For a discussion of the irrationality of the will
to power, see Alphonso Lingis ' "The Will to Power" in Allison
(1985)
.
[33] For discussion of Nietzsche's nihilism see Deleuze
(1983) and Maurice Blanchot's "The Limits of Experience:
Nihilism" and Eric Blondel's "Nietzsche: Life as Metaphor,"
both in Allison (1985).
[34] We could say that although Nietzsche doesn't
explicitly address the desire of an other in the text, the
speaking 'I' of his text subverts conventional language in
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order to attentively respond to the desire of his own Other.
That is, repetition of the same self/other pattern is
thwarted in order to attend to and attempt to reflect thebarely audible, barely intelligible signals of an Other not
yet incorporated into such patterning. This Other, being all
aspects of his experience not yet incorporated into his self-
system, is a bit more amorphous than Kierkegaard's God who atleast desires specific things of his creations.
[35] "Whatever makes them rule and triumph and shine, to
the awe and envy of their neighbors, that is to them the
high, the first, the measure, the meaning of all things."
From "On the Thousand and One Gaols" in Thus Spok^
Zarathustra (Nietzsche 1966, 58)
.
[36] "Your love of life shall be love of your highest
hope; and your highest hope shall be the highest thought of
life. Your highest thought, however, you should receive as a
command from me — and it is: man is something that shall be
overcome." From "On War and Warriors" in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra (Nietzsche 1966, 48)
.
[37] Schutte argues that there are two uses of the will-
to-power notion in Nietzsche: "In one case, power is used in
the sense of domination, whereas in the other it is used in
the sense of recurring energy" (1984, 76)
.
She relates the
former to Nietzsche's notion of the higher man of Bevond Good
and Evil who overcomes morality and the latter to the overman
of Thus Spoke Zarathustra who engages in the self-overcoming
of morality: "Self-overcoming involves the overcoming of the
Apollonian principle of individuation and drive to permanence
in favor of the greater reality of the Dionysian flow of
existence in which the boundaries between subject and object,
time and eternity disappear" (1984, 86)
.
Schutte feels that
Nietzsche's analysis of nihilism wasn't radical enough to get
him beyond the dualisms of strong versus weak, master versus
slave (p. 190)
.
She further claims that this failure
manifests itself in his depiction of love between the sexes
(the sex drive seen as an instinct of domination — p. 177)
and in his tendency to distrust the human need for community
(p. 180)
.
[38] For discussions of Nietzsche's "deconstruction" of
'woman' see Derrida (1979), Krell (1986) and Oliver (1984,
1988) .
[39] See Derrida's Spurs (1979) and Oliver’s rendition
of Derrida's position (1984)
.
[40] Of course, man, in his attempts to assume self-
sufficiency, must evade this feeling of lack through mastery.
It is woman, or Truth, that is dependent on him and his
mastery and not vice versa. It is he who possesses them. By
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mastering the both of them he will finally be the whole man
that he is supposed to be. Despite Nietzsche's
deconstruction" here of the notions of 'truth' and 'woman'
we will see that he is still drawn to the notions of mastery
and possession.
[41] "The "world," "essence" are themselves texts
written by a particular type of will. The idea of an
original music of the world is replaced by an original text
of which human texts function only as metaphors: all text
becomes correlated with an interpretation that constitutes a
determined sense, provisional, symptomatic of the domination
of the world and other types of life by a certain type of
life" (Kofman 1972, 121 — my translation)
. Also see
Kaufmann (1968) and Nehemas (1985)
.
[42] "In effect all construction is the expression of an
internal architecture, that is, a certain hierarchizat ion of
instincts, the subordination of a multiplicity of instincts
to the strongest instinct that thus serves as a provisional
center of perspective" (Kofman 1972, 90 — my translation)
.
[43] In Spurs (1979), Derrida refers to three kinds of
women in Nietzsche: "Woman, inasmuch as truth, is scepticism
and veiling dissimulation" (p . 57); "Feminism is nothing but
the operation of a woman who aspires to be like a
man .... Feminism too seeks to castrate .... Gone the style" (p.
65; and "In the instance of the third proposition ... woman is
recognized and affirmed as an affirmative power, a
dissimulatress
,
an artist, a dionysiac . . . . She affirms
herself, in and of herself, in man" (p. 97), and comments:
"He [Nietzsche] was, he dreaded this castrated woman. He
was, he dreaded this castrating woman. he was, he loved this
affirming woman" (p. 101) . Krell (1986) picked up on this
Derridean view of Nietzsche as the deconstructor of 'woman'
who moved beyond gender categories by taking up feminine
positions in his text. On this reading, Nietzsche's
misogynist comments refer to social constructions of 'woman'
rather than women themselves. This view is more
sophisticated than Kaufmann 's view (Kaufmann 1968) that we
can simply bracket Nietzsche's misogynist comments as
aberrations of Nietzsche's time. I am in agreement with
Oliver, however, when she says: "Nietzsche does not, as both
Derrida and Krell suggest, want to become woman" (1988, 28);
"rather, he desires to possess woman. Nietzsche's desire,
then, is not a feminine desire. It is not the desire of a
woman. Rather, it is a masculine desire (the desire to
possess through impregnation)" (1988, 25).
[44] The true, undissembled voice of Dionysian art
cries: ""Be as I am! Amid the ceaseless flux of phenomena I
am the eternally creative primordial mother, eternally
impelling to existence, eternally finding satisfaction in
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this change of phenomena!"" From Birth of Tragedy
r section 16(Nietzsche 1968b, 104). Oliver comments: "Nietzsche
repeatedly uses metaphors of biological reproduction— 'womb
of being', 'mother eternally pregnant', 'procreative life' —
to describe the Dionysian force. Nietzsche's Dionysian type
is . continually be reproducing. The biological metaphors
which Nietzsche uses to describe the will to power are
metaphors of reproduction, procreation, motherhood" (1988,
26) . Also see Eric Blondel's "Nietzsche: Life as Metaphor"
(in Allison 1985) for a discussion of Nietzsche's "central"
image of the "vita feminia ."
[45] See Kaufmann (1968)
.
[46] Deleuze refers to life-enhancing and life-denying
forces of life as becoming-active and becoming-reactive
forces: "Becoming-active is affirming and affirmative, just
as becoming-reactive is negating and nihilistic" (1983, 68)
.
Schutte, however, feels that Deleuze 's distinction "remains
conceptually tied to the old notion of the struggle for power
between the forces of good and evil" (1984, 90) . She
distinguishes two versions of Nietzsche's will to power: "The
Ubermensche who symbolizes "the ability of human beings to be
at one with the process of life and death without building up
walls and mental barriers against it. It is a Dionysian
symbol reminding one of the dynamic continuity of life" (p.
124) .
[47] "(T)here is a situation for consciousness to the
extent it views existent things in their totality and in
their relation ... to itself, arranging them as a world around
itself" (Jeanson 1980, 123) . Also see Warnock (1965, ch . 5) .
[48] For discussions of how one's fundamental choice of
being affects one's relationship to the world and others, see
Catalano (1980, 196-202), Hayim (1980, 50-58) and Jeanson
(1980, 180-187) .
[49] "(T)he For-itself is not a person, nor a substance,
nor a thing; it is merely revelation of the In-itself" (Desan
1954, 10)
.
I have been influenced by Catalano (1980, Part
Two), Desan (1954, 10-56) and Jeanson (1980, ch . 1-4) in my
rendering of the "For-itself."
[50] "Consciousness, in general, is a desire for
"things"; it is at all times aware of an object, with the
realization that it can never coincide with that thing which
it desires or with that which it is conscious of.... it is a
mere desire or lack. . ." (Hayim 1980, 12-15) . Also see
Catalano (1980, 103-106), Grene (1980, 126-136) and Warnock
(1965, 42-43) .
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[51] "What it [the For-itself] lacks is being, which
would make it a totality, a self, i.e., itself an In—
itself.
. . .The For— itself is a failure. A Being— for— it self
can never be a Being-in-it self without losing, ipso facto,
its most characteristic feature of consciousness [i.e.
freedom or nothingness]
. If such a being could be
hypostat ized, realizing this utopian identification of For-
itself and In-itself
,
it would be God" (Desan 1954, 32-33)
.
Also see Jeanson (1980, 140)
.
[52] (T) he phenomenon of being is being as revealed to
consciousness, encountered by it, while the being of
phenomenon [transphenomenal being] is apprehended by it as
the objectivity that inevitably overflows and grounds any
knowledge that consciousness has of it" (Jeanson 1980, 112)
.
Also see Catalano (1980, Introduction) and Grene (1980, 114-
119) .
[53] For discussions of Sartre’s notion of bad faith,
see Catalano (1980, 78-91), Hayim (1980, 24-26), Jeanson
(1980, 127-135) and Warnock (1965, 50-62)
.
[54] "Ontologically, the Other appears as an alien
freedom, as the upsurge of another subjectivity with its own
consciousness as well as with its own desire for a human
world" (Hayim 1980, 32) . Other commentators that have also
influenced my reading of Sartre's "other" are: Catalano
(1980, Part Three), Desan (1954, 65-95), Grene (1980, ch . 5),
Jeanson (1980, ch. 5) and Warnock (1965, ch. 3)
.
[55] Also see Desan (1954, 116).
[56] It's important to remember that I am restricting my
discussion to the Sartre of Being and Nothingness . Although
it would be interesting to compare this Sartre to the later
Sartre of say, the Critique of Dialectical Reason , especially
on this point, I will not do that here.
[57] For discussions of this trio (to do, to have, to
be), see Catalano (1980, Part Four), Desan (1954, 121-131)
and Hayim (1980, 61-63) .
[58] See Margery Collins and Christine Pierce's article
on the sexist nature of this discussion (Collins and Pierce
1979) . Also see Warnock's comments on the 'viscous' (her
translation of slimy) (1965, 99-107).
[59] As Desan puts it: "His extreme notion of freedom
needs a For-itself which is void, completely void. he thinks
that the slightest granule of being would provide something
for deterministic influence to take hold of and that the
freedom of his pure and translucid consciousness would
thereby be destroyed (1954, 158)
.
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[60] "...because it is not a fixed attribute with a
certain nature, consciousness as the for-itself is also
characterized by Sartre as nothingness . . . . Tn contrast to the
for-itself,
. . .the in-itself possesses no lack or
desire .... every act of consciousness is an instance of
negation, that is, of breaking away from the in-itself"
(Hayim 1980, 14-15) .
[61] "The Sartrean individual is utterly alone, wholly
responsible, making himself as the negation of a barren field
of being, in itself wholly devoid of meaning" (Grene 1983,
92) . Also see Hayim (1980, 17) .
[62] "It is ... inevitable that the nihilating power of
consciousness, unable to indefinitely sustain everything and
remain present to everything, will allow phenomena to be
reabsorbed one by one into the in-itself from which
consciousness had made them emerge for itself " (Jeanson 1980,
151) .
[63]
Many commentators have criticized Sartre's
conception of human freedom and his insistence on the radical
split between the for-itself and the in-itself (see, for
example, Desan 1954 and Grene 1983) . Judith Butler comments
on the repercussions of this dualist thinking in the context
of de Beauvoir's reading of 'woman' as 'other': "Women are
"Other" according to Beauvoir insofar as they are defined by
a masculine perspective which seeks to safeguard its own
disembodied status through identifying women generally with
the bodily sphere" (1986, 8); "...From this belief that the
body is Other, it is not a far leap to the conclusion that
others are their bodies, while the masculine "I" is a non-
corporeal soul .... Beauvoir ' s dialectic of self and Other
argues the limits of a Cartesian version of disembodied
freedom, and implicitly criticizes the model of autonomy
upheld by these masculine gender norms" (p.9)
.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
5 . 1 Introduction
This dissertation is a response to the puzzle of gender—
-what function do gender categories serve, and why is it such
^ tricky business to challenge their legitimacy? My goal in
writing this dissertation was twofold. First, I wanted to
develop a theoretical framework for addressing the puzzle of
gender. Second, I wanted to affirm philosophy as an activity
of human self-understanding that continues to provide
satisfying answers to current social dilemmas. Just as each
individual needs a self-identity that integrates the fullest
range of her experience, thus allowing flexibility without
sacrificing passionate commitment, responsibility, or
effective agency, so do we, as a world community, need a
self-identity that integrates the fullest range of human
experience without trivializing or cancelling out the
experiences of those who live on the "margin." [1]
I believe that the struggle of each and every individual
or larger collective for recognition is crucial to the
development of a new worldview. To avoid totalitarianism, no
one should give in until they're satisfied that the aspects
of their experience that would be liquidated by hegemony are
incorporated into the dominant discourse. [2] If we are
struggling for a new world-view--one that will nurture us as
a whole species, a world community, rather than blight us
with the disease of social categories that distort or cancel
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out the rich detail of human experience—no one must allow
their voice to be shut out. All must demand to be heard.
Philosophy has the task of providing individual and
collective struggles for recognition with a framework
flexible enough to incorporate new viewpoints without
bringing the whole edifice down, a world-view that will
respect multiplicity and allow new categories to multiply
without threatening to destroy any possibility of categories
at all—a framework that values and respects all life and
experience, rather than just the small range manifested by a
particular group of people.
This new vision is already coming to life as people
grapple with the contradictions facing us. The contradiction
I have attempted to address here is that of gender—why do we
persist in clinging to categories that attempt to box the
multi-faceted nature of human existence into two, mutually
exclusive, categories? Obviously any conception of man vs.
woman cannot possibly hold. Even if one restricts oneself to
human anatomy alone, hermaphrodites as well as other sexual
"anomalies" attest to the inadequacy of a two gender system.
[ 3 ]
In chapters two and three I developed a theoretical
framework from which to approach philosophical texts, using
Lacanian psychoanalysis and feminist critiques of
psychoanalysis. Lacanian theory brought out the contingent
nature of a self that is not a given, but a construct that
needs continual reconstitution via self/other relationships
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if it si to be maintained. A look at object relations theory
and feminist critiques of psychoanalysis brought out aspects
of this self that Lacanian analysis—due to its own male
bi-as overlooked. With the help of these psychoanalytic
theories and the background of a philosophical tradition that
places the self in a social context, I developed a
theoretical framework that delineated two different self-
strategies for creating and maintaining self-identity. By
exploring three versions of masculine self-strategies I have
underlined the ideal nature of "masculine” and "feminine".
Even as self-strategies the two poles of the male and female
positions are no more than abstractions from the myriad ways
self-strategies actually play themselves out in the
interconnecting field of human relations. By choosing to
look at philosophers I felt were pushing against the
boundaries of "masculine" self-strategies, I underlined the
possibility of collapsing male and female self-strategies
into one, more flexible, strategy that could reap the
advantages of both. [4]
I have argued that the philosophers I looked at could
not make this move to incorporate the two strategies due to
the conceptual barrier of their gender categories. I have
also suggested that there is a critical point for each and
every individual--a point of no return—when they are faced
with the dilemma of the collapse of gender categories, and
that this dilemma is not a trivial one. Until we take this
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dilemma seriously we will not be able to go beyond gender
categories
,
and we will not be able to resolve the current
power struggles that face us. Truly reciprocal relationships
require the abandonment of a rigid, mutually exclusive, two—
gender system. Although such reciprocal relationships may
require something approaching "androgyny, " I do not use that
term here for two reasons. One, despite my belief that we
need to move toward a "new" kind of subjectivity, one which
incorporates the two self-strategies without the conceptual
barrier of rigid gender categories, I want to avoid the
connotation that there should be a uniform self-strategy for
human subjects. It is not difference between men and women
that should be eradicated--but restrictions on differences in
self-strategies due to gender categories. Self-strategies
should evolve out of the context of a particular individual's
life experience in response to that individual's particular
problems in creating and maintaining subjectivity. As we saw
in my readings of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre, they
could not resolve certain problems due to their own reading
of gender categories . I am interested in what kind of
solutions we might find for such problems if we could get
past the gender categories that restrict us.
Two, "androgyny" is too easily read as effeminate
masculinity. That is, because the masculine self-st rategy is
the accepted "norm" for personhood in dominant Western
culture, any attempt to envision a new kind of human subject
tends to take this norm as its basis and throw in a few
287
feminine aspects for good niessure
. Before we csn
articulate what the incorporation of two self"Strategies in a
way that breaks the conceptual barrier of gender categories
m^-9ht entail, we need to be able to articulate and valorize
the "repressed" self-strategy--the feminine. [5]
In the third section of this chapter I will compare
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre (or, to be more precise,
Silentio, Nietzsche and Sartre) as representatives of
variations of a male position. In the fourth, I will explore
suggestions for a new kind of self-strategy I see emerging
from their texts. And in the fifth section I will discuss
further possibilities for the theoretical framework developed
here in light of philosophy as an enterprise and a feminist
project
.
5 . 2 Interpretive Framework
The interpretive framework I am developing here is a
restricted one. I have generated it using Lacanian
psychoanalysis, critiques of Lacanian psychoanalysis, and the
idealist tradition of Western continental 19th and 20th
century philosophers. Whether this framework could apply
cross-culturally is a question that I leave open. I am here
interested in seeing how these traditions can be brought to
bear on the question of gender in the context of
philosophical texts that are a part of this tradition.
My interpretive framework stands as follows: We can
characterize two poles that represent "pure" femaleness and
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"pure" maleness. That is, we can characterize two modes of
being that are so radically distinct from one another that
they are opposed and mutually exclusive in the strictest
sense of those words. No one could actually personify either
one of these poles. Briefly, we can characterize the two
poles as follows:
The female PQlg: The purely and eternally feminine is chaotic
flux. It is life in its concrete specificity— so concrete
that it escapes any and all attempts to characterize it via
general categories. The eternally feminine mode of being
takes each and every aspect of life as completely unique and
unrepeatable— so much so that the attempt to characterize
this mode of being in words immediately falsifies it. It is
beyond language, beyond all attempts to label, describe or
even point it out. Even to say that "each and every aspect
of life is unique" is false, since without names or any kind
of generalizations to help us distinguish one aspect of life
from another, all aspects flow into one another and there is
only an overwhelming chaos within which no distinctions can
be made and in which no selves or perspectives can
distinguish themselves. This pole can only be a limit
because a self at this position is a contradiction in terms.
There can be no purely feminine self since such a self would
be completely unable to distinguish itself from the life
around it. It would be dissolved into a chaotic flux of life
that pulsated along with no beginning, middle or end.
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The male pQle : The purely and eternally male is changeless,
eternal, harmonic order. It is a complete, self-sufficient,
completely rational, changeless map of the universe in which
everything and everyone has its unique place plotted out for
3-11 time. It contains all categories necessary for capturing
every nuance of life. It is the real rendered orderly. That
is, it is the real with everything in its proper place, the
proper order toward which the universe is striving, the only
order where absolutely everything and everyone has the place
that is in harmony with all other places. The harmony of the
whole where all of life is finally brought into harmony, all
things follow their appropriate course and nothing is in
conflict. It is life made perfect, rendered completely
intelligible and rational, where all connections are clear
and intelligible, and everything is connected to everything
else. It is completely characterizable via the perfect
language that reflects all the categories it has. Everything
has its boundaries and definable ways of relating to
everything else. Nothing is muddled, confused or blurred.
All is complete clarity and distinctness. This pole can only
be a limit because a self at this position is also a
contradiction in terms. There can be no purely masculine
self since such a self would be motionless. Being perfect,
it would not need to change. It would remain in a state of
suspension in the only place in which it truly belongs. All
would be known, desire would be sated, and all would remain
fixed in their positions with no need or desire to move, no
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lack to push them to reach for what they don't have. Thus,
no change, no movement, no life.
Having set up these two poles, we discovered that we
could characterize two self-strategies, each related to one
of which took one of these poles as its guiding ideal:
The female self-strategy : This self-strategy is based in
connectedness. The feminine self who makes predominant use
of the female self-strategy is a self who maintains self-
continuity by maintaining connectedness with others. She
must always be connected to an other who informs her, gives
her her meaning and her function, by demanding her to play
the role of other. That is, she takes on the shape that will
satisfy the desire of a self. She reflects back to this self
the image that self desires to see. She conforms to the
self/other pattern set by another. She conforms to this
self /other pattern by responding to that self's desire with
no self parameters of her own to hold her back. She becomes
whatever self will fit the form provided by the "other" of
the other's self/other pattern. She gives first priority to
connectedness, to the fusion experienced by fitting so
closely to the desire of an other that she feels that other's
desire as her how and so desires what the other desires--that
she be the "other" that will affirm the other's self. She
cares very little about the pattern of social positions laid
out by the Symbolic. Instead, her attention is completely on
the specificity of those others in her life whose "other" she
plays. She cares very little about the "rational" code for
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t ^3ns lat ing and. transposing a particular self-identity
through the positions of the Symbolic. She attends instead
to the concrete specificity of the particular individuals in
front of her in order to take on whatever shape they give
f this is within the socially acceptable parameters of
the Symbolic, fine. If not, she is perfectly content to
subvert those parameters. Her priority is satisfying the
concrete desire of a particular other for an "other" that
will satisfy that other's self /other pattern.
The male self-strategy : This self-strategy is based on
opposition. The male self who maintains himself with a male
self-strategy must always oppose himself to those around him.
He takes the self of a self/other pattern created in early
childhood, and he attempts to translate and transpose this
self through the social positions of the Symbolic by finding
others to play the "other" of his self/other pattern that
will repeatedly confirm and so maintain a recognizable form
of his original self. Unless the other is willing to conform
to his self/other pattern, he must establish a connection
with the other by using his self/other pattern as a guide to
staking out the Symbolic positions between them. He can thus
build up the layers of his identity to fit various situations
and social contexts by using the logic of the same—rules of
analogy and similarity--to translate his identity with the
help of the Symbolic categories available to him. Through
the various meaning structures at his disposal, he can find
the self/other pattern suitable for a situation he has never
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before encountered by ordering that situation via socially
acceptable categories and finding his appropriate position
vis a vis those categories. By finding others in the
situation that take the same positions vis a vis him that his
self/other pattern specifies, he can maintain self-identity,
even though specific people and events have changed. His
priority is the laying out of a clear self/other pattern via
clear categories that can be related to one another in an
orderly and "rational" fashion. Everything has a category, a
place within the Symbolic. This place could be found by
tracing out through rules of similarity and analogy, a
logical deduction of categories, the implications of one's
original self /other relationship. Any messiness must be
cleared up and properly categorized in order to allow the
transposition of self/other patterning through the network of
already established categories. Ordering of experience
through already established categories makes transposition
and translation easier by clearly labeling, clearly defining,
the boundaries of things. Then all one has to do is maneuver
through those positions via the transposition of one's
self /other pattern.
We have delineated these two self-strategies as extremes
approaching the limits set by the two poles. A self that
only used the female self-strategy would be a self that was
so pliable she would take on absolutely any form some other
in her vicinity desire of her. She would be so dependent on
others to determine her form for her that she would take on
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whatever shape was given her with no questions asked. A self
that only used the male self-strategy would be a self that so
rigidly adhered to his own fixed conception of himself that
he could never change, but would have to continually repeat
the same self /other pattern with no variation. He would thus
need an other who was very pliant, changing to fit his need
in whatever new situation presented itself, or he would need
a very stable external situation with rigid Symbolic
categories. As we have seen it is more likely that the
particular position between the poles taken up by an
individual would combine the two self-strategies in some form
or other. As we have also seen, there would be a critical
point for each individual, representing their own conception
of gender categories, that would be the point of "no return"
for these individuals when it came to incorporating any more
of the opposite-sex self-strategy than they already had.
Testing a particular text for this critical point has given
use useful insights into the conceptual barriers preventing
an author from making use of his own suggestions for getting
himself out of dilemmas he himself confronts . By analyzing a
text's category of 'woman', we have been able to suggest new
ways of getting beyond certain impasses of the text the
author couldn't due to his conception of gender categories.
Such an analysis suggests an internal critique of the gender
categories of the text. Reworking gender categories can
resolve problems presented by the text. The "deconstruction"
of gender categories a gender-sensitive reading of
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philosophical texts can provide could, in turn, have
ramifications in the broader realm of social relations
between men and women
.
5 . 3 Variations in a Male Position
The positions taken up between the two poles, with a
critical point different for each individual, mean that each
individual divides humanity into the two groups of "male" and
"female" a bit differently. It also means that many of those
individuals may divide the two groups up with a greater or
lesser overlap of the male and female characteristics that
both sexes can share without putting their gender into
question. But as long as there are gender categories there
will always be a point where a person of one sex cannot
manifest characteristics of the other sex. That is, there is
what I will call a "critical point" where if I, as a man,
say, were to go any further toward the female pole, I would
no longer be a man. The same is true for a woman, coming
from the female pole, and going towards the male pole.
I would further argue that this critical point has to do
with the need for two strategies that are complementary. A
purely "feminine" self would get lost in the broader realm of
social positions. Since her priority is connectedness with
an embodied other, she acts in responsiveness to another
rather than on the basis of social acceptability. To the
extent that she takes on a masculine self-strategy she can
position herself in a socially acceptable way. To be
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guaranteed a position in the broader social realm, she is to
a greater or lesser extent dependent upon a masculine self to
position her. In her responsiveness to this self she takes
on the role of other that will guarantee her a position in
the social realm.
A purely "masculine" self would lose the richness of his
embodied experience. Since his priority is positioning
himself vis a vis Symbolic categories, he orders his
experience via categories in accordance with the self/other
pattern that will maintain his identity. Like any theory
that refuses to respond to data it hasn't yet been able to
explain, such a self-strategy would soon lead to
falsification of one's experiences by reducing them to
inadequate categories. To incorporate new aspects of
experience into one's self /other pattern, however, one needs
a responsive other. It is only through the responsive
mirroring of an other that anticipates one's desire that as
yet meaningless bodily sensations can be incorporated into
one's self/other pattern.
Each individual has their own sense of when a strategy
would no longer be complementary and so threaten their own
selves with extinction. Depending on one's upbringing and
cultural background, this critical point would come at
various places between the two poles. Thus, the critical
point for each person would represent that point at which
they can no longer conceive of the kind of response necessary
for maintaining their self-identity, the point where their
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own strategies would fail because there would be no strategy
out there to complement it
.
As we have seen this critical point can take different
forms. Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Sartre all have different
conceptions of gender categories—that is, the critical
point, or conceptual barrier, past which they cannot push
incorporation of two self-strategies further, differs for the
three of them. I will now characterize the critical point
for each of them, relating that critical point to what we
learned about their particular category of 'woman.'
Kierkegaard : Kierkegaard could conceive of a woman taking a
female self-strategy with respect to a man. That is, he
could conceive of a woman being receptive enough to a man to
allow an experience beyond her conceptual categories to
occur. The princess waited for the knight of infinite
resignation or the knight of faith (depending on how it
turned out) to make up his mind about how to deal with the
unsuitability of their match. The bride waited in all
modesty for the groom that never came. Agnes was ready to
entrust her destiny to the merman. Sarah was ready to let
herself be saved by Tobias . All the women characterized by
Silentio in Fear and Trembling were either innocently
recept ive--wait ing for someone to take them by the hand--or
actively entrusting themselves to the judgment of another.
Thus, all these women were willing to receive another, to
entrust themselves to the judgment of another even though to
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them that other's reasoning may have seemed irrational
according to their own sense of the Symbolic
. Because they
were women, willing to take the female position with respect
to another, they put connectedness with another first. That
is, they were willing to override their own sense of the
Symbolic in order to satisfy the desire of the other.
The man who won this woman's trust, on the other hand,
had the weighty responsibility of respecting that trust by
keeping the woman within the bounds of the Symbolic.
Silentio's conception of 'woman' was of someone who utilized
a female self-strategy of surrendering herself to the form
given her by the "other" of another's self /other pattern, and
who took no responsibility for maintaining Symbolic order.
This, in turn, necessitated that the man take all
responsibility for maintaining Symbolic order. It was next
to impossible, and inconceivable as far as Silentio was
concerned, for a man to let go of his self /other pattern
enough to let himself be informed by the female's "other".
Since the responsibility of maintaining the Symbolic order
was his and his alone, and since overflowing his own
self/other pattern to receive another could subvert Symbolic
categories, he could not "indulge" in a female self-strategy.
And yet, Silentio felt the restriction of Symbolic
categories. He granted a kind of experience beyond all
categories, beyond the universal, within the context of a
God-relationship
.
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Silentio could more easily justify taking up the female
position with respect to God. That is, of conforming to
God's desire by playing the role of "other" in God's
se -^- f /other pattern. he could not, however, conceive of
taking up this role with respect to women. For someone in a
God-relationship, someone who attended to the will of God,
who had a faith in God that went beyond all Symbolic
categories, there were feelings and acts that went beyond the
Symbolic, beyond what could be communicated in language,
beyond the rational. Thus, man could take up a position of
innocent receptivity with respect to God, without forsaking
his role as upkeeper of the Symbolic order.
Social relations were protected from an exploration of
inwardness that included opening oneself up to the desire of
the other and letting it inform one. Silentio allowed the
possibility of individual transformation, but stopped short
of social transformation. The external demeanor of a knight
of faith remained the same, social categories remained the
same, the traditional male/female complements of self-
strategies remained the same. It was only in inwardness that
one could explore the possibility of breaking down
traditional ways of dividing the task of self and other that
maintain subjectivity. But the new kind of subjectivity
Silentio posited in the inwardness of the knight of faith
could not be translated into the outwardness of social
relations. The receptivity with respect to God that defied
.
all categories was a realm of inward experience that man
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would not introduce into the Symbolic. He would keep it to
himself, knowing that his actions could not be expressed via
any available categories. Man could take up a female
position with respect to God, just as woman could, but
Silentio could not conceive of man taking this position with
respect to woman or other men.
Silentio' s critical point, then, did not come in
positing a man in the female position. It came in
determining the "other" with respect to whom this position
could be posited. Silentio could not conceive of a man who
would risk subversion of Symbolic categories, because it was
the male sex that must preserve those categories. Since
women weren't responsible for maintaining the Symbolic order,
if men gave up that responsibility, then the Symbolic would
be threatened with dissolution and chaos would ensue. To
counter this possibility, man had to make sure that he did
not forsake his role. Silentio maintained the possibility of
getting beyond restricting Symbolic categories by positing
the possibility of a different kind of self-strategy carried
out in an inwardness that would not effect one's external
relations with the world. Thus, he could conceive of the
incorporation of the two self-strategies into one as long as
the Symbolic order itself could be kept safe from tampering.
Nietzsche : Nietzsche went further than either of the others
in questioning the boundary between the two self-strategies.
His free spirit could make use of both. But he still felt
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that different self-strategies had to be divided between
different groups of people. he recognized the importance
those with "feminine instincts" had for the "strong," but he
to see that if the "strong" were to incorporate two
self
-strategies into one, other individuals of the human
community would have to make corresponding changes.
Nietzsche s critical point comes in his failure to recognize
the interdependency of self-strategies
. The free spirit
should be able to impose his self/other patterning on others,
and yet challenge Symbolic categories by overflowing any and
all categories that do not respect the specificity of his own
experience. Thus, Nietzsche's free spirit would impose a
patterning that requires the support of the Symbolic, at the
same time that he should respect life's specificity in a way
that would subvert Symbolic categories
. he should create the
categories that speak to his own experience, but he should be
able to create these categories with no help from another.
Thus, Nietzsche overlooks the complementary nature of what
I've called "male" and "female" self-strategies in his
attempt to incorporate them. Silent io recognizes that an
attempt to subvert categories needs to be contained within
the context of a relationship. Nietzsche doesn't provide
this context, thus leaving him much more vulnerable to being
overwhelmed by chaotic flux.
Nietzsche's conception of 'woman' is that she should
stick to her feminine role so that man can perform his task
of incorporating the two self-strategies. But he fails to
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recognize that an incorporation of the two self-strategies
would require a change in the other that played another's
"other". Since human identity is created and maintained in
interdependent relationships, and since self-strategies must
be complementary, a change in one self-strategy necessitates
a change in the other. For Nietzsche's new vision of
subjectivity, of the free spirit, to work, all must change to
support this new kind of subjectivity in the complementary
and interdependent network of human relations. Nietzsche's
critical point comes in failing to recognize that the change
he envisions cannot be of one individual or an elite group of
individuals— it must be a whole community of individuals.
Thus, while Silentio's conception of a new kind of
subjectivity takes into account its relational nature,
Nietzsche's critical point leads him to believe that a new
kind of subjectivity can be imposed on others in the same way
that the old, male identity was.
Sartre : Sartre recognizes that there's no particular reason
that any particular group of people should take on one or the
other of the two self-strategies . But he could not conceive
of incorporating the two strategies. If there weren't a
group of people to play the other, if the distinction between
self and other was not complete, then identity, and human
agency, would fail completely. He could not tolerate any
overlapping of the two strategies, although the possibility
of such an overlap comes out in his work. His critical point
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comes in conceiving that a man could make use of a female
self-strategy. He concedes that others may refuse to don the
female self-strategy—but this only makes it harder and more
unlikely that one will find an "other" to fit one's own
se ^ f /other pattern. The task of being a man is thus harder
than ever, but it is still the same task. One can't count on
the Symbolic since it turns out not to be sanctioned the way
that one thought
. One cannot count on the Law of the Father
to preserve one's identity. If one is to preserve an
identity, one must continually impose one's self /other
pattern. With the legitimacy of the Symbolic in doubt, this
task is harder than ever, but at the very least one must make
sure that one doesn't become an "other" for another's
self /other pattern.
Thus, Sartre's critical point comes in taking on the
female position with respect to any other—be they God or
human. He shares Nietzsche's feeling that the Symbolic is
arbitrary, but rather than challenge it or subvert it in
light of one's own specificity, or in light of a God-
relationship, he focuses on the need to legitimate Symbolic
categories on one's own. One must take responsibility—there
is nothing else to appeal to, neither God, nor subtler
nuances of life. One must admit that all is arbitrary and
take responsibility for the categories one chooses to affirm
as being arbitrary. Unlike Silentio, Sartre doesn't feel
that man has a responsibility to maintain the Symbolic as it
is. He doesn't specify the conditions under which one is
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justified in subverting the Symbolic because he believes that
one is always recreating the Symbolic. Like Nietzsche, he
thinks the Symbolic is an arbitrary creation that has no
claim to legitimacy or authority. Unlike Nietzsche, he
doesn't think that there's anything beyond it to inform one.
If the Symbolic has no legitimacy, no authority, then nothing
does. There is nothing with respect to which one can take up
a female position of receptivity, nothing one can entrust
oneself to, in order to let oneself be informed by a new
shape that will give rise to new categories.
If the Symbolic has no legitimacy then there is nothing
to inform one and one is entirely on his own, to make sense
of an inert in-itself as best he can. Unlike Silentio,
Sartre doesn't think there's any other with respect to which
one can take on a female self-strategy. Unlike Nietzsche,
Sartre doesn't think there's any pulse of life waiting to
inform one. For any meaning at all to exist, one must create
one's own categories out of the nothingness of one's own
freedom. Thus, unlike Silentio, Sartre throws the Symbolic
into doubt, but refuses to take up a female position with
respect to anything else. He thus can conceive of the
failure of a male self-strategy, but he cannot conceive of an
opposing self-strategy with any efficacy.
All three show some awareness of the possibility of two
st rategies--that is, they all seem to be aware that the male
strategy is not the only one, that there is another strategy.
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their stance toward, that other strategy varies. All
three have varying critical points that constitute varying
conceptual boundaries in their ability to incorporate the two
self-strategies of the typically male and the typically
female into a new self-strategy. While Silentio will allow
the possibility of being informed by God's desire, and
Nietzsche allows the possibility of being informed by a will
to power beyond rational categories, Sartre will not allow
himself to be informed by anything at all. All three share
the refusal to be informed by a human other. The mark of the
male position that they all share is the refusal to take on
the "other " of a human other's self /other pattern. At the
same time, all three grant this as a mark of the female
position, of 'woman' as she appears in their texts. Tracing
out these three male positions has thus allowed us to arrive
at a critical point that they all share in common. In the
next section I will explore the possibilities that going
beyond this critical point may lead us to.
5 . 4 Suggestions for a New Subjectivity
Up to now we've thought of the two strategies as needing
to be performed by one or the other of the self /other dyad.
We are now ready to move to an incorporation of the two
positions into one. That is, up to now there has been what
I've called a "critical point"--a point where the individual
could not envision anymore overlap of the two strategies
without endangering the possibility of subjectivity entirely.
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There may have been a greater or lesser overlap of the
masculine and feminine, but finally each according to their
gender had to bear responsibility for one or the other of two
kinds of functions designed to maintain the identities of
both. If either the one or the other failed to carry out the
function they were responsible for then identity,
subjectivity, would fail. This would entail obliteration of
the worst sort for both parties.
In a relatively static society with rigid Symbolic
categories, an individual would assume an identity at birth
and keep that identity the rest of his life. For example, a
serf in feudal times would not have much opportunity for any
change in his identity. His identity would be staked out in
terms of his relationships to the people around him. These
relationships, being relatively static, would ensure a
relatively static self. For the breakdown of static social
relations to occur without a loss of stable subjectivity,
there must be a group of people willing to mirror back the
desire of those who would create new identities. For
example, a serf who typically thought of himself as
subservient and lacking in decision-making abilities would
need someone to reflect back to him his dawning desire to
fight back rather than submit to demands. A mother gives the
infant's initial attempts to reach out for something by
putting an object in his hand. She notes what he's reaching
for and anticipates a desire the infant may not have yet
recognized in himself. The women, or man, who picks up on
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the serf s impatience with his position and reflects back to
him an angry person with the power to act will be able to
affect the serf s subjectivity by allowing him to incorporate
new aspects of his experience (e.g., the tension of his body
which now signifies his anger to him) into his self/other
pattern. Thus a social position takes on new meaning in the
context of concrete relationships with others.
In our complex society there has been a proliferation of
symbolic structures. Mass media and cable TV, along with
accelerated methods of transportation, have created a clash
of all the symbolic structures various cultures have created.
If we could delineate a "central" network as the symbolic
structures representing Western hegemony, we could target
subsidiary networks from "deviant" walks of life as well as
"marginal" cultures all across the globe, that are being
incorporated into the "central" network and which incorporate
other symbolic structures into themselves as well. With this
complicated Symbolic, the positions one may take up with
respect to others have become much more diverse. While a
serf might need a concrete other to reflect back to him new
aspects of himself, a boy from a family of farmers might
choose to emulate Michael Keaton of "Family Ties" and get
involved with public TV. . Having been presented with this
option by the media, he has a new position available to him
that may be better suited to how he experiences himself in
concrete relationships than, say, trying to keep the family
farm afloat.
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With the proliferation of identity possibilities
supplied by a symbolic framework that has expanded to absorb
more and more of the vast range of human experience, we no
longer need to relegate women to the role of "other." As
long as there is a group of people prepared to play out an
extreme version of female subjectivity, there is a group of
people flexible enough to provide men with whatever "others"
they need. Such a group of people insures that a continuous
self-identity can be maintained even when new situations are
being confronted that exceed the current Symbolic categories.
As the globe becomes a world community and the Symbolic
allows an increasing diversity of positions, we no longer
need one group of people to supply this kind of cement. The
Symbolic structures have become complicated enough to allow
each individual to take on the positions that suit his
experience without needing a group of people that will
surrender their own self/other pattern to conform to that of
another's. Thus, both sexes could now assert themselves as
individuals, transposing themselves through the Symbolic,
without needing others flexible enough to sacrifice their own
positioning in order to nurture new identities. There are
enough paths laid out so that one can sort through the
various and conflicting Symbolic orders of various cultures
without getting lost, without needing an other to conform to
one. Thus, a new option is opened up--the possibility that
we could all learn to perform the role of other without
losing the role of self. We can all play the self because
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there's a complicated enough variety of Symbolic structures
available to us to fit a wide range of experience. This
allows more likelihood that two people with conflicting
experiences can find common ground in the Symbolic. We can
also play the other, without sacrificing our own self/other
pattern, because there are parameters that can open up
between two selves that allow such mingling. That is, there
is room in the overlap between the two selves for both to
play "other" to the other's self at the same time that the
other continues to confirm their own self /other pattern.
This creates a kind of play-space similar to what we looked
at in chapter two in our discussion of Winnicott
. Both
selves need confirmation of their social position and yet can
release new aspects of their experience in keeping with their
other's "other."
For example, I may be a white, male lawyer with an
office in New York City. My self/other pattern with a
subordinate requires that he give me a certain amount of
deference and so forth. If I could allow myself to play the
other's "other" in a way that prioritized concrete
connectedness rather than Symbolic categories, I might find
myself playfully engaging with the subordinate. Instead of
disqualifying any aspect of our interaction that didn't fit
my self/other pattern, I would allow my body to respond to
his body. I would then give these responses meaning by
attending to them and articulating them in one form or
another. For example, picking up on his body stiffening when
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I gave an order in a certain way, and modifying my order.
The same would hold true for the subordinate's engagement
with me. This kind of interaction occurs all the time of
course. The point here is that two modes of interacting can
be going on at the same time, with either one mode (the
masculine self-strategy ) or the other (the feminine self-
strategy) predominating. It's interesting to contemplate how
quickly the form of the lawyer/subordinate relationship would
change if both parties made predominate use of a feminine
self -st rategy
.
Gender-sensitive readings of philosophical texts can
help us explore and articulate how gender affects our world-
view and our ways of relating with human others.
Articulating the two strategies, valorizing both of them, and
demonstrating how they can come together into one strategy,
will help pave the way toward a new kind of subjectivity in
which both strategies can be used by all individuals.
I have tried to suggest how such an incorporation of the
two strategies might work. For reciprocal relations to work,
individuals must be able to use both strategies equally well.
They must be both responsive to the desire of the other, as
well as clear on their own parameters. They cannot let
themselves be taken over by the desire of the other, and they
cannot let themselves turn into dictators of the form the
other will take. [6] Instead, both must utilize both
strategies in an equal give and take. This give and take is
within the confines of the Symbolic in the sense that it
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makes use of the positions the symbolic makes available. It
also defies the Symbolic in the sense that it readily
subverts Symbolic categories, for example, those of status
(as we saw in the example on the previous page) or gender, in
order to create new categories in keeping with the concrete
specificity of the concrete relationship. But this new kind
relationship is not merely the imposition, transposition,
of the self-same identity of one onto an other; it is the
creation of two new identities in reciprocal responsiveness
to the desire of the other that gives them a new form within
the parameters of their identity as laid out by the Symbolic.
In the three philosophers I have looked at here I have
explored the possibilities for a new subjectivity presented
by each;
Kierkegaard : In his relationship to God, Silentio talks of a
receptivity to the incomprehensible desire of an other. If
Silentio could take this position with respect to a human
other without losing his own identity, he could stretch his
identity beyond "rational" standards, without losing his
identity entirely. Thus, what he says about a relationship
to God, I take as being instructive for a relationship with
another that doesn't take one outside of one's own
parameters. In addition to the male sense of self that
maintains its identity in a self/other context by imposing
its self and making the other conform to its desire for the
other that will sustain that sense of self, this new self-
maintaining human being will allow the same receptivity to an
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other that defies all "rational" meaning given to life and
one's own experiences as Silentio suggests that Abraham felt
in his acceptance of God's desire despite its apparent
irrationality. If every individual—whether male or female
—
could allow this "irrational" moment to creep into their own
project of maintaining self-identity, they could allow faith
in the other they were involved with to carry them through
that moment where the other was taking them beyond themselves
and what they had already worked out through the
transpositions of a male self-strategy, to a new moment where
things made sense in an entirely new perspective. That is,
they could take a "leap of faith" by trusting that in taking
on the role of "other" to another's self/other pattern, they
would not entirely forfeit their own position.
Nietzsche : Nietzsche suggests that we are not tied to any one
position in the Symbolic, but his taking on of the female
position doesn't have the parameters of Kierkegaard. Instead
of taking on the female position with respect to a particular
person, Nietzsche attempts to take on the female position
with respect to life. This is admirable. But it also makes
the danger of losing all and any identity much more
immediate. That is, Nietzsche has no answer to the question
of how to protect one's identity given that one has abdicated
from the male strategy in order to take on the female one.
If one were to attend to every nuance of one's embodied
experience, one's self and perspective would unravel.
Without some sort of parameters to guide one's attentiveness,
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the world would quickly lose its coherence. Attending to the
nuances of one's embodied experience in responsiveness to an
other in order to respond to the other's desire, is the
feminine self ~ strategy for providing such parameters.
] Kierkegaard protects himself from the loss of all
identity by speaking of dropping the male strategy only
within the context of a God-relat ionship
. Nietzsche tries to
adopt female relationships with respect to all life
experience, and yet insist that it is one's own personal
responsibility to yet maintain identity. Thus, he
complicates things for himself by refusing to admit that
identity is a contextual affair in which people have to take
on various roles if one is to continue as a person. He tries
to say that one individual can take on both strategies and
not have his identity fail rather than admitting that if his
vision is to work, both parties must take on both strategies
so that both can continue as identities working in a
reciprocal relationship. Instead he insists that woman
continue to play her role--even if it is an arbitrary one
—
and he insists that even though man should push toward the
female position, that he should be able to protect himself
from a loss of identity, not by insisting on a reciprocal
change in any other, but through sheer strength of will.
Sartre : Sartre suggests that the Symbolic order is not
sacrosanct, thereby breaking down the legitimacy of a
masculine self-strategy. Although he doesn't offer a
feminine self-strategy as an alternative, we can trace the
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struggle toward a new kind of subjectivity in the project of
becoming God. Sartre says that such a project is impossible,
but he is operating on the assumption that each individual
has the project of becoming God. No single individual can be
both in-itself—an object subject to the gaze of another—and
for-itself—the consciousness that gazes—at once. A
community of individuals could conceivably attain a state of
in - itself-for-itself if they could achieve reciprocal
relationships. If the self-strategies of the individuals of
the community perfectly complemented one another, then it is
possible the community could form a harmonious, self-
sufficient, self-causing whole.
The new self-strategy incorporating both female and male
self-strategies : This self would be based in both opposition
and connectedness as two moments in the whole of a dynamic
process of self-maintenance . A self that made equal use of
both strategies would be a self that would use the positions
laid out by the Symbolic as a vehicle for translating and
transposing its own self/other pattern to new situations and
contexts. it would also be a self that would be open to
being informed by the desire of an other within the
parameters set by an overlap of its self/other pattern with
the self/other pattern of the other. That is, it would
adhere to the form of its self/other pattern, but it would
also be flexible enough to overflow the boundaries of its own
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self/other pattern in order to conform to the "other" of a
/other pattern of someone of his or her choosing.
In the reciprocal relationship of a fusion-experience in
which both selves are able to take on a female self-strategy
with respect to one another, each will anticipate the desire
of the other in a mutual attempt to pleasure one another.
Thus, neither will dictate the exact shape the other should
conform to. Instead, the two selves will create a new
self /other pattern for both, by mutually conforming to the as
yet unarticulated desire of the other. That is, through
attentive receptivity to the concrete specificity of the
other that defies all categorization, each self will
anticipate the desire of the other and attempt to satisfy
that desire before it is voiced. In this mutual
attentiveness where each attempts to conform to the other's
"other," the parameters of both selves' self/other patterns
will change. The desire to satisfy the other will lead each
to overflow the self-boundaries set by their self/other
patterns in the Symbolic. But this overflow of self-identity
will remain within the parameters of taking on an "other"
that will satisfy another. The transformed self/other
pattern of each will also be continuous with their original
self/other pattern since that pattern was the context within
which the other attended to the self's desire.
For example, two colleagues may have very decided views
on their relationship vis a vis the other and the book they
want to write together. If both take on a female self-
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strategy with respect to the other, those views will swiftly
change. Rather than attempting to fit the other and the
project into one's self/other pattern, the individual will
attend to the pleasure of the other. Again, a playspace is
created in which both try to tune in to and anticipate the
desire of the other. In this state of reciprocal
attentiveness the project and their relationship to one
another take on a form that is different from either
individual's preconception of it. Thus, the self /other
pattern of both is transformed in the process of creation.
5 . 5 Philosophy and Feminism
The new self-strategy that I have just characterized
above came from a reading of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and
Sartre that took the possibility of two types of self-
strategy and their incorporation into one self-strategy
seriously. This possibility cannot arise until the male
self-strategy is no longer considered the ideal norm for any
and all self-strategies. In order to articulate a new kind
of self-strategy, one that utilizes the advantages of both
male and female strategies, we need to become aware that
there are two types of strategies, characterize the types and
the various forms the positions that fall under each type can
take, and articulate ways of incorporating the two more fully
into one. Thus far such a project has been hindered by the
assumption on the part of both male and female theorists that
the only "good" strategy--the only strategy that is a
316
strategy is the male, oppositional strategy. We will not be
able to formulate a new kind of subjectivity until we can
koth recognize and affirm the female self
—strategy as a
strategy that has, in its own right, solved the problems of
effective human agency. Both strategies have their
advantages and draw-backs. As we have seen, neither strategy
can work without the other
. But a further exploration of
both strategies as strategies rather than as givens about
human nature or "man" and "woman" needs to be made if we are
to go beyond both to a new mode of being, a new kind of
subjectivity that can create new possibilities for human
existence
.
I consider the interpretive framework that I have
sketched above to be tentative and contingent in the sense
that further use of it will inevitably change it. What I
would like to see is further investigation of the differences
between a male and female self-strategy, and further
speculation about how the two might be combined in such a way
that we could do away with the need for any gender categories
at all. There have been many interesting studies in recent
years about human nature and the self. The Frankfurt School,
post-structuralists such as Foucault and Derrida, have all
made provocative attempts at articulating the dialectical
nature of self/other relationships and self/society contexts
in order to enrich our understanding of human nature. But
none of these attempts has taken gender into account in a
systematic way.
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Unless feminist theory is taken seriously, and unless
the existence of two kinds of self
—strategies are taken
seriously each with their own valid perspective to offer—we
have no possibility of working beyond gender to a new kind of
subjectivity that could allow each and every individual to
make use of both self-strategies and so expand their
perceptions of the world. Until we can take female
experience as an aspect of life that is informed by a
perspective every bit as valid as the male perspective, we
will never be able to confront the impasses we currently face
and move beyond them. Not only must we grant "female"
experience as a different perspective on life, but we must
characterize what constitutes that difference in perspective
and we must incorporate that perspective into the new world-
view that we are all struggling to create.
I would like by interpretive framework to allow a
reading of all those who have investigated human self-
understanding in the Western idealist tradition, in a manner
that will bring gender to the fore. Most of the people who
have written on the subject have not directly addressed the
question of gender. They have written analyses that are
"gender-blind" in the sense that they have completely
excluded or ignored the female perspective by either
marginalizing it or putting it completely off-stage.
Feminist theory has, of course, tried to correct this
limitation. What I have tried to do in this dissertation is
to suggest an interpretive framework that would allow us to
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utilize the insights of these gender-blind analyses of human
nature and self by reading these very same gender-blind texts
in such a way that gender is brought to the fore. For the
purposes of this dissertation, this framework is restricted
to a specific philosophical tradition, although it is
possible it could have a wider application.
Even a gender-blind text is informed by gender. Every
theorist speaks from a position that is gender-informed,
speaks from a perspective that makes more or less use of
either a "masculine" or "feminine" self-strategy. Reading
these texts with such an interpretive framework in mind
highlights the gender categories at play in a particular
text. This, in turn, demonstrates the importance of these
categories as conceptual barriers to envisioning a new mode
of being for humanity—one that goes beyond gender
categories, that reaches beyond relations to others built
upon oppositions and domination, and instead strives for
relations built upon connectedness and cooperation.
Feminist theory is not relevant merely for the feminist
project of emancipating women from a role that has become
constricting and oppressive for women. It is also the key to
resolving the conflicts we all face, both men and women, in
our self-concept ions . We are moving to a new sense of self-
identity. Both men and women need to make full use of both
self-strategies to give full expression to the new kind of
human being that is currently emerging. Until men can get
over their gender-blindness, and until women can get over
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assuming that they must either become male to speak, or must
deny male" self-strategies in order to affirm themselves as
women [7], we will not be able to create the new self-image
we need to create a new kind of human community.
^®it.her sex can ignore the advantages of the other's
self-strategy. Both sexes must learn to incorporate the
advantages of the self-strategy of the other. We must
overcome our differences in order to affirm what both have to
°ffer to the other. Human identity always has and always
will be a product of a social and communal enterprise— no
single individual can form and maintain an identity without
the help and support of the others around her. For women to
be emancipated, both men and women need to change. For men
to deal with the crisis in values and meaning that currently
faces them, both men and women need to change. We need to
recognize and affirm the interdependence of us all, and the
need we all have for both male and female strategies in order
to maintain human identity. Only then will we be able to
transform a practice of maintaining human identity that has
divided two tasks between two sexes into a practice that can
incorporate those two tasks into a dual task that can be
performed by all in reciprocal relationships based in mutual
trust and respect.
A gender-sensitive reading of philosophical texts can do
several things for us:
1) It can help us further articulate the interdependent
nature of human identity. Once we've put the self into
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context
,
positing it as one moment in the whole of a
self/world relation rather than isolating it from the world
in which and by which it constitutes itself, we can further
elaborate that context by investigating the other kinds of
selves a self needs in order to continue in a particular
form. Once we start seeing how various kinds of selves
constitute one another in a community of interlocking human
^® Ist ions
,
we can better understand what kind of contextual
transformation would be needed to effect particular kinds of
individual changes. In particular, we could better
understand the way current gender categories work in
preserving both male and female selves and so envision a
transformation of gender categories that would respect the
way in which gender categories play off of one another.
2) It can help us further articulate the interdependent
nature of various perspectives on reality. The "masculine"
worldview, as represented in the dominant discourse of the
Western tradition, would not be possible without its
"underside"—the unarticulated feminine position that
supports the masculine worldview. If we all actually
subscribed to the masculine view that fullfledged personhood
consists of autonomous thought and action that asserts its
mastery over everyone and everything around it, human society
would soon fall apart . "Masculine" persons can only maintain
this view as long as there are silent, feminine others to
submit to playing the roles necessary for maintaining this
illusion. Without the feminine prioritizing of human
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connectedness, the masculine prioritizing of human opposition
would have left them so alienated from themselves and other
people that they would no longer be able to function as
members of a society.
3) It can demonstrate the importance of feminist theory to
both men and women without invalidating the achievements of
the masculine perspective. Just as the feminine perspective
has been crucial to the development of the masculine
perspective and self-identity, so is the masculine
perspective crucial to the development of the feminine
perspective and self-identity. Without the Symbolic
structures put into place by masculine self-strategies, the
feminine perspective could not be articulated. It is thus
not a matter of male against female or vice versa, but of two
kinds of perspectives, each of which enabled the other one to
exist
.
Given my account of human identity as the product of an
interlocking network of self-strategies, and given the role
human identity has to play in the constitution of a
particular world-view, a better understanding of gender is
crucial to human self-understanding as well as an
understanding of how we shape the reality we attempt to
describe. Philosophers who have any interest in a deeper
self-understanding or a deeper understanding of the way our
self-understanding enters into our understanding of the world
we live in, can therefore not afford to marginalize gender
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issues. We can no longer afford to assume that understanding
the experience of a particular group of people can give us
the whole picture. Not only are the experiences of the rest
of humanity crucial for an understanding of the human race as
a whole they are crucial to the understanding of the
masculine perspective as well. Feminist theory not only
allows women the opportunity to theorize about their
particular perspective on the world and human affairs, it
also allows men the opportunity to better understand what
informs their own perspective.
In addition to what I have called the "female"
perspective, we could distinguish other alternate
perspectives that form the background to the dominant
discourse. The "marginal" perspectives that aren't
incorporated into the current hegemony of the current
dominant discourse takes many different forms. Gender is one
way of approaching the interdependency of various
perspectives. Additional categories for characterizing the
different perspectives are those of race or class. It seems
to me that gender is one of the key entrypoints into an
exploration of the interdependency of various perspectives
because it is the one perspective that counters the dominant
masculine discourse that each and every one of us experiences
from birth on. Gender difference is a key part of all human
identity from our earliest childhood. [8] As we grow up we
learn to marginalize various parts of our identity--we learn
what aspects of our experience finds expression in the
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dominant discourse and what aspects are marginalized
according to various other categories such as race, class,
geographical region, or other "deviancies" (being
handicapped, or whatever)
. To create a self that is
acceptable in all walks of life, we constitute ourselves
according to the social categories that apply most
universally. We learn to restrict other aspects of our
identity to the social contexts where it is accepted—our
Particular geographical region, or a particular group of
people. Trying to introduce these identities created in
smaller, more marginal, contexts creates the tension that
introduction of a "marginal" identity into the hegemony of
the dominant discourse of a culture always creates.
Gender is a focal point for a particularly interesting
way that certain self-identities have been marginalized.
Female self-strategies constitute roughly one half of the
population, and yet they are still considered "marginal"
according to the dominant discourse. Feminist theory that
attempts to characterize and valorize female self-strategies
is still considered marginal in academic departments all
across the country. Female academics have learned to
marginalize their female experience, just as male academics
have. To have a voice in the dominant discourse as given
expression by the academic community, one must marginalize
the female aspects of one's experience and speak with a male
voice
.
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It is only if we articulate the female perspective, as
well as the male perspective that we will be able to explore
ways of changing both perspectives by bringing the two closer
together. Both perspectives capture aspects of human
experience. The question is, do we want the two perspectives
divided between two groups of people, or do we want an
entirely new perspective that can be shared by all. When I
say a "new perspective" I don't mean the perspective of a
God's eye view that finally captures all of human experience.
If such a view is possible, it is too far in the future for
me to envision. What I do mean, is a perspective that can
see all perspectives as interdependent and mutually
af fect ing--and that can valorize all the different
perspectives that go into the whole perspective of a human
community as equally valid. [9] A philosophy that takes
gender and gender issues seriously has the task of providing
a theoretical framework in which various perspectives can be
seen as mutually supporting and mutually enriching. Thus,
instead of valorizing any one perspective as the "correct"
view of human experience, we will have a perspective for
seeing how various perspectives not only fill out the picture
of reality, but also make other perspectives possible.
The self-strategies I have laid out here and
characterized as either "male" or "female" could take many
different forms depending on culture, race, class, and other
factors that may enter into one's particular identity. [10]
Gender is an important place to start in investigating the
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interconnectedness of all perspectives and how they interact,
because it is a crucial feature of everyone ' s original
creation of a self in connectedness with and individuation
from a same-sex or opposite—sex other. We need a perspective
that can hold multiple perspectives together, giving a
theoretical framework in which their interdependence and
their interconnectedness can be explored. Masculine
identity, being oppositional in nature, opposes itself to a
female other. It may oppose itself to other groups of human
beings as well, depending on its race, class, etc., but its
most fundamental opposition is to a female other. [11] Thus,
gender is a key entry point for commencing an exploration of
philosophical texts as the creation of a perspective that is
dependent upon the background of another perspective. To
better understand the way human perspectives play off other
human perspectives, gender-sensitive analyses are crucial to
the philosophical enterprise of theorizing the human
condition
.
NOTES
[1] For discussions of the problem of difference in a
feminist context see, for example, Bulkin, Pratt and Smith
(1984), Hooks (1984) and Spelman (1982). This problem has
been of on-going concern in the women's movement due to the
difficulty of forming a collective identity as "women."
Women come from different races, ethnic groups, and economic
backgrounds. These differences may often seem more striking
than the shared identity of one's gender. Feminist theory
has taken on the challenge of being sensitive to these
differences at the same time that it still attempts to
provide a comprehensive theory. My remarks in this chapter
are informed by this discussion.
[2] It is on this point that I'm very sympathetic to
post-structuralists like Foucault and Derrida who carry on a
continual practice of deconstruction. I do, however, feel
that there is at least possibility of achieving a new world-
view more satisfying than the present one—even if such a
world-view would be quickly outmoded. I am thinking of a
world-view here along the lines of a group-identity
constructed by myriad individuals, just as a self is
constructed from myriad fragments of embodied experience.
[3] See Dworkin (1974) and Frye (1983)
.
[4] Although I chose three male writers since my
particular interest here is the limitations of male
positioning, I certainly think female writers can exemplify
male positioning. In addition, how gender categories impact
on the self-constituting activity of women and just what
might constitute a "woman" writer (or a writer beyond gender
categories?) are both interesting questions that I would like
to explore in the future
.
[5] I am influenced here by Janice Raymond's discussion
of problems with the concept of 'androgyny' for feminism in
The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She~Male (1979, ch
.
VI) .
[6] For a discussion of problems due to the "ego-
permeable-boundaries" of the female gender see Flax (1978)
.
[7] The French trend of l'ecriture feminine explores
some of the problems of a purely feminine voice. See
Eisenstein and Jardine (1980), Marks (1978), Marks and de
Courtivron (1980) and Moi (1985) .
[8] I am thus, for the purposes of my project,
emphasizing gender as an identity category. For a discussion
of what identity categories (e.g., race, class, gender) have
priority that challenges this view, see Elizabeth Spelman
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(1985) . her view brings up for my project the interesting
question of how other kinds of identity categories affect
self-strategies. Such question, however, are beyond the
scope of this work.
[9] This is a Hegelian view in the sense that I'm
assuming a sort of "coming together" of perspective along the
lines of absolute spirit. Any self-respecting post-modern,
Post-structuralist would turn over in her grave! I here
admit a yearning for this kind of ultimate closure, at the
same time that I accept deconstructing practices as more
feasible for a day-to-day understanding of human experience.
[10] I have argued that there are many positions in a
spectrum of positions between the poles of "male" and
"female" that an individual could take; thus, for example,
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre are representative of three
variations in male positioning. The possibility that such
positioning could be affected by factors such as race, class
or ethnicity, is a fascinating one, but I don't have the time
to pursue it here. To bring up this possibility and do it
full justice would complicate my project to the point of
absurdity. Rather than taking this as an indication that the
kind of exploration of gender categories I propose here is
futile, however, I take this as a further indication of the
possibility of getting beyond gender categories entirely.
See my discussion of this point with respect to the feminist
concern for differences among women in chapter one, section
1.5.
[11]
Again, that the opposition of male and female is
the most fundamental opposition is subject to debate both in
and outside of feminist circles. Although I am advocating
gender as an important category of analysis, it is not
crucial to my project that it be accepted as the most
fundamental identity category.
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